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THE BUCERIUS SUMMER SCHOOL ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 2016

BUCERIUS SUMMER SCHOOL ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Conference Report

Between World Orders: Managing Fragmentation and Institutional Competition

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1 Executive Summary

The summer of 2016 feels like living in an in-between world: The "old" order of the post-Cold War years – dominated by globalisation and American superpower – is crumbling, and the contours of a new order – marked by backlashes against globalisation and the emergence of multiple powers – are already visible, though not yet established. Quite possibly, in historical terms, it will be the whole period after the fall of the Wall that will be regarded as an in-between era: between the bipolar system after World War II and the (most likely) multipolar system of the future.

However, with crises in abundance from rising inequality to terrorism and from migration to military conflict it is already hard to see the underlying trends of the global shifts around us. Add to this that the current state of the world has already lasted for about a generation, it is quite a powerful foil against which possible future challenges are measured.

Yet this is precisely what the participants of the 2016 Bucerius Summer School ventured to do during two intensive weeks of discussions and deliberations in Hamburg, Berlin, and Paderborn. 59 young women and men, coming from all corners of the globe and spanning the worlds of politics, business, civil society, academia, and the military, explored the state of global governance today and debated their own proposals for improvement. This report presents the essence of their debates, each session summarised by one rapporteur. In the executive summary, I try to put these meetings into perspective, though without possibly doing justice to the richness of the discussions among the participants.

The old world order that seems to be coming to an end is marked by the failure of "governed globalisation". After decades of successfully steering a process of growing interconnectedness, international organisation in particular have reached the limits of their policy-making abilities. "Gridlock" is the consequence, where both a self-reinforcing interdependence and a growing multipolarity make it impossible for international actors to offer solutions. (Needless to say that nation states are no longer in a position to deal with global problems anyway.)

One example discussed was the issue of Internet governance and cyber diplomacy: Here, a "multi-stakeholder approach" would be needed to address the problems arising from issues such as cyber warfare, infrastructure vulnerability, and personal privacy. However, getting representatives of business, the technology community, academia, and civil society as well as governments (in particular the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China) all sit around a table and agree on common solutions is very optimistic.

In addition to requiring a great number of actors to agree, today's challenges are often (at least perceived as) harder problems than before. Take the Middle East, in which a "counter-revolution" of autocratic forces has done away with the prospects of good governance and a stable security architecture entertained after the 2011 Arabellion. The persistence of some problems cannot even be explained by a lack of political will, i.e. blaming the Americans for disengaging, the Europeans for looking away, and the Arabs for simply not getting their act together. The Israeli-Palestine conflict has, due to its intractability, over time morphed into a conflict in which the

"two state" solution – long considered common sense – might give way to a "three state" scenario in which the Palestinian territories are divided between Egypt and Jordan, both abutting Israel.

Most obviously, it is the civil-war-turned-regional-war in Syria with its myriad of actors and interests that symbolises the helplessness not just of international organisations but also of individual states. Linked to this conflict is another example for how hard today's problems are: the refugee and migration question. Not only do the two often get confused in public discourse, but they are also both linked to other phenomena such as terrorism and Islamophobia, regional conflicts, extreme poverty, authoritarian regimes, and even climate change.

Part of the blame lies with international organisations themselves and the institutional inertia they have displayed. The persistent lack of (serious, fundamental) reform of the United Nations (UN) system is just one of the more prominent examples. Founded in the wake of two world wars, the UN structures today still reflect the balance of power of 1945. Given the increased number of political players as well as the new types of global challenges, there's an urgent need for adequate institutional adjustment. Appointing a woman as the next UN Secretary-General would certainly be only a fairly small – though more than symbolic – change, but even that is hard to achieve, as the discussions have shown.

Finally, a fourth contributing element to global gridlock is fragmentation, both internationally and within societies. The recent economic and financial crisis has exposed high degrees of inequality around the world, diminishing the glue between both peoples and states. Again, the recent *Brexit* vote in the United Kingdom (UK) to leave the EU is part of a struggle between the nation state and intergovernmental or supranational structures. Some observed that both globalization and deglobalization appear to have the same root, i.e. they both are a reaction to technological progress. In that sense, radicalisation should be seen rather as a manifestation than a source of the existing fragmentation of our societies.

While "gridlock" is an apt description of how a previously functioning system has ground to a halt, there are also forces that actively reject the existing order. The (revived) competition between Russia and "the West" is one example, in which Moscow is seen to break with the post-Cold War era of *Pax Americana*, i.e. a non-inclusive, unilaterally controlled world order. Others saw two types of exceptionalism at play: a Russian one does not accept anyone's leadership, and an American one that does not accept anyone as equal.

More broadly, the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – stand for an opposing approach, even though it's not yet clear which "new order" these five very different states could agree on. Admittedly, they came together partly out of frustration over the difficulty of the established institutions to adapt to the increased importance of (emerging or emerged) powers. In particular, many regard this 'minilateral' cooperation as a mutual reinsurance against the (economic and political) dominance of the United States. However, at least with regard to China, it was said that it is, ultimately, willing to work with status quo: neither is it interested in a fully fragmented world, nor is it ready to be a global geopolitical leader itself. More generally, the BRICS were thought to be very inward looking, showing little interest in contributing to global governance.

Certainly, however, China and its BRICS partners see a lot of double standards at work when Americans – and sometimes their European allies – seem to take rules (and their exceptions) for granted but are loth to grant such flexibility to other non-Western powers. The leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran, an emerging regional hegemon torn between isolation, confrontation, and accommodation, would certainly agree.

In ideological and religious terms rather than based on political or economic power, radical Islam and extremism also pose a counter-movement to the established order. Some felt that radical Islam is a response to the decline of power among Muslim-dominated countries, which has strengthened a revivalist current that aims to return to the roots of Islam and destroy the West. Unsurprisingly, radical Islam and Islamophobia were said to feed on one another

Finally, there is also resistance to the established order within countries of the West, i.e. the anti-establishment or populist movements that have gained traction over the past years. Whether the *Brexiteers* in Britain, the *Front National* in France, or Donald Trump in the US – these movements are the symptoms of a new illiberalism threatening Western democracies from within. Their programs and rhetoric are anti-globalisation and anti-international cooperation, and they are likely to stay even if they do not win power in the upcoming elections this year and next.

So there is inherent gridlock and there are forces that work against the current system – but what is the nature of the current crisis? Some argued that crisis is the "new normal", something we had better get used to. Whether terrorism – be it from the so-called Islamic State (IS), Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, or others – or the wars in Ukraine and Syria; whether a crisis like the Ebola epidemic or political upheavals like the *Brexit* vote; whether the territorial disputes in the South China Sea or the on-going political, economic, and refugee crisis in the Middle East; all these individual crises are inter-linked and here to stay.

Others argued that crisis is indeed *not* normal, as it – very literally – implies a deviation from the norm. Rather than just "managing" (or not) the multitude of crises, policy-makers should aim to address the root causes of those conflicts and look for radical solutions. These would usually involved answering difficult questions of justice and fairness, which makes this route a strenuous and long process – part of the reason why few people have embarked on it. Some even ventured whether fear, not crises, is the real issue: Is fear being brokered for political or business interest, they asked.

Next is the question of how a "new world order" (i.e. newer than the one declared by President Bush senior in 1990) could evolve from the current "world disorder". The above-mentioned BRICS states, without formally making a joint proposal, lobby for the establishment of a rules-based order that provides equality and representation of all powers – themselves included foremost. In practice, however, they seem to oscillate between conforming or reforming, bypassing or recreating the current structures. Which led to the broader question whether emerging powers – defined as having both material capacity (e.g. economic and military power, large population and financial clout) and a functional niche in the international system – should play by existing rules or influence the setting of new ones?

Europe, rather than being a shaper of the world order to come, is another manifestation of transient order, with fragmentation and institutional competition appearing within the EU, too. Given the supranational, sometimes "post-national" nature of the European project, it was argued that the EU simply is not used to survive in a Hobbesian world, whereas other (nation) states are. Similarly, Germany as one of the core – and possibly currently the most crucial – member states is learning to adjust to a new European and global environment. Faced with high expectations from the international community and internal calls for 'restraint', German foreign and security policy finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Its apparent failure to lead the EU in its response to the current migration flows – after it could steer the union through both the Greek debt and the Russia-Ukraine crises – makes it unlikely it can rally all member states around a new vision for Europe in the aftermath of Brexit.

One "European quality", however, could be instructive for how to overcome global gridlock: It's ability to change incrementally. In fact, some argued that the solution to such gridlock is to make a virtue out of global fragmentation and multipolarity and look for small-scale solutions that bring together the necessary actors.

Prudence and time are needed in the case of the war in Ukraine, and strategic modesty with regard to the conflicts of the Middle East. Fighting extremism requires personal agency as much as an understanding of the multi-faceted and interconnected challenges. Any solution thus necessitates engaging with local communities to promote cohesion and critical thinking as well as to focusing on economic rejuvenation, community capacity building, and service delivery. Likewise, one way to "take back democracy" in Western countries is through deliberative polls that produce sane, smart, and stable outcomes drawing on a small set of randomly selected citizens.

Speaking of new world(order)s, science fiction can help to explore alternative scenarios as a means to better understand our own world in new ways. Whether as movies or in literature, such stories help to shake up people and make them rethink their current path. And while digital learning promises to give students some control over the time, place, path and/or pace of their learning, experts also point to the importance of interpersonal interaction to teach certain skills such as critical thinking and leadership.

This is precisely what the Bucerius Summer School tried to do during the 16th installment of its annual gathering in the Free and Hanseatic City. Certainly, the young generation understands that it is them who have to not only live in, but also shape a new world order emerging. In times like these, there is no "normal" to refer to. Instead, it is time to think bold about what could become normal in the future.

Berlin, September 2016

2   Session reports

2.1   Beyond Gridlock in Global Politics

Speaker: *David Held*, Master, University College Durham, Durham

Rapporteur: *Julia Münch*, Germany

Session 1:   Monday, August 15

David Held gave his assessment of gridlock in global politics and at the same time argued that this standstill could be overcome. The post-WWII world order has reached a point where global cooperation has become increasingly difficult. Global policy-making by international organisations is at its limits, even though international cooperation is needed more than ever given the multitude of today's conflicts. Luckily, there are ways to bypass global gridlock in order to achieve incremental change in solving global problems.

The post-WWII era brought about a relatively stable period of economic prosperity and peace which can be attributed to 'governed globalization' dominating the world order for decades. However, this world order also initiated a cycle of self-reinforcing interdependence, which has halted our ability to larger global cooperation. The "old" world order has ground into gridlock.

