BUCERIUS SUMMER
SCHOOL ON
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

2022 Conference Report

Facing new Realities: Global Governance Revisited

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1 Executive Summary

The global pandemic was what forced the Bucerius Summer School into a nearly two-year hiatus, but also allowed for an unusual 'spring edition' in April 2022. Still, it was Russia's invasion of, and subsequent war against Ukraine that by far dominated this year's discussions in Hamburg. The twentieth annual Bucerius Summer School on Global Governance therefore rightly revisited the concept of global governance in the face of these new realities.

Defying persisting Covid-19-related travel travails as well as the ongoing war in Eastern Europe, 43 women and men made their way to Germany from all corners of the globe. With considerable professional experience in politics, business, civil society, academia, and the military, they came for group discussions as much as to participate in the ZEIT Foundation's three-day EuropaCamp at Kampnagel, a former production site for harbour cranes turned into an international centre of contemporary art. The gathering's goal was not just to foster the leadership qualities of those young professionals through an informed international dialogue on current political, economic, and social questions, but also to integrate these young professionals into a tightly knit network of alumni. This way, the organisers aim to help create strong partnerships among upcoming leaders that will serve humanity in the future.

The Summer School focused on crucial issues such as the war in Ukraine and the resulting challenges to the European security architecture; the broader implications of a Western realignment against an alliance between Russia and China; the effects of such a "Cold War 2.0" on global finance and trade as well as on regions like the Middle East; the role of women in global governance; and on how to tackle global challenges like migration, pandemics, and the increasing clout of Big Tech in the face of growing great power competition.

This overall report presents the essence of the group's deliberations, each session recapitulated by one volunteer rapporteur from among the participants. The executive summary puts these individual reports into perspective, though without possibly doing justice to the richness of the discussions among the participants.

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Broadly speaking, the debates focused on **three overarching themes**: First, European security governance after the Ukraine war; second, the global challenges that won't go away; and third, the question whether cooperation is still possible in the coming age of global competition?

The ongoing war in Ukraine presented ample material to discuss the new threats to **European Security governance**. The "Stories from Donetsk", told vividly through a documentary and in discussion with the filmmaker himself, offered insights into the social and economic fabric of a region now fully subsumed by the war. Based on this pictorial opener, there was some discussion as to how war could return to European soil, and how the continent could get out of it again. On the former, it was argued that aiming to build a negotiated cooperative security in Europe was not a mistake *per se*, but that clinging to this mission for too long in the face of Russian aggression had led to failure. At least from an EU perspective, deepening relations with all neighbouring countries – whether on track for membership or not – is in the member states' own strategic and security interest.

With the war itself still raging, imposing sanctions on Russia and providing weapons to Ukraine to defend itself appeared to be the only two viable options. Beyond the battlefield, the fighting has already had serious consequences, from the EU providing arms shipments, to governments like in Germany reprioritising its 'energy transition' towards renewables. Many more EU member states have promised to increase their defence spending. However, it was noted that, much needed as they are, such budgetary surges should be proportional to other expenditures aimed at education and environmental protection, which form the bedrock of strong, resilient societies. Lastly, Russia's military activities have prompted a realignment among NATO allies, not only with regard to strengthening its Eastern flank but also by looking again to the High North. A potential redeployment of U.S. troops there would be another tangible consequence of Russia's brutal war in Europe's East.

Taking in the more geopolitical view, the repercussions of a "new Cold War" between a China-Russia-led bloc of autocracies and Western democracies received similar attention. Here, the position of the EU and its member states appeared critical, given that trade relations between China and the EU plus the United Kingdom are ten times the size of Sino-Russian ties. While Washington is set on a more confrontational course, Europe can try to leverage its superior economic relationship with China to make Beijing understand that such a global confrontation is in neither side's interest. The connection between the war in Ukraine and China's claims over Taiwan was also discussed, with Beijing watching carefully how the EU and the United States deploy their combined heft through broad-based economic and financial sanctions against Russia.