Gridlock as an unintended consequence of global cooperation can be explained by four underlying reasons

1. Growing multipolarity: the bipolar world order has transformed into a multipolar system with more and more countries having diverse interests to be considered when negotiating global policies;

2. Harder problems: The problems to solve by the international community have become much harder to solve. Problems cutting across the interests of a multitude of states – as in the case of climate change – require almost all nations to consent to a deal;

3. Institutional inertia: Most international organisations were not designed to grow organically, allowing institutions to respond and adapt to a shift in global power and interest representation. Therefore their architecture for most parts still represents the distribution of powers of the post-war era;

4. Fragmentation: The post-WWII institutions are increasingly faced with a diffusion of authority by the emergence of other international organisations leading to a more complex – and much harder to coordinate – system of global cooperation.

On a more positive note, a thorough analysis of global cooperation shows that some parts of global policy-making – despite involving a multitude of actors such as nation-states, international organisations etc. – manage to circumvent gridlock. Such exceptions are usually small steps that can indeed be taken incrementally to progress in global policy-making. These exceptions, however, can have very different underlying dynamics.

Examples to overcome gridlock are for instance civil society actors and governments building a coalition to jointly drive change in a concerted manner. This was the case with the landmine treaty in the 1990s being pushed from bottom-up by civil society

and subsequently formalized by governments. Another pathway to circumvent grid-lock is when actors gather around a common set of norms and principles and are therefore able to progress and cooperate even in the absence of one decisive international organization.

The subsequent discussion in the plenary raised a multitude of current issues related to global cooperation, the role of the classic (sometimes "Western"-dominated) organisations such as the United Nations or the European Union, but also new brokers facilitating gridlock such as NGOs or other non-state actors.

The discussion furthermore concluded that the Western world is regarded as having passed its peak of power in global cooperation and its dominance in writing the rules of world economy. Western hegemony – which has been dominating the world order over the last 300 years – seems to be over, as global politics have become more multipolar, competitive and complex than ever before.

To overcome gridlock, David Held advocated during the discussion to make a virtue out of fragmentation and multipolarity. Advocating for a common purpose, such as in preparation for and during the Paris climate agreement in 2015, it does get possible to find a common solution for a global policy, despite increasing pluralism in the world order.

2.2 Global Security Challenges: Crisis as the New Normal

Speakers: *Hans-Lothar Domröse*, Former General, Federal Armed Forces, Oldenburg
Maya Malkani, Deputy Director for North & West Europe, Department of Defence, Washington, D.C.
Cameron Munter, President and CEO, EastWest Institute, New York
Eva-Maria Nag, Executive Editor, Global Policy, Durham

Rapporteur: *Kelechi Udeozor*, Nigeria

Session 2:   Monday, August 15

The plethora of global crises discussed ranged from terrorism–ISIS, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and others–to the Russia-Ukraine conflict to Ebola to political upheavals like the *Brexit* vote to the on-going refugee crisis in the Middle East and Europe. Speakers maintained that the longevity of these challenges as much as the magnitude and high frequency of several incidents make the current situation worrisome and a cause for global concern. In the discussion, three differing viewpoints emerged: Crisis is the new normal; crisis is not normal; and fear rather than crisis is the issue.

Paraphrasing a quote by one of the discussants, one can say that no political problem has ever been completely solved. Instead, one moves on to the next problem according to one's priorities. Following this argument, today's crises have been simmering for a long time, be they in the Middle East or in Russia-Ukraine. However, they received little or no attention as world governance focused on other topics perceived to be more important. The fact that the 70-years-old Israeli-Palestinian dispute was absent from the topics discussed seems to support this viewpoint.

In that sense, an acceptance that "crisis is the new normal" may be dawning upon us. This could imply an increase in – and strengthening of – the use of hard power as opposed to soft power instruments. Particularly striking is a sudden agreement of democratic governments with autocratic leaderships to broker peace agreements while sometimes turning a blind eye to human right violations (as a precondition for a deal to emerge). While this route might bring some pseudo-peace to a war-torn region, it would also mean to let global values erode.

A different viewpoint refuted the position that crisis is a new normal by stressing that, etymologically, crisis implies a deviation from the normal. Arguing along this line, crisis was mentioned to stem from unresolved structural issues within and outside countries, which have their roots in questions of justice and fairness. Crises are always a result of groups of people rejecting a suppression of their right to be heard or to receive justice, or simply a rejection of a particular leadership or influence. Accepting that crisis is indeed *not* normal would lead us to look for radical solutions. This, in turn, would include confronting the real issues, i.e. addressing the root causes of a conflict and finding lasting solutions to it. This viewpoint, however, would be unpopular because it necessitates a strenuous and long process.

A third and completely different perspective saw fear as the underlying consequence of the global security challenge. Crisis coming from several sources in seemingly unmanageable volumes, helped or amplified by the plethora of media available,

breeds fear. This raises the following questions: Is fear being brokered for political or business interest? More so, is there a fear of the West losing relevance and control in a world where other nations are growing in importance and the West can no longer completely control the world as it used to? Is globalisation seen as the major cause undermining Western clout, and is nationalism therefore a response to this? Consequently, are we not creating more monsters by peddling fear?

It is clear, however, that some elements that did exist between actors in the post-cold war era – such as mutual respect – no longer exist today. Involved parties used to respect an agreement and the other party could be counted on to be rational. The absence of such respect therefore amplifies the perception of the crisis situation. We are clearly in between world orders: the eruption of several crises globally could be a rejection of a world order that is not inclusive, a world order controlled by a unilateral power. It seems that exercising dominance to prevent a crisis only results in more crises. This calls for a change in how the world is run. Still, some fundamental questions arise: Who wants this change? Are interest groups profiting from the world crisis? Who should lead the change? And whose values should be upheld?

2.3   Unresolved Issues: Europe, Ukraine and Russia

Speakers: *Ian Lesser*, Senior Director, Foreign and Security Policy; Executive Director, Transatlantic Center, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Brussels
Orysia Lutsevych, Manager, Ukraine Forum, Chatham House, London
Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow.

Rapporteur: *Ieva Baubinaitė*, Lithuania

Session 3:   Tuesday, August 16

The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 2014 and the on-going military conflict in Eastern Ukraine both reflect the tectonic movements in the current world order caused by competitive relations between Russia and the West. Caught in the middle of this, the European Union oscillates between failure and successful conflict management in Ukraine.

Some time ago, academics, NGOs and other civil society actors raised the idea that there could be cooperation between Russia and the West. The current situation on the world's chessboard, however, has dramatically changed. What is more, the West lacks a clear understanding of how serious the situation is, as it is tempted to simplify the explanation of a recent situation in Ukraine. That's why a deeper look at the situation is needed.

First of all, the nature of the conflict must be understood. The crisis in and around Ukraine is a symptom of Russia's break with the post-Cold War era and the time of Pax Americana – this comparatively peaceful decade of United States dominance. Currently, we face a situation where two types of exceptionalism meet: Russian exceptionalism that does not accept anyone's leadership, and American exceptionalism that does not accept anyone as equal. This indicates existential challenges for both the West and Russia (not to forget – a nuclear power), which will not be solved in a short period of time.

What is more, the rivalry does not mean the repetition of the Cold War era as some have tried to define it. The current confrontation has a different setting and operates in a more complicated environment. There are a number of reasons for this: trust and respect between major players are lost; decisions and actions often come unexpectedly; strategic understanding has decreased, making it problematic to decode what actions can be stabilizing or destabilizing. This creates an obscure environment for all players in the international community.

As for European Union in the context of the conflict in Ukraine, its primary task is to contain the war. This means, first and foremost, to ensure basic communication between the major sides of the conflict, as direct contact between Kiev and Moscow has broken down. That is why the "Normandy format" – the contact group of France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine – was created, in which the four parties accorded the Minsk agreement.

While "Minsk" is the only show in town, the implementation of this agreement is debatable. Dmitri Trenin argued that it would never be fulfilled, because "it works for Russia, but not Ukraine". Its full implementation would give Russia a virtual veto over Ukraine's potential joining of NATO someday: The agreement contains a provision

regarding Ukraine's constitutional reform, which could and would result in more autonomy for separatist-held (i.e. Russia-controlled) regions. This is not in the interest of Kiev. There is also a financial aspect: regaining the separatist territories means investments into the restoration of the Donbass region, which would be painful for Ukraine and unwanted by its elite, but in the interest of Russia. At the same time, the non-implementation of the Minsk agreement would mean a failure of Europe as a peace broker.

In this regard, any solution of the Ukraine issue demands time. In the context of a changing world order, it will need prudence as well.

2.4   Debating current issues in the Near and Middle East

Speakers: *Netta Ahituv*, Senior Correspondent and Editor, *Haaretz*, Tel Aviv
Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Associate Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Ayham Kamel, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia Group, London

Rapporteur: *Rocco Polin*, Italy

Session 4:   Tuesday August 16

The Near and Middle East remains in a situation of deep crisis. Despite the on-going "counter-revolution" of autocratic forces, the root causes of the 2010/11 uprisings have not been addressed. Still, contemplating a return to the *status quo ante* would be a dangerous illusion. In addition, geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia continues to fuel instability and civil wars, and no solution is in sight for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Against this backdrop, discussions focused on the possible role of the international community and on the lessons to be learned from its past failures. Should we aim to intervene more effectively (and sometimes more decisively) or should we rather adopt greater "strategic modesty" and abstain from new dangerous interventions?

Following the "failure" of the Arabellion, a "counter-revolution" seems to be underway in most of the Arab world. Any attempt to go back to the *status quo ante* is however bound to fail. The socio-economic roots of the 2010/11 uprisings have not been addressed; the Arab world still has to find a solution to the problem of good governance; and the region is in dire need of a new and stable security architecture. Revolutionary processes might take decades to fully unfold, but autocratic stability remains an illusion and a recipe for future instability.

The strategic rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has become a defining feature of regional geopolitics. Yet the role of religion and of the Sunni-Shia divide should not be over-emphasized. Small Gulf States have grown increasingly independent from Saudi Arabia but (with the exception of Oman) do not trust Iran. The West needs to learn how to navigate its difficult triangular relationship with both Iran and Saudi Arabia, avoiding to further fuelling Saudi "strategic jealousy" (as it happened during the nuclear negotiations). The rapprochement between Israel and Sunni powers in the face of a perceived Iranian threat could lead to the revamping of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and open new spaces for the role of the EU in the Mediterranean. The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, however, is still fragile, especially as it has not yet delivered the expected economic benefits to Iran. In this context, a resurgence of the populist right in Tehran is a dangerous possibility.

In Israel, the growing influence of the nationalistic and religious right risks undermining the secular and liberal foundation of Israeli democracy. The commitment of the current government to the two-state solution is dubious at best. Still, if pushed by the right mix of external incentives, a right-wing government could be best positioned to deliver peace ("only Nixon could go to China"). Economic pressure by the international community could have an important effect in changing Israel's incentive structure.

The record of the West in the Near and Middle East in the last ten to 15 years is abysmal. Whether western powers intervened military, as they did in different ways in Iraq and Libya, or abstained from doing so, as it has been the case in Syria, the results have been invariably disastrous. The lessons to be drawn are however not self-evident, although the respect of international law should be an important guiding principle for future actions.

On one hand the negative record of the past calls for greater "strategic modesty". Given its limited understanding of complex local dynamics and the high likelihood of making things worse, the international community should above all avoid new ill-conceived interventions (*"do no harm"*). On the other hand, given the weakness of regional actors, it is hard to see how solutions can be found without some form of external support. Furthermore, calls for local actors to solve their problems by themselves sound quite hypocritical in light of Europe's long history of colonization and interference. While the United States is likely to continue to gradually disengage from the region, Europe is gravely affected by the consequences of regional instability (e.g. migration, terrorism) and cannot afford to do so.

2.5   Breakout Session: Israel and Palestine

Speaker: *Netta Ahituv*, Senior Correspondent and Editor, *Haaretz*, Tel Aviv

Rapporteur: *Marko Savkovic*, Serbia

Session 5:   Tuesday, August 16

The breakout session included a short introduction from Netta Ahituv and two kick-off presentations by fellow participants, including an overview of the most important events in Israeli-Palestinian relations. One statement was particularly strong: "The State of Israel today is a result of failed colonialisation policy and a number of promises made by colonial powers that were later not kept".

The relations between Israel and Palestine have been conflictual and violent for decades. By some counts, five conventional wars and three so-called intifadas have taken place until today, with the 2008, 2012, and 2014 Israeli incursions into Palestinian territories as the latest response. Several international attempts at mediation and resolution have been made, often unsuccessfully, of which the 1979 Camp David and the 1993 Oslo accords are the most prominent – and still fragile – examples. Until today, the occupied territories (often referred to as "disputed areas" by the Israeli government) remain contested.

As principal stakeholders, the speakers identified the member states of the Arab League, the United States, Turkey, and Iran. They also illustrated how some of the stakeholders have changed their respective position and policy over time, such as Iran after the Islamic Revolution. Potential solutions so far have included the "one state" and "two state" scenarios, the latter being the preferred option of an important part of international community. However, there is also a lesser known "three state" solution, which would mean to divide, in effect, the Palestinian territories between Egypt and Jordan, with Israel between them.

Two differing views were offered as to why there is still no solution to the conflict: Either a lack of willingness, because the problem is not in "the West's" focus given that there is no immediate threat to Europe and the United States; or a lack of power, given that there is no institution that can force parties to put an end to the conflict (certainly including the United Nations). One speaker argued that it was useless to simply call parties in conflict to resume talks when this approach clearly did not work.

In fact, both parties seemed unwilling to abide by the two-state solution: In Israel, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu got elected for promising this would never happen; in Palestine, mediators face, on the one hand, groups resorting to terrorism, and on the other, a corrupted elite that has no interest in changing the status quo. Moreover, the leader of the Palestinian Autonomy (PA) has serious legitimacy issues, meaning he would not be willing to pay the "price of peace". Therefore, calls for new or renewed negotiations present the perfect cover-up for maintaining the status quo.

With regard to building plausible alternatives to the corrupted elites of the PA, participants agreed that more time would be needed for these to emerge. In the meantime, however, donors should stop propping up the existing elite. The EU and the wider international community interested in resolving the crisis should prepare for the "post-Abbas" time, coming to terms with the fact that legitimacy in that society comes from violence, or continued violent confrontation with Israel.

One leader in particular – Marwan Barghouti – currently looks like the most likely candidate to succeed Prime Minister Abbas. However, he was sentenced to years in prison in Israel, so his "case" should be approached with great care. If Barghouti were to be released for no apparent reason, the "Palestinian street" – the highly influential and volatile public opinion in Gaza and the West Bank – would smell foul play of Israel trying to determine the next leader of the PA.

At the same time, many Israelis continue to perceive international organizations as inherently anti-Semitic. Israel remains a very diverse society, it was argued; with little consensus among the many constituencies on how to proceed as a society. Independent media reporting is under increasing pressure. The country is sliding towards right-wing populism. On the positive side, Israel currently experiences a rise in population and relative sense of safety, probably for the first time in history. All this is happening while 20% of Israeli population, being of Arab (i.e. mostly Palestinian) ethnicity and holding 15 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, believe that they are being treated as "second grade" citizens.

Some concluded that Israel remained in a "security trap" of sorts: Thinking in terms of security alone would lead to the conclusion that the problem is not in oneself, but only in the other group. In particular if violence and hate are inherited, these are passed on to the next generation through a certain worldview of the other.

Participants thus recognized many obstacles to implementing the two-state solution. First and foremost, borders are mixed or intertwined, with numerous settlements making demarcation very difficult. Second, more people are turning to religion. All parties to the conflict see the other side as the one truly responsible for the gridlock and the violence. Finally, there is little or no incentive to find a solution.

The breakout session resulted in the following, somewhat radical, proposals, which are based on two premises: On one hand, it is necessary to change the PA from within; on the other, one has to put pressure on Israel to see the consequences of ignoring the international community. In that sense, the international community should stop calling the two sides to the table and instead focus, in particular through the EU's relations with and support for both sides, on each one individually. Even then, no breakthrough should be expected over the next ten years.

The EU should threaten to pull out of the PA if the latter fails to engage and take steps proving its commitment to the peace process. This could well lead to cut-off its funding, reduce its presence on the ground, and withdraw from the Quartet. The first step in this direction would be the decision to stop paying the PA salaries and pensions, amounting to 240 million Euros per year.

The EU should also consistently apply the so-called differentiation policy, targeting illegal Israeli settlements. This would mean that all goods coming from beyond the 1967 border could not be imported to the EU under Israel's preferential treatment. In addition, Israeli citizens coming from the occupied areas would need a visa to travel to Europe. Likewise, workers would not receive their pension if they retired to a settlement. Finally, access to EU initiatives such as Horizon 2020 would not be granted.

In more general terms, the EU should support civil society organisations in a well thought-through way, so that they do not become "Trojan horses" in the eyes of Israel's public opinion.

2.6 Breakout Session: Syria

Speaker: *Ayham Kamel*, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia Group, London

Rapporteur: *Ana Valle Padilla*, Spain

Session 6:   Tuesday, August 16

The Syrian conflict is at the same time a civil war and a regional war where regional powers aim for hegemony. Many actors are involved in the war, with different supporters and different motivations. Although the defeat of the so-called Islamic State (IS) is the declared aim of most of these actors, it appears not to be a priority. This makes a political solution ever more difficult.

The Syrian war cannot be understood without its history. The country was occupied first by the Ottomans for 400 years and then by the French, creating different areas for different ethnic groups. Syria became independent in 1946, followed by a number of military coups. In 2000, Bashar al-Assad became the president. He is an Alawite in a country with a Sunni majority that feels to have no representation. In 2011, his government cracked down on widespread social and political protests.

The Syrian conflict is at the same time a civil war and a regional war, where multiple actors are involved: The Anti-IS Coalition, IS itself, the Kurds, rebel forces, and the regular Syrian Army, backed by Russia, Iran, Hezbollah, and various Shiite groups from Iran. Besides, the motivation of each group diverges notably: The Syrian Army aspires to keep the president in power. Russia aims at protecting its strategic interests in East Mediterranean by supporting the regime and fighting IS. Iran supports the regime, as she wants a Sunni dominated region where she could be a hegemonic power, and Hezbollah supports the government because its existence depends on it. On the other hand, rebel groups forming the Free Syrian Army want to bring the regime down, while the Syrian Kurds (YPG) aim for autonomy of the territory they inhabit. IS fights for the creation of a caliphate. Finally, the anti-IS Coalition and NATO aim at fighting terrorism and empowering local moderate forces.

So IS is the problem everyone else wants to defeat, but this fight is not a priority for all. Besides, as it is a local war with foreign supporters, regional powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia keep the war going.

Most conflicts that last for a long time usually end with the military victory of one of the parties. In recent months, the battles have become more intense, especially around Aleppo, where Russia is helping President Assad to retake the second biggest city in the country. At the same time, Russia is aware that the United States is not as involved in the war as it is itself. So the battles are becoming more intense in order to take advantage on the ground and to delay the UN-sponsored peace talks.

Against this scenario, the group discussed different solutions in order to find a balance among the three main Syrian actors involved – the government, the opposition, and the Kurds – coming up with three political options:

1. Let Russia support President Assad, which means that the West would not undermine the regime ("Let Russia do its work").

2. Enforce negotiations towards a federal state in which power is shared among the government, the rebel groups, and the Kurdish population.

3. Partition the state into three separate political units, each being under control of the regime, the rebels, and the Kurds, respectively.

The group supported the first option as the most realistic and pragmatic one. Options two and three rely on each government's respect for minorities (highly unlikely) and are prone to create more tensions in the region (fairly likely). That's why the group ended up with the first as the "least bad" option.

2.7   Breakout Session: Iran

Speaker: *Ali Fathollah-Nejad*

Rapporteur: *Merin Abbass*, Iraq & Germany

Session 7:   Tuesday, August 16

The breakout session on Iran dealt with the political situation within the country and its impact on the foreign policy decisions taken by leadership of the Islamic Republic.

The discussion started with an overview of the Iranian society and state, beginning with the Revolution in 1979 and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, a Shia Muslim religious scholar, revolutionary, and politician. He was the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the leader of the 1979 Iranian Revolution that saw the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran. Khomeini was the first to politicize Shia ideology in Iran, and this ideology has been used until now as a political instrument for decision-making on domestic and external affairs.

The weaknesses of the opposition in the beginning of the 1980s and the Iraq-Iran war from 1980-1988 contributed to the stabilization of the Khomeini regime in Iran. Regionally, the new Iranian republic received backing from Syrian president Hafid Al-Assad and Libyan president Muammar Gaddafi. This explains today's close relation between Iran and the current Syrian leadership: Iran still shows loyalty to the Syrian regime under Al-Assad's successor and son, Bashar Al-Assad, due to this early support.

Under the Khomeini regime, the role of the regular military decreased. Due to a general mistrust of the military (which used to support the Shah), the Supreme Leader founded the Revolutionary Guards to protect the regime and its ideology. The group also discussed the important economic role of the Guards, as they are heavily involved in business activities, controlling most of the Iranian companies.