The renewed European and Western sense of purpose brought about by an external threat cannot, however, paper over the internal weaknesses democracies have faced lately. This relates to questions of 'democratic resilience', defined as a democratic society's ability to bounce back following a shock arising from political, economic, social, or external issues, as much as to ongoing illiberal tendencies weakening the rule of law in several EU member states. More often than not, the concept of European values is raised in this context, with the added question of how far they are different from universally enshrined principles.

This leads to how one can tackle all those **global challenges that will not go away so easily**. After more than two years of lockdown-induced interruptions to a globalized economy, far-ranging trade and financial sanctions against Russia and a widespread reprioritization of self-reliance have increased the threat of global economic disintegration. In addition, advanced economies have to grapple with runaway inflation for the first time in four decades. The geopolitical rivalry between major powers looks likely to translate into separate and competing trade blocs, incurring huge initial costs for dismantling existing financial and technological interdependences. One question is whether it will take a global conflagration before the system can be reconfigured, or whether current leaders can manage to do so without recourse to war.

Another issue area currently under enormous pressure is arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. In the coming age of great power competition, an increased number of countries appear to assert their influence on the world stage. This may include more states aiming to develop a nuclear weapon, especially if the talks with Iran about reviving the deal to curtail its nuclear program falter. At the same time, many non-nuclear weapons states are getting impatient with the 'nuclear haves' for failing to honour their disarmament commitment. The newly signed Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, however, so far lacks broad international acceptance by those that

matter most – the five recognised nuclear powers (that also happen to be the five permanent members of the UN Security Council).

Then there is global migration, which reached record numbers last year due to violent clashes and internal repression, from Afghanistan to Myanmar to Syria. Both resolving these conflicts while addressing other causes like climate change and managing the flow of refugees, requires international cooperation that is sorely lacking under the current geopolitical rivalry. EU member states, meanwhile, may have shown particular generosity regarding the millions of Ukrainians fleeing the war at home. However, the EU needs to reconsider its migration and asylum policies to allow for justice and equality for all refugees, not just those from a neighbouring – majority white, of Christian heritage – country. Thanks to widespread public support, the Ukraine crisis could be regarded as a golden opportunity for broadscale migration policy reform in Europe.

The persisting difficulty, however, is that many diverse societies have not yet found a commonly accepted formula for the 'glue' holding them together. If every individual could freely contribute to its (chosen) host society, the result would be neither a melting pot nor the persistence of parallel lives, but a society where people have multiple identities. Even the United States, the textbook case of an immigrant society, struggles with the current transformation, leading to societal polarisation and radical movements. A country thus tearing itself apart internally cannot be a strong and reliable partner on the international scene.

It is, however, not just people (migrating) that change the fabric of society, but also technology. The dominance of Big Tech and social media companies in public discourse over the past six years or so has led many to ask for more – and better – regulation. Not least because of the impact of so-called 'fake news' spread during election campaigns in different democracies, the public has lost in social media as well as in the traditional variant (broadcast and print). At the minimum, this is thought to contribute to greater societal polarization, with tech billionaires not only whispering into politicians' ears but also directly influencing public discourse through ownership of dominant media platforms.

Finally, the Covid-19 pandemic has not gone away. It equally requires an amount of international cooperation – buffeted by funds provided by rich countries – that has yet to materialize, despite bold pledges. Instead, even this global threat has been framed as part of the clash between democracies and autocracies, with some countries arguing why their own political system would be superior to fight the pandemic. Yet, much of the (relative) success in handling the pandemic can be traced back to countries' previous experiences with public health emergencies, e.g., from the SARS epidemic in Southeast Asia in 2002-2004 or the Ebola epidemic in Africa in 2014.

Given all these challenges (and others not listed here), an astute observer begins to wonder whether **the coming age of global competition will allow for sufficient international cooperation?** Most speakers expected a new era of global bipolarity, some kind of "Cold War 2.0". Just as global society faces issues making global governance more required than ever, cooperation among the great powers ensconced within their blocs is unlikely to be forthcoming. That said, the transatlantic partners would do well to broaden their tent as much as possible, as they need the buy-in from other countries. After some instances of liberal overreach post-1989, those defending the rules-based international order against the use of force today need allies from all corners of the globe.