With the death of Khomeini in 1989, the situation changed slightly when Hashemi Rafsanjani became president and Ayatollah Khamenei the new Supreme Leader. Still, the main political actors in Iran – the so-called radicalists (or fundamentalists), the centrists (or pragmatists), and the reformists – all focused on the same objectives, i.e. to maintain the regime. However, the fact that these actors ignored important development issues within the society paved the way for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He became President in 2005 with the support of the poor, as he addressed the social topics dear to the people. In addition to his populist policies, President Ahmadinejad garnered support by opposing the Western countries, which worsened the relations between Iran and the West.

After the election of President Rouhani in 2013 and in the face of a conflict-ridden Middle Eastern and North African region – the Arab revolution, the war in Syria, and the rise of the Islamic State – the international community made another attempt to resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. The Iranian nuclear deal of 2015 thus was the result of a new politics of international "rapprochement". Although the agreement led to concerns expressed by the governments of Israel and Saudi Arabia, it can be seen as a first step to improve the relations between Iran and the West.

Iran is becoming more and more a regional power in the Middle East, and its own aspirations to regional hegemony are evident. It might not shape the global order but it has already shaped the regional order in the Middle East and is now is a key player for solving or managing several conflicts such as the wars in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Thus, improving relations with an emerging regional power is essential in order not to lose control over the region. The nuclear deal is a good start to resume the dialogue with Iran that was suspended after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

2.8 Cohesion versus Populism: The Future of the European Union after the Brexit

Speakers: *Cornelius Adebahr*, Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.
Almut Möller, Head of Berlin Office and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Oana Popescu, Director, Global Focus Centre, Bucharest
Brendan Simms, Professor of the History of International Relations, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge

Rapporteur: *Jan Willms*, Germany

Session 8: Monday, August 15

The discussion focused on two main points. First, the group debated the question of whether the EU's primary purpose was still to contain Germany. While some argued that the only real solution to this "German problem" was a full political union, others felt that political union of all members was not realistic. Instead they favoured – point number two – a model of flexible (or differentiated) integration. This, however, also poses risks such as the loss of cohesion of the EU and a lack of trust in its institutions. These two points reflected that not only the current world order is transient but that fragmentation and institutional competition have to be managed within the EU, too.

Taking a historical and geopolitical perspective, one speaker argued that the EU was designed to deal with two problems: the German and the European one. The "German problem" relates to the size and strength of Germany, not so much its behaviour. The "European problem" is the weakness of the other European states vis-à-vis Germany (as well as the Soviet Union and Russia), creating a need for containment. In order to resolve the "German problem", the EU was founded (and NATO for the powerful Eastern neighbour). Later, the majority of the EU's member states decided to introduce the euro as a currency, thereby decommissioning Germany's so-called "nuclear weapon", i.e. the Deutschmark.

Conversely, this speaker held that the EU was not designed to deal with the "British problem". British history shows that the UK is not a threat to Europe but that it regularly faced threats from Europe. The answer to these threats from Europe was the union between England and Scotland established in 1707. In other words, Europe was the problem and the UK – i.e. the British Union – was the answer. In that line of thinking, *Brexit* becomes a logical consequence of British history, not only a result of recent populism.

The necessary response to the *Brexit* referendum brings these two problems together. An angry EU-27 could underestimate the UK and try to punish it for leaving the club. This, the speaker posited, would be dangerous because the UK is a powerful state that cannot be coerced and is capable of being very unpleasant. Therefore a new deal between the UK and the EU is vital: The UK helps the EU with security; in return, the EU grants access to the Single Market without full residence rights. Moreover, the EU should learn the lesson from the United States that it needs to create a full political union of debts and defence among the remaining 27 member states.

On the "German problem", it was countered that the containment of Germany was no longer the issue. Instead, Germany now has to lead – though not too much. In fact, the government of Chancellor Merkel has done a lot of mistakes by alienating other member states. On the "British problem", some opined that the UK risked becoming a failing state; that even the dissolution of the UK was possible. As long as the UK defined itself as part of the EU, shared EU membership was a moderating feature by providing a mutual-profits world to engage in. With *Brexit* imminent, the country enters a relative-gains world in which bigger blocks always attract more investment than neighbouring smaller ones.

Another speaker observed a populist cohesion around Europe, highlighting that the main problem for deeper integration is systemic: Integration used to work by stealth (functionalism or "Monnet method"), which started with technical integration followed by political integration. This does not work any more because it has hit a wall with the nation state being the main source of identity for people across Europe. Nations have the power of history on their side, whereas the European project is just a few decades old.

In order to resolve the current gridlock, a model of flexible integration should be adapted. The most inclusive part of this is a Pan-European Union on the basis of the current Council of Europe membership of 47 countries. From thereon, one can add further layers of integration (e.g. the Single Market, Schengen, and the Eurozone). The disadvantage of such flexible integration is a loss of momentum, while a big advantage is that membership would be time-bound, so that states have to prove their virtues to continue membership. In contrast, if a state wishes to have a lower level of membership, this can be dealt with inside the club. Taken together, this would create a positive narrative of Europe, a "Europe of choices".

Some welcomed the idea of flexible integration or observed that it existed already. Others warned that it could dangerously undermine the cohesion of the EU and the trust in its institutions. At any rate, there was wide agreement that a treaty change would not be a realistic objective at present.

The debate then shifted to Germany's policy towards the EU. In light of the crumbling order outside and within Europe, German EU policy now focuses much more on realistic goals than on constitutional affairs. Germany's political elite wants to anchor Germany's future in the EU and intends to rebuild a political centre to manage the EU, i.e. a flexible notion of "core Europe" that would not leave others out. Building such a centre requires resources and the consideration of domestic issues. Importantly, German citizens have to be kept engaged so that they want a closer union. As another speaker observed, electoral decisions in EU member states were – due to an overload of information, fear and manipulation – emotional and personalized rather than based on reason.

Turning to the question of world order, the speaker held that the EU did not have the mechanisms in place to provide global leadership. The EU is not used to instability and a Hobbesian world, whereas other states are, so they can use such an order more effectively to their benefit (e.g. Turkey and Russia). Instead of attempting to restore order, the EU would be better advised to learn to live with persistent disorder. In that context, one participant opined that the peace narrative for the EU of the post-WWII era ended and should be replaced with the "stronger together" narrative. Sadly, however, in all three post-2010 crises – the sovereign debt, refugee, and Ukraine crises – the EU failed to deliver on this new narrative.

2.9   Emerging Powers and Global Governance: BRICS

Speakers: *Kai Michael Kenkel*, Professor of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro
Ann Lee, Adjunct Professor of Economics and Finance, New York University, New York
HHS Viswanathan, Ambassador, Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Rapporteur: *Divya Mathew*, United States

Session 9:   Wednesday, August 17

The session focused on contextualizing and discussing the BRICS bloc with regard to their relative position in current global institutional frameworks. The ensuing discussion raised interesting, and at times controversial issues such as the rise of China and the relation between democracy and economic growth.

The concept of emerging powers can be defined along multiple dimensions: material capacity (gross domestic product/military power/population); financial clout; and functional niches in the international system. BRICS, a fluid bloc of emerging powers, is still a work in progress transitioning from a geo-economical bloc to one that is geopolitical. Unsurprisingly, competition and divergences exist also amongst these countries, for example the Sino-Indian border dispute or anti-dumping disputes between Brazil and China. However, the focus of the BRICS is to work on the convergences as a bloc, for example on progressive values of social justice, mobility and equality. The European Union attitude towards the BRICs ranges from curiosity to apprehension (due to the uncertainty of the implications of the bloc) to hostility (because if these countries are against status quo, they must be dangerous).

Should emerging powers play by existing rules or influence the setting of new ones? The primary goal for the BRICS is the establishment of a rules-based order that provides equality and representation as well as protection of powers. The process to do this can be achieved by conforming or reforming, by bypassing or recreating the current structures. On one hand, the establishment of the Group of Twenty (G20) in 1999 as the premier economic and financial cooperation platform was a positive move towards better representation of the world order. On the other hand, the setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, both in 2014, is a larger political message against existing (Washington-based) institutional frameworks such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank that have so far failed to reform in line with geopolitical developments

China – and how both the Chinese and the rest of the world perceive its global rise – provided for a particularly invigorating discussion. The Chinese leadership is very clear that it is not interested in a fragmented world; at the same time, it is not ready to be a global geopolitical leader. This is primarily because the country is still dealing with internal development challenges, and it has no interest in disrupting the current world order and the related hegemony of the United States. China is willing to work within existing frameworks such as the IMF and the World Bank to reform their global representation.

In many instances, China perceives double standards when it is accused of exerting undue power: (i) China is often seen as a currency manipulator but considers the

United States even more offensive; (ii) the United States denies representational voting rights within the IMF and the World Bank; (iii) China considers the recent ruling in the South China Sea (i.e., the case brought by the Philippines to the International Court of Arbitration) as hypocritical given Japan's refusal to acknowledge Chinese and Taiwanese claims over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands; (iv) the 'One Belt, One Road' initiative is an effort to build infrastructure in weaker countries and is a response to the United States excluding China from discussions and negotiations related to the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

Moreover, and despite frequent criticism, China considers itself quite liberal with regard to human rights, essentially aiming to create economic and social opportunities for its entire population. Still, positive cooperation with other superpowers is also possible when the focus is on issues of mutual interest, as Beijing demonstrated through the Paris Agreement on Climate Change last year.

The discussion also covered whether democracy is perceived as a disadvantage for economic progress, given China's unparalleled growth rates as compared with the other BRICS countries. The consensus was that in the short run democracy can be seen as an impediment, and but it is much more useful in the long run. Ambassador Viswanathan provided a poignant African proverb to illustrate the club's desire to cooperate: "If you want to go fast, go alone; if you want to go far, go together."

2.10 Radical Islam

Speaker: *Husain Haqqani*, Senior Fellow, Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C

Rapporteur: *Johannes Demuth*, Germany

Session 10: Thursday, August 18

Religious hostilities have reached an all-time high globally. One third of the world's countries experienced religious violence in 2014, most acutely in the Muslim World. In his keynote, Husain Haqqani provided explanations for the increase in violence and discussed the question whether so-called Radical Islam is a response to the decline of power of Muslim-dominated countries.

To illustrate the Muslim world's decline, Haqqani provided some comparisons, highlighting the early contributions of the to various academic fields, literature, and the economy. After the founding of Islam, many Muslim-dominated countries experienced 1000 years of success – militarily, economically, and in many fields of the sciences. In contrast, by the 20th century, all of the Muslim-dominated countries ended up being ruled by colonial powers.