The current world order may not crumble over night, but the United Nations are set to become increasingly irrelevant, especially if there is a deep split among the five permanent members of the Security Council. Here, the role of China will be decisive, as it is considered less of a disrupter than, say, Russia, and more like an aspiring world leader eager to maintain the system that has enabled its rise but keen on tilting it in its favour. However, when looking at the main elements of Chinese foreign policy – sovereignty, political stability, technology-based rule, pragmatism, and internal control – none of these points to an openness for international rules-based cooperation.

In addition, it is believed that Beijing is studying closely how Russia fares in its effort to annex (parts of) Ukraine, so as to receive some clues – in particular from the West's reaction to Moscow's invasion – for its own claims over Taiwan. While Washington in particular appears bent on avoiding direct military confrontation with Russia, lest it spark World War III, China now knows that it would have to expect a harsh Western reaction against any military effort to unite the island with the mainland. For the moment, at least, it looks like the Chinese leadership does not want to risk provoking a major war that would set it back in its overall rise to global power status.

One major flashpoint remains the Middle East, despite the recent 'peace agreements' concluded between Israel and some Arab monarchies. Crucially, many of the countries face political instability due to socio-economic inequities – now exacerbated by rising food and oil prices – and autocratic leaderships that are unable to instigate reforms. Afghanistan and Yemen may have mostly disappeared from public attention due to the war in Ukraine, but there is not even sufficient humanitarian assistance available to ease the suffering of the civilian population, let alone resolve the underlying conflicts. Moreover, the entire region is mired in an ecological crisis that cuts across state boundaries but does not elicit the cross-border cooperation needed to tackle it.

Finally, the discussion about the role of women in global governance led to some fundamental questions about how change could and should be brought about. For it is one thing to highlight the importance of increasing gender representation in politics in general and in international negotiations, peacebuilding, and climate change policies in particular. It is quite another to decide for either gradual progress, which advances by millimetres, not meters, or radical change, which comes through a revolution, peaceful or not.

In any case, to overcome the structural inequalities that mark much of today's world, action is needed both from the bottom-up and by including those communities most concerned. The first requires finding targeted and contextualized solutions, adapting inclusion and diversity strategies to local conditions, needs and priorities. The second aims to make policies not just *for* excluded segments of society but *with them* and *by them*. This is true especially for a democratic community such as the EU, which should support grassroots level action and encourage citizens to become active for the continuation of the European project. Because when it comes to bringing a change in the world, everyone can make a difference!

With their open and inclusive professional mindsets and a global spirit that unites them, the Summer School's participants appear well-placed to address these challenges outlined in this report, tricky as they are. Good luck!

Rome, May 2022

2 Session reports

2.1 Cold War 2.0: Is It Coming and Are We Ready?

Speaker: *Charles A. Kupchan*, Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.

Rapporteur: *Stefan Vladisavljev*, Serbia

Session 1: Sunday, April 3

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24th will be remembered as a turning point in history that drastically altered the world's geopolitics. We are on the verge of a new era of global bipolarity, at a time when global governance has never been more required. Liberal democracies on the one hand, and a group of authoritarian countries led by China and Russia on the other, will be divided into two blocs. This setting will struggle to address various challenges, including the United Nations' increasing irrelevance and global economic disintegration.

Charles Kupchan pointed out that the world is on the cusp of global bipolarity. In fact, dividing the world (again) into two blocks would be one of the greatest threats to the global order, he warned. On one side, there will be liberal democracies, and on the other, there will be a bloc of authoritarian countries led by China and Russia. This will not only also divide global society; rather, this division will demonstrate that economic integration and global interdependence can be turned into real vulnerabilities. This, in turn, could usher in a new epoch in which countries seek economic sovereignty, resulting in global economic fragmentation.

At the domestic level, liberal democracies can "see the enemy, and the enemy is us," as Kupchan explained. That means the rise of populism, the emergence of autocratic politicians, and the lack of options at the political centre all are issues placing a burden on today's democracies. He cast doubt on the liberal democratic system's long-term viability, adding that while people want to live in democracies, the latter must function well. He emphasized that he is not concerned about the possibility of World War III, but instead worries about the development of an illiberal population, both at national and global level.

For Kupchan, there has been a surplus in the global allocation of power explaining how the world arrived at this predicament. China's ascent to become the world's largest economy and true superpower poses the greatest threat to the world since World War II because it is not a democratic country. Aside from the rise of China, Russia's emergence as a "successfully failed state", i.e., a resource-rich country fuelled by Eurasian nationalism and run by one man rather than functioning institutions, has made the country aggressive in the conventional sense. Kupchan also recognized instances of liberal overreach of the past, such as the belief that the West "triumphed" in 1989 and that everyone would enter a democratic global society. Instead, there was a backlash, as globalization did not benefit everyone. For some, it has been rather detrimental, resulting in economic uncertainty and social immobility.

Even in a globalized society, though, global powers dislike having rival nations on their doorstep. For Ukraine, given its aim for security guarantees as well as its overall long-term conflict with Russia, it would be reasonable to join NATO. However, it turns out

that the attempt to expand NATO's presence before working on a change in Russian politics and society was a strategic blunder.

The changes described have several geopolitical ramifications. Kupchan believes that a bloc led by China and Russia will emerge, and that China will not "throw Russia under the bus". Instead, these autocracies will face off against a bloc of liberal democracies led by the United States, but there will be no direct confrontation between the two superpowers. This division may result in fewer liberal institutions and more traditional conflicts in the future. On a global scale, the United States will focus less on promoting democracy. To counteract the effects of those alignments, Washington will have to work much harder with autocracies, such as by sourcing gas and other raw materials from non-democracies like Venezuela.

The United States should respond by trying to create a barrier between Russia and China. As a political system, China is more formidable than the Soviet Union, so this new divide will usher in a period of de-globalization. The failure to incorporate Russia into an effective global governance system based on cooperation and the consequences for democracies dependent on energy imports from Russia are forcing China and the United States to reconsider whether they want global economic interdependence to be the cause of their own failure.

Kupchan's final remarks highlighted the political implications of further divisions between liberal democracies and authoritarian countries. First, he pointed out that global events may cause social instability across Europe and the United States. Once the dust from the Russia-Ukraine war will settle, we may see a resurgence of the "America first" crowd within liberal democracies. He went on to say that disruption is already occurring in global trade, and that increased polarization and bloc allegiance could result in even more upheaval.

Kupchan concluded by stating that to counteract these pessimistic forecasts, the transformation of global society would have to originate from within national societies. While European countries have fared better than the United States in dealing with the emergence of nationalistic and populist tendencies, work on restoring the political centre within liberal democracies remains necessary.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine could be the first step toward a split world that resembles Cold War 2.0 rather than World War III. However, global society faces deeper issues that will necessitate global governance and cooperation among the great powers ensconced within their blocs. Because the fight against climate change cannot be won without participation at the global governance level, the confrontation between liberal democracies and a Sino-Russian-led bloc will not contribute as effectively to global society as an interconnected world would.

2.2   The other Chelsea. A story from Donetsk

Speaker: *Jakob Preuss*, Documentary Filmmaker, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Lewe Paul*, Germany

Session 2:   Sunday, April 3

The documentary "The other Chelsea: A Story from Donetsk" follows a group of miners and an ambitious young politician through the 2008/09 season of football club Shakthar Donetsk. Weaving football matches as a red thread through the plot, the film explores the economic struggles in Ukraine's Donbas region, the stark wealth gap between workers and influential politicians-cum-businessmen as well as questions of national identity among the local population.

As one of the first items in the program, the documentary set the stage for the Summer School by offering insights into the social and economic fabric of Donbas. This eastern region of Ukraine effectively became the main target of Russia's invasion during the course of this week. The discussion that followed the screening touched upon identity formation in this region, the endemic corruption of its local power holders, as well as political sensitivities attached to the production of the film.