This decline, however, began much earlier: Power had already eroded after critical decisions made by the two great Muslim empires between the 16th and 18th century – the Ottoman and the Mughal Empire. They proved unwilling to adopt western innovations, a prominent example being the use of the printing press. Nevertheless, it was the ensuing colonial time which was perceived as a great weakness.

Islamists – as opposed to Muslim believers in general – believe that Islam has a political purpose. Beginning in the early 20th century, political Islam had the ultimate goal of getting out of the inferior position against the west. Haqqani pointed at four major responses to colonialism in the Muslim world:

- Traditionalism: Let's keep our way of life; don't adopt ways that lead away from Islam.

- Secularism: The west is superior; so let's imitate it.

- Modernism: Learn from the west and adopt things according to Islam.

- Revivalism: Return to the roots when Islam has been created and destroy the west.

Radical Islamist groups today are essentially building on the revivalism approach. They want to "create a dictatorship of the pious in the Muslim world, […] but in fact radical Islam is more about identity than about religion," Haqqani argued.

In the course of the debate, a number of related issues were addressed, such as Islamophobia, the alignment of colonialism and non-achievement of Muslims, participation of the female population, and the arguments of extremist (Islamist) groups. Islamophobia was described as one of the most worrying phenomena in the world today, also feeding on arguments of a non-contribution of Muslims to today's societies. Fighting this phenomenon has to start on a very individual level, emphasizing the distinction between the vast majority of non-political Muslims and a small group of Islamists – without denying the existence of radicalism. As two different, but similar forms of bigotry, Islamophobia and Radical Islam were said to feed on one another.

Even today, predominantly Muslim countries that have acquired great wealth like Kuwait choose not to use their money to ramp up and diversify their economy. This adds to a series of bad decisions that have been leading to such a decline of power in Muslim countries that the west could actually dominate them. Another argument was the low level of participation in the labour market of the female population. Being effectively denied to work by a mixture of cultural and religious traditions, they could not add their potential to their country's economy.

In order to counter extremist Islamic groups today, the use of military force was deemed insufficient, as it gives even more incentive to continue the fighting. Correcting the narrative of Islamist groups is a first step, as they are not intended to – or even capable of – building up sustainable welfare systems. One prominent example of this failure is the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s. A major difficulty lies in the Islamists' argument about the law of God, which they use to undermine criticism as it denies the possibility of disagreement.

Addressing economic issues and creating alternative ways of participation in society and the labour market are steps that have to be taken along with communication efforts in order to prevent radicalization of young people.

2.11 Extremism: Finding Approaches to a Multifaceted Security Challenge

Speakers: *Virginia Comolli*, Senior Fellow for Security and Development, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
His Holiness the Gylawang Drukpa, Head of the Drukpa Order and Founder of Live to Love, Ladakh
Alastair King-Smith, Head of International Counter Extremism, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Ashraf Swelam, Director, Cairo Center for Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa, Cairo

Rapporteur: *Daniel Littlejohn-Carrillo*, Mexico and United Kingdom

Session 11:   Thursday, 18 August

The panellists' presentations, backgrounds, and focus were relatively divergent, as each focused on their area of expertise and professional engagement. Overall however, the issues presented proved to be interestingly complementary. Four key themes emerged from the session as a whole: Personal agency, interconnected challenges, localism, and evidence-based action.

The initial exhortation of the Drukpa to focus less on theory and discussion and more on practice and action was echoed up by the other speakers in different ways. The Drukpa urged those present to focus on themselves, and on their possibilities for engaging with current challenges in order to improve the world for future generations. He pointed to the importance of putting 'humanity' at the centre of all endeavours – be they political, academic, or religious – by asking the question 'what for?' With specific reference to the topic of the session, he underlined the importance of teachers or 'masters' in the process of learning. Yet he also pointed out that extremism resulted from not taking a critical approach to the teachings or instructions received by not 'thinking with your own head'.

The other panellists included elements of these messages through examples of practicality in action and a focus on the role of personal agency in tackling the issue of extremism. Ashraf Swelam highlighted the work of his organisation in empowering local leaders to provide a counter-narrative to possible extremists during the process of recruitment. Equipping them with information, debating skills, and a basic understanding of the issues at stake are crucial elements for them to encourage a critical and questioning approach among those at risk of being radicalised. Alastair King-Smith also echoed the importance of engaging with communities to promote cohesion and critical thinking. He pointed to UK government initiatives at home and abroad, ending his presentation with a challenge to all those present to think about what they could do themselves to reduce extremism.

All of the speakers, in one way or another underlined the importance of understanding that the issue of extremism was not one-dimensional but presented a set of multifaceted and interconnected challenges. The Drukpa, again taking a broader approach, underlined the interconnectedness of humans to the natural environment, reminding participants that 'what we do to animals, trees, and rivers, we do to ourselves'.

Speaking directly to the theme of the session, Virginia Comolli presented a case study of Boko Haram in Nigeria – an extremist group that developed from a nonviolent protest movement into a militant insurgency. In a matter of a few years, it acquired the military capacity to threaten the territorial integrity of Nigeria. She argued that tackling the group solely as a military problem misses the root causes that created a situation fertile for extremist thinking to take hold. Economic, social, political, and cultural grievances played an essential role in preparing the ground for Boko Haram's extremism. Fighting the group without simultaneously addressing those grievances would simply result in one extremism replacing another in due course. Extremist problems are multifaceted and require multifaceted solutions involving long-term engagement focussed on economic rejuvenation, community capacity building, and service delivery.

Similarly, King-Smith highlighted the importance of not tackling extremism as a purely religious problem or as a problem that affects only one, religiously defined, group. He highlighted the importance of understanding the interconnectedness between different forms of extremism (Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, Islamic radicalism etc.) and of committing to tackle all forms of extremism. His presentation put rebuilding community cohesion at the centre of tackling the roots of extremism of all forms.

Localism, or the importance of communities and their specific realities in understanding and tackling extremism, was a recurring theme in several presentations and the discussion that followed. King-Smith underlined the importance of working in communities where extremism can be tackled in the context it emerges from. Comolli emphasized the importance of specific, local contingencies in giving rise to Boko Haram. Swelam highlighted the highly contextualised and individual nature of the radicalisation process and argued the importance of adopting approaches that focussed on the community. Government and outside actors should support local leaders, best placed to understand the dynamics of the issue, to take the lead. He also stressed the importance of avoiding co-optation of these leaders by converting them into government agents or de-radicalisation specialists.

In response to questions about the possible role of the West in supporting this process, Swelam warned of the risk of delegitimising leaders in the eyes of their communities through excessive, misguided, or tainted external support. King-Smith's comments echoed this thought by pointing out that government could not tackle the challenge of extremism alone, but needed to find credible voices that could work within communities themselves.

Finally, Comolli, King-Smith, and Swelam all highlighted the importance of ensuring that counter-extremism actions are guided by an understanding of the issue derived from a solid evidence base. Swelam warned of the risks (for the West in particular) of attempting to 'solve' problems that are not properly understood. King-Smith cited interventions that had backfired as a result of a poor understanding of the situation and emphasised the critical importance of collecting data and carrying out proper problem analyses before launches initiatives. Comolli underscored the importance of analysis in understanding the strands of the multifaceted origins of extremism and extremist groups before devising a response.

Though time for discussion was brief, the complementarity of the speaker's presentations allowed for a problematized picture of an issue that is often depicted as straightforward and one-dimensional to emerge.

2.12 Global Challenges and German Foreign Policy

Speakers: *Niels Annen*, Member of the German Bundestag, Spokesman on Foreign Affairs of the SPD Parliamentary Group in the German Bundestag, Berlin
Roderich Kiesewetter, Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin
Jana Puglierin, Head of Program, Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Jürgen Trittin, Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Vera Mulder*, the Netherlands

Session 12:   Friday, August 19

Germany is, politically and economically, the most important member state of the European Union at present. However, 'with great power comes great responsibility', as the so-called *Spiderman* doctrine holds; hence the international community expects Germany to play a bigger role on the world stage. However, Germany itself is reluctant to take on this bigger role, especially in the military sphere, for historical reasons. Even more than half a century after World War II, it still does not feel comfortable to exercise leadership alone – no 'Alleingang', please. Instead, Berlin prefers to partner up with other countries, in which case it likes to govern through international institutions. Yet the functioning of these institutions, such as the EU and the UN are under discussion. The discussion tried to describe the role of Germany along three lines: inside the EU, beyond the EU, and with regard to reforming global governance.

The discussion started with an overview of the recent and current crises and challenges the world, and especially the EU are facing, such as the sovereign debt crisis, the migration challenge, and the Brexit vote. As Germany is currently the most important member state of the European Union, both from a political and economic point of view, the international community, especially the United States, expects Germany to play a bigger role on the world stage. In particular, it should take a leading role to solve the EU's problems. Yet Germany is reluctant to lead, especially in military sphere, due to its past.

This general hesitation notwithstanding, Germany saw itself forced – both by the international community and by the circumstances – to lead on the EU's policy response to the refugee crisis. However, the EU was not able to find a consensus among its Member States on a relocation scheme for refugees, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel got increasingly under fire in her own country. For the time being, the conflict has been calmed, thanks mostly to the EU-Turkey deal that Germany's chancellor negotiated with Ankara.

The crises and challenges of recent years and the high expectations of Germany have led to a series of different studies and articles published by the German government analysing its foreign and security policy. The "Review 2014" was an assessment and reorganisation process conducted by the Federal Foreign Office, while the Ministry of Defence published its latest White Book in June 2016.

Although German foreign and security policy showed some changes during the last years, the central word remains 'reluctance'. Germany clearly prefers to partner up with others (no 'Alleingang', or going it alone) and govern through institutions, such as the EU, NATO and UN. This may account for certain pillars in Germany's foreign security policy, such as the strengthening of EU and NATO, reforming the UN Security Council, and enhancing the role of local actors in the Security Council.

Due to the tension between the above-mentioned outside perspective, e.g. high expectations and demanding leadership by the international community, and the internal perspective, e.g. the German restraint due to its recent past, German foreign and security policy could be mainly characterized by dialogue and diplomacy rather than military solutions. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Wolfgang Steinmeier wrote a recent manifesto under the title "Germany as a reflective power". This is aptly illustrated by the role Germany has played in the Russia-Ukraine conflict so far.