The film contrasted the economic hardship of the miners with the astronomical investments that Rinat Akhmetov, a billionaire and oligarch from Donetsk, pumped into the local football club Shakthar. Despite the working population's grasp of the rampant abuse of power prevalent there, the audience concluded that at the time, the public broadly support the pro-Russian and Akhmetov-affiliated Party of the Regions. Jakob Preuss explained that many people harboured nostalgic views of the Soviet Union and felt that their true capital was Moscow rather than Kyiv. Having suffered an economic decline that left many workers frustrated, he argued that they found new purpose in the separatist campaigns instigated by Russia that have ravaged Donbas since 2014.

The audience explored the topic of corruption through the persona of Kolya, an aspiring young politician from the Donetsk chapter of the Party of the Regions. The viewers were struck by Kolya's self-assured remarks about his involvement in the property business and his flaunting of considerable wealth. Preuss explained that this interplay between political power and commercial interests was widely accepted in the working population and remained entrenched until now. However, it was coupled with the expectation that a fraudulent politician would defend his region's interest from other fraudsters. As one protagonist in the film put it: "Yanukovych is a bandit, but at least he's ours and he can deal with the other bandits."

The far-reaching access to Kolya's political circles and frank portrayal of his views prompted the question of political sensitivities that had to be navigated in the production of the film. The group found that Kolya would have misinterpreted the film as an opportunity to promote his political efforts and only later began to worry about its potentially harmful effects on his career. It also emerged from the discussion that Kolya particularly feared a negative reaction from his benefactor Akhmetov. However, in the eyes of Akhmetov the film was a promotional success for his football team, which, during the process of filming, had won the UEFA cup in spectacular fashion. The film had even passed the scrutiny of the Russian secret service FSB prior to screenings in Russia for its forthright portrayals of sympathies towards Moscow among the local working population in Donetsk. At the same time, the film received critical acclaim across Europe at the time of its release and is gaining new relevance today, as the focus of Ukraine's defence shifts to the Donbas region.

2.3 How will the Pandemic and the War against Ukraine affect Global Finance and Trade?

Speakers: *Heribert Dieter*, Senior Associate, Research Division Global Issues, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

Sunjoy Joshi, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Rapporteur: *Erik Eenlo*, Estonia

Session 3: Monday, April 4

The panel discussion covered the effect of both the global pandemic and Russia's war against Ukraine on global finance and trade. The debate was dominated by rather bleak assessments on the consequences of economic sanctions, deglobalization, reprioritization of self-reliance, and runaway inflation. The threat of global economic disintegration into separate and competing blocs appears real.

Sanctions have historically been used as economic measures in support of war; these days, they are considered as somewhat peaceful measures. In fact, they have always been a very potent, if also often blunt weapon, even more so in the last 30 years of technological changes and the globalization of the financial system. Since sanctions tend to fire both ways and often have unintended consequences, the panelists explored the possible long-term consequences of unprecedented Western financial and trade sanctions implemented against Moscow.

While the sanctions do make Russia suffer, they could end up backfiring by destroying industrial capacities in Western countries. They are also not yet complete, as the West continues to fuel the Kremlin's war machine by importing Russian oil and gas. Nonetheless, the impact of sanctions on the global economy is already strongly felt and risks consuming the whole world one way or another. At the same time, however,in some quarters the war in Ukraine is considered an expression of a larger conflict between Russia and the West. As a consequence, an increasing number of countries do not want to take sides or be affected by the fallout from Western sanctions.

This ambivalence notwithstanding, the world is about to experience the end of the post-Bretton Woods period that began after the end of that system in 1971. Major powers now engaged in a geopolitical battle seem to have forgotten that the international division of labour is beneficial to them. Many countries are deliberating whether to continue holding their bonds in OECD countries. In addition, the economic decoupling by major powers and the reprioritization of self-reliance might lead to the creation of antagonistic blocs. This will likely lead to more, rather than less conflict.

Absent Russia's war in Ukraine, the geopolitical focal point would have been on trade and technology competition between the United States and China. Shaping the standards of the 21st century and determining who will be the winner in the new knowledge systems is the core of their antagonism. Globalization has ushered in significant structural changes around the world, creating interdependence between the Global South and the West – from financial and data flows to steep increases in foreign direct investment (FDI).

In addition, the post-pandemic and post-war recovery needs to entail curbing runaway inflation that already creates widespread suffering in the world. A global course correction is necessary, which means to stop the policy of quantitative easing. It is

mistaken to believe that during the last decades inflation was kept low by smart policies of central bankers, one speaker argued. Instead, the real reason is the integration of China to a globalized economic system.

This is now changing overnight, as both the West and China have begun to economically decouple from one another through value chain diversification. Moreover, as sanctions are ushering in a new version of globalization, pressure on the social fabric of liberal democracies is increasing. As a consequence, serious questions about the future of global (economic) governance have emerged.

In fact, the geopolitical landscape and geo-economic dimensions have become two parallel worlds managed by different rules. The use of sanctions and the placing of geopolitics at the center of economic decision-making is further splintering the international community. The big question at this moment is whether a global conflagration is needed before the system can be reconfigured, or whether current leaders are up to the task of doing so without recourse to war.

2.4 Dean's Talk: China in Geopolitics

Speaker: *Eberhard Sandschneider*, Dean, Bucerius Summer School on Global Governance

Rapporteur: *Miya Cain*, United States

Session 4: Monday, April 4

China's history and Beijing's "strategic pentagon" will determine the answers to some of the pressing issues about country's role in geopolitics. How will President Xi Jinping interact with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin? Will China change its human rights policies? Will it keep its markets open? What will the Middle Kingdom be for Europe and the United States – or, more broadly, "the West" – in the future: a partner, a competitor, or a rival? The Summer School's participants discussed these questions with co-dean Eberhard Sandschneider, one of Germany's foremost experts on Chinese politics.

Historically, China used to be a leading power in the world, from the inventions of paper and gunpowder to the bustling commerce along the historic Silk Road. In 1445, however, China decided to cancel an overseas fleet traveling to east Africa and Latin America, deeming it too expensive. Instead, the emperor had the Ming Great Wall created. For Eberhard Sandschneider, it was this focus on the internal as opposed to the external that caused China to lose its status as a global power. In his view, today's President Xi wants to bring back the glory days from before that fateful decision.

The speaker outlined five main elements – the "strategic pentagon" – of Chinese foreign policy that need to be considered in any debate on China's role: the country's fundamental aim for sovereignty, political stability, technology-based rule, pragmatism, and internal control.

- First, the government has a strong desire for sovereignty based on nationalism, which includes control of Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 90 percent of the South China Sea.
- Second, there is an equally robust aspiration to uphold the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The people's liberation army's principal aim is to maintain communist rule first, and only then to support the Chinese state. In doing so, it has no qualms to shoot at the people it is supposed to 'liberate'.
- Third is the government's ambition to rule based on technology, as outlined in the *China Standards 2035* official strategy. This document describes how the country wants to again become the global leader in technology, returning by 2049 to where it was in 1445 – at the top of the world.
- Fourth, pragmatism prevails, as in this Chinese proverb: "You cross the river by carefully touching stone after stone." In this spirit, the government is now slowly opening to Western companies long banned from entering the market, but only if they do not pose a threat to the established order.
- Finally, by maintaining tight control over the flow of information, whether through the Internet police, face recognition in public places, or other forms of social control, the government aspires to be internally cohesive enough for global power. With millions of CCP members and most people supporting the government, any form of 'regime change' is unlikely for now, despite some dissent.

Some of these elements are also at display when it comes to China's position to Russia's war against Ukraine. Most importantly, Beijing does not want the United States to have a strong Indo-Pacific strategy, so keeping Russia as a "Chinese vassal"

and on its own side of the new world order is in China's interest. At the same time, however, China stands to suffer from the war's geoeconomic effects, whether this is about direct investments in Ukraine, such as a wind farm near Donetsk, or a global economic downturn and prevalent stagflation.