2.13   Europe: Refugee Policies and Human Rights

Speakers: *Anna von Bayern,* Journalist and author, Munich
               Gerry Salole, CEO, European Foundation Center, Brussels
               Hugh Williamson, Director for Europe and Central Asia,
               Human Rights Watch, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Sophie Kammerer*, France

Session 13:   Friday, August 19

In the context of the current massive inflow of refugees to both Germany and the EU, the debate focused on the fundamental rights' implications of the refugee crisis and the wider risk of an erosion of rights in the European Union. The group also discussed the differing policy responses in Germany and the EU and formulated some policy recommendations.

All the speakers raised the attention for contextual issues to better understand the current situation of refugees in the EU. Despite several warning signs, both in Germany and at the EU level, the policy response was rather slow and the failure to anticipate the scale of the inflow made the situation more difficult to manage. For example, the EU's Dublin Regulation (determining which member state is responsible to examine an asylum application) proved very hard to implement with countries of first entry facing difficulties to handle the high number of refugees.

Still today, policy makers are adopting a piecemeal approach to crisis response, while the issues at stake are much more complex and interconnected than they seem. There are links to terrorism and Islamophobia, but also to regional conflicts, extreme poverty, authoritarian regimes and climate change. That's why the migration flows are unlikely to slow down, and the crisis will continue for the foreseeable future. Political will is needed to take the necessary tough decisions, thereby enabling the multitude of creative local initiatives to become sustainable in the long term.

Speakers and participants both highlighted the refugee crisis' implications for fundamental rights and the risk of an erosion of rights in the European Union. The ill treatment of migrants at borders, the conditions in refugee camps in Greece, the detention of asylum seekers in hotspots, and the EU-Turkey deal – with Turkey not being fully compliant with the UN Refugee (or: Geneva) Convention – are examples of such erosion. Ultimately, however, erosion is a much broader phenomenon, as fundamental rights and freedoms are more generally at risk in some EU member states, such as Hungary or Poland. Moreover, EU institutions have often reacted only in a rather weak way. Finally, the fundamental rights of the growing cohort of undocumented migrants in Europe are completely ignored by policy makers.

The Geneva Convention was described as out-dated: Its understanding of refugees is no longer adapted to today's – let alone, tomorrow's – situation. An update would be useful, but care should be given not to undermine the work, or weaken the position, of the UN Refugee Agency and other organisations in the field. The concept of safe country of origin and its implications on human rights was also discussed.

More leadership and solidarity are thus needed in the EU to maintain efforts to save lives in the Mediterranean, to continue to build up a fair asylum system, and to complete the relocation programme and implement it. A successful relocation programme

would indeed help creating a more stable and manageable process. If well managed, it could also help reduce secondary movements of refugees within the EU.

Policy responses should be long-term driven and integrated with other policy areas as well as based on better analysis of past integration policies to prevent segregation and fragmentation. Systematic skills assessment and more emphasis on the development of the skill sets of refugees and migrants would help. In addition, legal economic migration routes should be further developed. Internal EU policies should be complemented by an additional effort on development aid, making sure funds reach their targets in developing countries. The EU and its member states should use all external policies instruments at their disposal, including diplomatic tools and trade.

Last but not least, member states should avoid framing migration as a security issue, which is unhelpful in a context of rising populism and Islamophobia. While radicalisation does happen in refugee camps, so does it in a multitude of other places including prisons or segregated neighbourhoods. Radicalisation should rather be seen as a manifestation of the fragmentation of our societies.

2.14 Global Economic Challenges

Speakers: *Steffen Kern*, Chief Economist and Head of Financial Stability,
              European Securities and Markets Authorities, Paris
              Manfred Lahnstein, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, ZEIT-
              Stiftung Ebelin and Gerd Bucerius, Hamburg
              Stormy-Annika Mildner, Head of Department of External Eco-
              nomic Policy, Federation of German Industries, Berlin

Rapporteur: *May ElSayyad*, Germany

Session 14:   Friday, August 19

In line with the Summer School's theme, the session focused on the main global economic challenges the world faces today and how they interconnect with global political and security challenges. Manfred Lahnstein and Steffen Kern addressed the question by outlining the four main economic challenges they perceive: deglobalization, Brexit, monetary policy in a low interest rate environment, and floundering emerging markets. Stormy-Annika Mildner complemented the discussion by adding a more conceptual approach: She expanded on the idea that our global economic challenges stem from our need to master increasing uncertainty.

While the financial sector and markets have managed to stay out of the spotlight in the last years, the current economic climate cannot be called calm. The global economy is naturally intertwined with the political and social upheaval of a changing world order.

With the emergence of deglobalization sentiments within the European population and the re-emergence of right-wing populism, the benefits of trade openness and globalization are difficult to make it on the political agenda. The recent Brexit vote further exacerbates the problem with uncertainties surrounding the future of the Single European market and how the new relationship with the United Kingdom will affect investment flows and the EU's negotiating power. New trade agreements such as TTIP and CETA are under a lot of public pressure – a particularly troubling prospect if one takes into account countries' reliance on trade and persisting trade account imbalances.

The audience inquired about the drivers behind this trend: Is it possible that both globalization and deglobalization stem from the same root, i.e. are a reaction to technological progress? That the same technological advancement and disruptive technologies that have taken our media, our economy, and our politics by storm are also changing the underlying societal and political dynamics and are, thus, feeding this trend? The answers remained vague.

On another front, central banks are under a lot of pressure to stimulate growth. However, with interest rates at zero or even negative, it is clear that using traditional monetary policy instruments is not enough. Central banks face the trade-off that while low interest rates are supposed to stimulate private lending they can also lead to increased risk-taking. How to further stimulate growth in this environment remains unclear, with the majority of actors currently opting for a wait-and-see approach.

Moving away from the developed economies, the picture for emerging economies is not much better. Emerging market growth rates are no longer what they used to be,

with an expected 4.2% growth rate for 2016 and no major growth impulse in sight. Investors are at a loss for where to invest, which creates a particularly difficult situation for banks and insurance companies.

While there are no clear-cut solutions for tackling these challenges, there were a number of suggestions made by the panel. Firstly, strong leadership is needed to drive sustainable growth agendas particularly in the developing world. Secondly, advanced economies need to focus on innovation for growth stimulation and productivity. Thirdly, European regulators in particular need to continue to work on macro- and micro-prudential policies to manage the inherent volatilities of the global economy. Finally, firms need to embed a risk management program into their decision making process, allowing them to successfully identify, assess, and mitigate an increasingly uncertain world and market.

2.15 Urban (In)Securities: Science. Fiction. International Politics

Speaker: *Uri Aviv,* General Director, Tel Aviv International Film Festival for Science Fiction and the Fantastic Genres, Tel Aviv
Gabi Schlag, Research Associate, Institute for International Politics, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg
Liam Young, Founder, Tomorrows Thoughts Today, London

Rapporteur: *Andreas Wittmann*, Germany

Session 15: Saturday, August 20

This surprising session examined science fiction as a mighty tool for analysis of societal topics in today's world. The panellists showed that science fiction goes far beyond illustrating the possibilities of technological progress and instead follows the purpose of analysing how mankind might use or abuse these new possibilities. Thus, science fiction is always a mirror of today's burning societal issues, hopes and fears. The subsequent workshop transported the participants into the setups of three science fiction movies in which they had to find solutions to the issues of migration, national security, surveillance and societal segregation.

To prepare the ground thematically, the panellists explored the different aspects of this session's title – science, fiction, and the future of security. Uri Aviv initiated the session by explaining the setup of science fiction worlds. Science fiction plots take place against the background of a possible future – often highly technologized worlds populated by mankind and shared with alien races from space. However, despite all fantastic ideas about technology's advancements, from the printing of food to "beaming", Aviv argued that science fiction is never only about the future possibilities of technology per se. Instead, it always represents a critical social observation of how mankind might use – or abuse – these possibilities.

Science fiction plots typically evolve around three main themes: (i) the alien, (ii) technology, and (iii) aesthetics of the future city. The alien theme typically builds on humans' interaction with foreign life forms or races. Typical storylines are "first contact", "the metaphoric alien", and "the alien as the enemy". "First contact" plots focus on the characteristics that distinguish aliens from mankind, showing the audience the universality of life and the peculiarities of mankind itself. The "metaphoric alien" stories pick up sequences from human history and play with them. The future-directed setup allows analysis of historical developments from new perspectives – without the historical baggage of talking about real people or parties. "The alien as the enemy" presents us with an existential threat to mankind that needs to be overcome. Most of the time there is a strong focus on military, sometimes fascist, elements. Here, aliens are depicted as un-humanly as possible, e.g. as insects. Social topics that are typically covered by this storyline are invasion, migration, and refugees.

The technology theme focuses on the possibilities that future technological developments might bring, and how they would affect people's behaviour. Most science fiction novels or movies either take a supporting or a critiquing stance. Some, like the movie "minority report" which was discussed in the subsequent workshop, cover both aspects.

The theme of the aesthetics of the future city extrapolates current trends in city development. Science fiction cities range from dark, rainy, and corrupt Los Angeles in "Blade Runner" to the paradise-like space station in "Elysium". Novels and books play with the challenges of urbanization, increasing population density, segregation, and security.

Aviv summarized that science fiction is a great laboratory to explore what could happen and how people would behave if the current limits of technology were pushed outwards or removed at all. It is therefore a mighty tool to analyse a possible future based on the extrapolation of current societal issues.

After this dive into the setup of science fiction worlds, Gabi Schlag focused on the aspect of security. In her overview of the latest developments, she argued that the scope as well as the purpose of security had been changing over the last decades. Whereas security originally was a description for "peace of mind", the term has developed over time to signify survival in a multipolar world, with aspects of both internal and external security. Also, the scope of security has expanded to encompass many facets of today's life, from military over finance to security from environmental threats. In parallel, a change in the purpose of security has taken place – from originally representing a means of defence to today's concept of a reduction of vulnerability. Schlag however pointed out that this definition of security remains challenged, as it will always be influenced by the issues and trends of the time. To her – as for Aviv – science fiction offers a tool that allows out-of-the-box thinking on societal problems.

Liam Young brought his perspectives as an architect to the discussion, focusing on the spatial aspects of science fiction. He confirmed that alternative worlds serve as an ideal means to better understand our own world in new ways, to shake up people and make them rethink their current path. According to him science fiction picks up today's burning social issues, hopes and fears, exaggerates them by technological possibilities and examines how people might behave in such extreme situations. It brings the hidden taboos of today to the surface and examines them from a new perspective. In that way science fiction is always a mirror of the issues of its time.

In the subsequent workshop the group was asked to dive deeper into the issues of migration, integration, and national security (via movie District 9), surveillance and policing (via movie Minority Report) and societal and spatial segregation (via movie Divergent).