In conclusion, Sandschneider reminded the group that Chinese policy would first and foremost aim to benefit the country's growth. Therefore, any issue needs to be framed in terms of what the impact will be on the Chinese people and economy. This is true for human rights, China's investment in Africa, Latin America, and the Western Balkans, as well as climate change. Only after babies in China were born with lung diseases did the impact of climate change become more real. Sandschneider argued for Western nations to recognize China's interests as legitimate, even if they do not agree with them. Rather than scolding Beijing for what it does (wrong, in Western eyes), critics should point out how specific policies will actually impact the country's political, economic, and social stability and growth. If the world manages to get beyond the "us vs. them" divide, then much-needed cooperation on matters of climate change, prevention of pandemics, global economic reform, debt relief for lower income countries, and even human rights, becomes possible.

2.5   Women in Global Governance

Speaker: *Katja Gloger*, Journalist and Author, Salem
                   Clarissa Rios Rojas, Founder and Director, Ekpa'palek,
                   Cambridge
                   Anastasiya Shtaltovna, Program and Communications Officer,
                   Parliamentary Centre; Research Fellow, Montreal Centre for
                   International Studies, University of Montreal, Bonn

Rapporteur: *Margherita Giuzio*, Germany

Session 5:   Monday, April 4

The session highlighted the progress made in increasing gender equality and women involvement in global governance. It touched upon related policies, mainly the implications of Russia's war against Ukraine but also more generally increasing gender representation in politics and peace negotiations, as well as risk prevention. Gender equality and women empowerment are among the UN sustainable development goals, yet substantial gaps exist all over the world. Participants discussed the benefits and limits of gradual societal changes, related for example to language, versus revolutionary changes that come with disruption and protests to improve the actual conditions at work and in society.

The war in Ukraine is exacerbating gender-related issues and is destroying the progress the country had made in previous years. Gender equality should be a priority of the Ukrainian government – now more than ever – in the context of its security and legislation architecture. At the same time, there is a clear gap in the Ukrainian parliament's efforts to advance gender equality. As a result, there is a minimal level of critical representation, especially in the fields of security and defence.

It is important to consider the war's powerful impact on women. For one, there is displacement: more than four million people, most of them women and children, have left the country going West, while half a million Ukrainians were deported to Russia. The women who have stayed are often also fighting or providing support to the army. For another, the war has had huge implications for national and food security, especially for the most vulnerable parts of population, including women. For these reasons alone, women should be involved in any eventual peace negotiations. In addition, they would bring different perspectives and a cooperative and pragmatic attitude. The toxic masculinity of Russian President Vladimir Putin has hurt his country too, just when we need "feminists in global governance".

Given the different views they bring, women should get more involved also in risk prevention, especially when it comes to potential globally catastrophic – i.e., low probability but high-risk – events. Among these, climate change is the prime risk that has turned into a major political problem due to the short-termism of governments. Women are usually more careful and focused on the role of collective actions in reducing risks and on the impact of these actions on communities. Both are important perspectives to consider when trying to effectively prevent rather than just mitigate risks. Also, increasing diversity and ensuring a fair composition of elected representatives are crucial so as not to transfer the 'usual' biases, including those related to gender, when formulating policy.

Even though the world has made some encouraging progress in recent years, it is nowhere close to achieving gender equality. Increasing both gender equality and women empowerment is key among the United Nations' sustainable development

goals (SDG). Yet, the low representation of women in leading political and economic positions persists, child marriage and violence against women are not decreasing fast enough, and the gender pay gap even widened during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Gender biases are evident in our daily life, starting from the language and the images we use to represent and describe women. At work, there is typically little room for failure when women are in a position of power. It is important not only to recognise these biases, but also to monitor them. We need to measure and disaggregate data according to gender in order to avoid relying on stereotypes that do not lead to any practical policy measure against such biases. Robust monitoring mechanisms – including in government programmes – are necessary to create a culture of accountability and transparency.