2.16   Education in a Digital Environment

Speakers: *Jeff Haywood*, Emeritus Professor of Education and Technology, School of Education, University of Edinburgh
Friedrich Hesse, Executive Director, Leibniz-Institut für Wissenschaftsmedien
Reinhard Keil, Professor in the Research Group Contextual Informatics, Heinz Nixdorf Institute, University of Paderborn

Rapporteur: *Agustina Calatayud*, Spain

Session 16:   Monday, August 22

The session took place at the Heinz Nixdorf Museum Forum in Paderborn and highlighted the (many) advantages and (some) challenges of digital learning. The Museum Forum is the world's biggest computer museum, sponsored by the Stiftung Westfalen foundation set up by the late Heinz Nixdorf, a German computer pioneer. The foundation primarily promotes science and teaching, especially in the field of information technology.

Digital technologies are bringing many exciting opportunities for education, impacting what, where and how education is delivered. Connected classrooms offer today's students and teachers easier, more affordable, and faster access to information, teaching and learning resources, peers, experts, and the wider community. The methods of teaching are changing as well: from face-to-face lessons to a combination of virtual interfaces such as Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC). In turn, the content is moving from traditional text-based learning to text-plus-multimedia, while the community is now involved in the development of content.

Digital learning can be defined as "learning facilitated by technology that gives students some element of control over time, place, path and/or pace". With regards to time, learning is no longer restricted to the school day or the school year. The Internet and a proliferation of Internet access devices have given students the ability to learn anytime. With regards to place, learning is no longer restricted to the walls of a classroom. Students now have the ability to learn anywhere and everywhere. With regards to path, learning is no longer restricted to the pedagogy used by the teacher. Interactive and adaptive software allows students to learn in their own style, making learning personal and engaging. New learning technologies provide real time data that give teachers the information they need to adjust instruction to meet the unique needs of each student. Finally, with regards to pace, learning is no longer restricted to the pace of an entire classroom of students. Instead, students can learn at their own pace, spending more or less time on lessons or subjects to achieve the same level of learning.

Digital learning has created many new opportunities to better serve traditionally disadvantaged students. Increasing speed and availability of Internet access can reduce many of the geographic constraints that disadvantage poor students. The resources available on the Internet are equally available to all schools, regardless of the student population served. In addition, advances in artificial intelligence technology now allow teachers to differentiate instruction according to students' needs.

Despite these advantages, challenges to scale the benefits of digital learning still remain. Experts' opinion points, among others, towards the lower ability of these tech-

nologies to motivate students, the importance of interpersonal interaction to teach certain skills such as critical thinking and leadership, and the lack of universal access to Internet and adequate devices.

The most important challenge, however, is human interaction. At school, students learn how to make friends, be respectful of others' opinions and be a team player. Therefore, it is more appropriate to think of digital learning as a complement rather than a substitute to face-to-face learning.

2.17 Run-up to the 2016 US Elections

Speakers:	*Joseph Braml*, Resident Fellow, Research Program USA/ Transatlantic Relations, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
	Martin Klingst, Senior Political Correspondent, DIE ZEIT, Berlin
	Erjon Kruja, Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.
	Daniella Gibbs Léger, Senior Vice President for Communications and Strategy, Center for American Progress (CAP), Washington, D.C.
Rapporteur:	*Dani Sandu*, Romania
Session 17:	Wednesday, August 24

A wave of anti-establishment politicians is making inroads in most of the Western world, including the United States. While anti-establishment views have been around in Europe for some time, entering regional and national parliaments through small political parties, the American political space has seen the Tea Party materialize during President Obama's two terms as President. It now sees Donald Trump as an outside candidate for the Republican Party.

Britain's referendum to leave the European Union was considered to be a major surprise, but it is likely to be more like a symptom of a general trend in the Western world. The post-World War II peace brought an extraordinary time of prosperity and economic growth for most of the world. While this prosperity started in the Western world, it has slowly spread to the non-Western world also, with China now catching up with the United States in terms of economic and political power. The American white voter, however, feels his (or her) political power slowly decaying; they are thus rebelling against a political establishment that they see as at least partly responsible for this decline. As a result, modern day anti-establishment political organizations are mostly anti-globalization and anti-international cooperation.

The Obama administration has taken note of these changes, which previous administrations had mostly ignored. As a result, President Barrack Obama changed many things in the relationship between the West and the non-West. This change, seen as abrupt and almost treacherous by some, has created a backlash within the political group who lost most of its symbolic and economic power through globalization, the male American white voter. Few people took Donald Trump's candidacy seriously, so his ultimate nomination at the Republican convention in July 2016 created shock and horror among the establishment.

The anti-establishment wave in the US has taken the whole country by surprise and might be something that grows and spreads to Western Europe too. There is a lot of anger and resentment among parts of the electorate that some politicians have begun to harness for political reasons. Ironically, the Republican Party has become more and more extreme – as the emergence of the Tea Party within it has shown – while America itself has become less white. Today, no candidate can win a national election without sizeable support from minorities – which means that the Democratic Party is generally in a better position to win elections.

In fact, Donald Trump's candidacy might be the symptom of something more problematic, which has been brewing for a long time in the US and the Western world in general. His ideas are a problem for liberal democracies, and they will probably not go away even if Trump loses the election. This can be easily seen in the way similar political projects have surfaced in other liberal democracies across Europe, such as Hungary, Poland and others.

America has seen a growing polarization in recent years and there are multiple reasons for it: the involvement of non-political actors such as the gun lobby or super-rich donors that are spending increasing resources to block legislation and candidates they disagree with; an ever-increasing process of gerrymandering (i.e. re-drawing the boundaries of voting constituencies), which makes political districts safer and encourages office-holders to espouse the political extremes; plus major changes in federal government policy, such as introducing healthcare, facilitating abortion, legalising same-sex marriage, etc.

Against this backdrop, some felt that the American Dream is disappearing: Half of the country wants to make America great again and will be voting for Donald Trump, while the other half is convinced that America is at its greatest. The first half is made up of people who have lost relative power over the years, be it compared to China, India, and Mexico, or compared to minority American citizens, who have been granted more civil rights, the right to same-sex marriage, enfranchisement or other rights. They are mostly white, blue-collar men, who live in the American heartland. The other half is made up of people who have mostly benefited from the recent transition, though not necessarily in economic terms. They are mostly minorities, women, and generally citizens with higher education. As the overall proportion of the first category is dwindling, the 2016 presidential election might be one of the last opportunities of the American white non-educated voter to make a defining impact on the election results.

2.18   Human Rights and Cyber Security: Troubled Relationship?

Speakers: *Sean Kanuck*, Former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
Annegret Bendiek, Senior Associate, Research Division EU/Europe, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Paula Kift, Fellow, Information Law Institute and the Center on Law and Security's Cyber Scholars Program, New York University (NYU), New York
Samir Saran, Senior Fellow and Vice President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi

Rapporteur: *Simon Kofi Tettey*, Ghana

Session 10: Wednesday, August 24

Human rights and cyber security are some of the most controversial issues of our time. Exponential technology development has brought about both positive and negative impacts on states, regions, civil societies, and companies. Participants also discussed the definition of human rights and cyber security, concluding that particular definitions of "human rights" and "security" might ultimately hinder innovation. Therefore human rights and cyber security policies require partnerships between the public and private sector, upholding the public interest and ensuring that cyber security respects human rights.

Technology has developed exponentially during the last three to five years, and its many advantages have transformed the world. Technology as such should not be considered a threat; nevertheless, exploring its impact and implications, some are concerned about the amount of information that flows through technology. Not everyone is aware that "free" web-based email accounts are, in fact, not free at all, as users do not know how much they are paying through the information gathered from their usage of this platform.

Some felt that cyber security and human rights are not inseparable because they are viewed differently in different parts of the world. Others saw that two as more and more related. For example, the European regulatory system is not restricted to the internal market, but also has a global dimension. For this reason, digital integration also comprises a foreign policy dimension affecting not only the expansion of the digital internal market beyond national borders but also the member states' cyber foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the European Council conclusions on Internet Governance of November 2014 and on Cyber Diplomacy of February 2015 call for a "multi-stakeholder approach". This should include representatives of business, the technology community, academia, and civil society as well as governments. Furthermore, they demand close collaboration with the United States, for example in the Group of Governmental Experts at the UN level.

State intervention is only appropriate where the market fails to provide important goods such as data security and privacy. Cyber security capacity-building on a regional level can help build international understanding for the challenges ahead and impose requirements for due diligence in cyber security. The EU again is a leading example, as it has the potential to forge a third way balancing human rights and

cyber security needs outside of the technological dominance of the United States and China. Yet the question remains whether political leaders will be too late to regulate the pace of technology?

The discussion further highlighted that if human rights are defined as citizen rights, and cyber security is defined as national security, then they will, inevitably, conflict with each other. It provided three examples: two from the American and one from the European context. The first relates to jurisdiction, the second relates to encryption, and the third relates to the protection of fundamental human rights. Therefore, in order to assess whether human rights and cyber security are at odds with each other, we first need to define what types of rights and what type of security we are talking about.

Only if we define human rights as *human* and not merely citizen rights, and only when we protect not only national but also *personal* security as well as technological integrity, then will human rights and cyber security be able to go hand in hand. Democratically elected governments should lead by example.

The discussion then arrived at a dilemma because the topic could be discussed in positive and negative perspectives. A lot of people across the world have lost their money through advanced online fraud. How does this affect the right to privacy? It was also indicated that cyber security through stringent data protection could affect innovation, given that a lot of innovations are built on access to information. At the same time, access to (Internet) content is an important human right which the UN treaties do not sufficiently address. Some argued that technology, not energy, would decide the next stage of global development. Still, defining both human and cyber security will remain an on-going process, in which humans collectively have to decide how far they want to go.

2.19 How democracy gets defeated: The techniques to take government from the people, and the hacks to get it back

Speaker: *Lawrence Lessig*, Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School, Cambridge

Rapporteur: *Manuel Muñiz*, Spain

Session 19: Wednesday, August 24

The lecture centred on the idea of the failure of democracy around the world and the need to fix it. We live in fearful times according to Lawrence Lessig, and what is particularly worrying is the scepticism about democracy as a system of government. Part of this scepticism is rooted in the malfunctioning of the "election before the election", i.e. the process through which candidates for democratic elections are pre-selected. In the United States, this pre-selection is called "primary" and it decides ultimately who will run for high political office.

Lessig presented three fundamental ideas and sections: How the democratic system has been hacked ("against Tweedism"); why it does not take "the many" to fix it; and how "the few" can help us to get our system back.

Against Tweedism: Lessig explored three instances where the democratic system had been hacked by those willing to impose controls on who is allowed to run for office: The 1920s legislation in Texas that prevented non-Whites from running in the primaries of the Democratic Party (effectively depriving 16% of the population of that state from being put on the ballot); the recent reforms in Hong Kong empowering a selection committee made up of 0.02% of the island's population to decide who runs for Chief Executive; and, importantly, the way in which legislators in the U.S. are obliged to constantly fundraise, giving wealthy donors undue influence over who holds those offices. Lessig referred to this last system as a "green primary" (as in "greenback" for dollar) in which those with any chances of holding public office had to pay homage to donors who contributed money to their campaigns. (Coincidentally, the group of around 57.000 people providing the maximum amount of 5.200 US dollars to a candidate in an election year amounts to 0.02% of the US population – the same share as the number of people chosen for the Hong Kong selection committee).

U.S. democracy is, therefore, designed to please those generous funders. Not surprisingly then, when American elites favour a particular reform, this tends to be quickly put on the agenda of Congress and of the Executive. This same relationship however does not exist when one speaks of the concerns of average voters. According to Lessig, this way of operating is overall corrupt and very much a modern manifestation of the practices of Boss Tweed, a 19th century leader of the Democratic Party who famously once said: "I don't care who does the electing as long as I do the nominating."

Against the Many: The American ideal has always been that elites would rule. However, soon after independence the system began to concentrate power in political parties. The reaction to this corruption of the system was the progressive era and the idea that primaries should be decided by a majority of citizens. The 20th century was a unique moment in history which allowed this sort of democracy to emerge and to

flourish. With communication technology, in particular cable television, enabling the emergence of a truly national debate, informed citizens were for once at the centre of the political system. In the 1970s for example, three news networks controlled over 90% of the TV market share, making a national debate about central issues possible, This constituted what Lessig referred to as a true classroom for democracy.

However, technology today has fractured the sources of information and with it the entirety of public opinion. People are still at the centre of the political debate; but the structured opinion-forming process simply does not exist anymore in the age of diversified and specialised information through a multitude of TV channels and Internet sites and fora.

For the Few: The inability to construct an informed public opinion is the reason why we have to once again leverage the few. Lessig suggested making greater use of deliberative polls. These are small and random samples of people that are put together to discuss specific sets of issues. Deliberative polls have demonstrated to be capable of producing sane, smart, and stable outcomes, proving that harnessing the power of a representative few is all that is needed to produce effective outcomes.

An applied example of this way of proceeding was the recent constitution-writing exercise in Iceland. There, 1.000 randomly selected citizens came up with initial ideas about the content of the text. This way of selecting members followed classical Greek notions of fairness, which were manifested in the process of "sortation" or random selection of citizens for public office. In the case of Iceland, 525 citizens ran for the Constitutional Assembly, 25 of which were ultimately elected. Those 25 produced a final text, which, after intense consultation with the broader population via Facebook, was put to a referendum. The constitution was ultimately approved by two thirds of Icelanders – before, in a classical move, it was voted down by Parliament.

Lessig's closing remarks emphasized the need to save democracy from its failures. There is an urgent need to reverse the trend of smart powerful people doubting democracy and to build a system that inspires the best in us, he said. In order to do this we should explore the power of leveraging smaller and more representative groups of citizens.

2.20 Germany's role in the UN – Punching Below its Weight?

Speaker: *Ambassador Harald Braun*, Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, New York

Rapporteur: *Ntagahoraho Burihabwa*, Germany

Session 20:   Thursday, 25 August

The keynote and discussion focussed on an historical reflection of Germany's role in the United Nations and international relations as a whole. According to the speaker, the three key pillars of Germany's engagement in the United Nations are Peace and Security, Human Rights, and Development. Furthermore, structural impediments to greater involvement of Germany inside the UN System as well as possibilities to leverage these were also identified, including efforts to UN reform.

From an historical perspective, Germany's prospects to engage within the UN system were initially complicated due to the geopolitical divide of the Cold War. This changed in 1969 after the newly elected Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt broke with the *Hallstein doctrine* of the early Federal Republic – the "demand of exclusivity" in international representation – and managed to decrease tensions between the two opposing blocks through a policy of rapprochement labelled *Ostpolitik*. As a result, both East and West Germany became full members of the UN General Assembly on 18 September 1973.

While the Federal Republic engaged in all UN specialized agencies, the German Democratic Republic consistently focused only upon specific areas of the UN. However, following German reunification in 1990 the re-united country's importance and stature in the international community would increase dramatically. Still, consecutive post-Cold War governments tried to balance their foreign policy between the historical legacies of two World Wars and the growing expectations by partners given Germany's economic power and geopolitical location in the European heartland.

This was manifested in Germany's participation in a number of UN peacekeeping operations: In Cambodia as early as 1992, in Somalia in 1993, in Kosovo in 1999 and – following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 – in the Security Council-mandated operation in Afghanistan. Unified Germany also was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in the periods of 1995-1996, 2003-2004, and 2011-2012. In addition, Germany has been home to a number of UN administrative bodies in the UN campus in Bonn as well as the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg. Most notably, the Federal Republic plays a decisive role in the UN as the fourth largest financial contributor, paying nearly $160 million in 2016. With regards to the voluntary financing of international peace operations, the Germany is again the fourth largest financial contributor with 6.39% of the budget of $7.87 billion (fiscal year 2016-2017).

In terms of substance, German engagement in the United Nations has focused on three key areas.

Peace and Security: Germany participates actively in the UN's efforts for peace and security, through the deployment of soldiers, police officers and civilian experts as part of UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. Convinced that today's complex

challenges cannot be resolved through military means alone, Germany has placed equal emphasis on crisis prevention, stabilization, and post-conflict peace building. Germany chaired the Peace Building Commission in 2010 and supports early recovery of post-crisis societies through its humanitarian and development assistance.

Human Rights: The Federal Government advocates forcefully for the protection and continual development of human rights standards within the UN framework. This occurs in routine and close cooperation with the relevant UN institutions, especially with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. For the period of 2013-2015, the Federal Republic was admitted for the second time into the Geneva Council, formed in 2006. Furthermore, the Human Rights Council elected Ambassador Joachim Ruecker, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations Office at Geneva, to serve as its President for a one-year term in 2015.

Development: One of the most important instruments for Germany as one of the world's biggest donors is development cooperation. The Federal Government has almost doubled its budget for developmental assistance in the last ten years, currently spending up to €12 billion per annum. Germany has most recently decided to increase these contributions even more, from 0.4 to 0.7% of its gross domestic product in order to contribute to the global implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

German foreign policy has not evolved without setbacks. Most recently, the German abstention as non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in March 2011 regarding the Libya intervention resulted in a diplomatic shambles. After four years of restrained foreign policy, Berlin currently aims to be more assertive internationally. This was confirmed by the perfectly synchronized keynote speeches delivered at the Munich Security Conference 2014 by Federal President Joachim Gauck, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, and Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen.

In this context, the question whether Germany is currently "punching below its weight" in the United Nations comes up on regular basis. Proponents of this view have *inter alia* pointed out to the discrepancies between Germany's large financial support to UN peacekeeping and its low troop contribution to operations in the field where it ranks 45th with 434 peacekeepers deployed as of 31 July 2016.

The discussion suggested that the perception that Germany may not be living up to its potential was also due to structural conditions of the UN system. A product of its times, founded in the wake of two disastrous world wars, the UN's organs and structures reflect the balance of power of the 1945 post-War reality. However, since then the number of political players, as well as the challenges they face have increased exponentially, which begs for an adequate adjustment.

Therefore, reform of the UN – including the Security Council – remains a key concern for Germany. Together with its partners of the G4 Group (Brazil, India and Japan), the country stands ready to assume greater responsibility in a reformed UN Security Council.

2.21 The Election of the UN Secretary General: „The Most Impossible Job in the World"

Speaker: *Shashi Tharoor*, Member of the Indian Parliament, Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, New Delhi

Rapporteur: *Šárka Přibylová, Czech Republic*

Session 21: Thursday, August 25

The speaker described in his presentation the main functions and principles of the job of UN Secretary General and his role within this unique global organization. He also clarified the process of choosing the current UN chief administrative officer and informed about the specific features of the upcoming election.

The next leader of the UN should be an independent officer who serves the global community, the world as a whole, Shashi Tharoor said. The Secretary General is a leader who articulates the vision of the organization, proposes courses of action in many spheres, and thus plays a political role without taking into consideration his professional past or nationality. Once elected, the new officeholder must be successful in various domains including managing the Secretariat and running the organization's budget. Besides that, the Secretary General must have a "vision of higher purpose of the UN", recognize the power of the Security Council and its individual members, convince the organization of his or her decisions, and amplify the voices of those who are not usually heard.

In the past, all UN members gave their votes to the candidates proposed by the Security Council. However, the on-going elections of a new Secretary General differ a lot from the previous ones. In accordance with the initiative of the President of the General Assembly, this year, for the first time in UN history, officially announced candidates are interviewed publicly by the General Assembly, along the lines of a standard democratic election. All member states have the opportunity to directly influence the selection process rather than vote positively for a candidate proposed by the Security Council. Furthermore, the world community has the new opportunity to follow the selection process through a dedicated UN web portal. Consequently, the process has become more transparent for everyone.

This new and open process notwithstanding, the Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. The latter is expected to propose the candidate to the General Assembly later this year. There needs to be a consensus among the members of the Security Council and especially among the so-called P5, the five permanent members China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States. These member states may use their veto right during the candidate selection within the Security Council. Once approved by the General Assembly, the candidate will be appointed for five years, with an opportunity to be reappointed for another five-year term.

So far, the Secretary General has been selected based on an informal system of regional rotation. Until this year, all UN regional groups but one have provided a Secretary General in the past: the Western Europe and Others Group three times, the Asia-Pacific Group as well as the African Group two times, and the Latin American

and Caribbean Group once. Only the Eastern European Group still waits for a UN leader from among its members.

Taking into account this fact and the widespread agreement of the need of rising female representation, a consensus has emerged that the next chief administrative officer should be "an Eastern European woman". However, this candidate must be also acceptable to all P5 states of the Security Council. Nevertheless, the results of the latest so-called straw poll indicate that the candidate with most votes in favour is António Guterres from Portugal, i.e. a man from the Western European and Others Group. Two Eastern Europeans came in on second and third place, Danilo Tűrk from Slovenia and Irina Bokova from Bulgaria, respectively.

The session concluded with remarks to the audience about the overall function of the UN, i.e. that despite not being a perfect organization, it still represented "the hope of all the world for a better future". The UN Secretary General, whoever will be chosen to take on this position, will play a significant role in this process.