Change comes either through revolution, which can be violent or peaceful, or gradual progress, which advances by millimetres, not meters. Education plays a significant role in changing deep-seated cultural biases but being revolutionary may be necessary to break the glass ceiling. We need democratic representation to change the rules on almost every level of governance. Three policies are particularly crucial: (i) Increase the visibility of women, for example through quotas that are effective in increasing representation in the short term; (ii) Include gender-related policies in government budgets so that they have a tangible effect; (iii) Improve the working conditions by addressing the gender pay gap, providing a fair parental leave, implementing child care programs and other forms of assistance that help ensuring equal opportunity for men and women to pursue their career.

2.6 Crisis as the New Normal? Emerging Challenges to Cooperative Security in Europe

Speakers: *Dominik Jankowski*, Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, Brussels
Ulrich Kühn, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, IFSH – Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg
Oana Popescu-Zamfir, Director, Global Focus Center, Bucharest

Rapporteur: *Madalina Ciasar*, Romania

Session 6: Tuesday, April 5

The war in Ukraine raises the question whether global governance is still in place. Three points were discussed in detail during this session: Whether this is a situation of revisionism that threatens global governance; why the system in place has failed to foresee and prevent the war in Ukraine; and where the world can go from here?

After earlier threats to global governance from some states' revisionist agendas, the war in Ukraine now demonstrates that the rules-based world order has been overtaken by the use of force. Speakers agreed that this did not start with Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, but can be traced back to the its annexation of Crimea in 2014. At the time, many European countries continued to engage with Moscow, banking on negotiated security cooperation while failing to see that this was not in the cards. The failure to anticipate and, thus possibly prevent, the war in Ukraine plainly revealed the lack of a system of cooperative security in Europe.

In fact, security cooperation worked only partially for the Western bloc and its allies, and not in a pro-active manner as originally envisioned by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This has raised the question if there is still a framework in place to address breaches of international law? Even though this rules-based international system has been abandoned in favour of raw geopolitics, as it seems, some countries, it was argued, are nonetheless trying to address the war in Ukraine based on their values and principles. So far, at least, the European political system does not look prepared to address the ensuing power struggle. In particular, economic sanctions as one of the tools currently in use have potential side effects, the speakers conceded, the full scale of which will only later be visible.

Three reasons were discussed for the lack of foresight of the current system. The first one was that change is always difficult to manage, and policymakers failed to acknowledge the extent of reform required for the existing system of cooperative security. Rather than acknowledging the real challenges to the international order, the focus was on deterring a Sino-Russian axis working against the interests of the transatlantic alliance. Hence, some countries followed a cooperative approach with Russia, aiming to build a negotiated cooperative security in Europe. This, it was argued, was not a mistake *per se*, but by clinging to this mission for too long, leaders lost track of the shortcomings of the system itself – the second reason for failure.

The third reason is a failed approach to the European neighbourhood. The countries that cooperated with the EU and NATO did not make progress as expected. However, it is not only them to blame given that the EU's enlargement process has failed to

empower the actual agents of change in those societies. Instead, Brussels negotiated with governments that were losing legitimacy in their own constituencies. While accession conditionality should be preserved, it should be addressed in a more societal way. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that these countries have made their pro-European choice. Geopolitically, this is crucial because as new blocs are emerging, it matters where these countries fall. Hence, they need to have incentives to continue implementing necessary but painful reforms at home. The EU and its Member States should at the same time acknowledge that deepening relations with neighbouring countries is also to their own strategic and security benefit.

The last part of the discussion focused on where and how to move from here. In the immediate term, attention will be on how to stop the war and what strongly appears to be a genocide in Ukraine. In the intermediate term, the challenge is how to create a world system that provides a workable arrangement without compromising fundamental values and without legitimizing the crimes committed by countries like Russia. And finally, with the aim of building a resilient global governance system, institutions such as the UN Security Council need to be reformed. The world needs reliable and agile institutions that work in a transparent manner and act as effective enablers of the global governance system.

The unipolar moment has come to an end, and the world is moving towards a more fragmented system of different security blocs. What we can expect to see, as Oana Popescu-Zamfir so clearly framed it, is a new world order, one that is divided into one bloc aiming to see a rules-based international order and another one having at its core the use of force and *Realpolitik*. The West should therefore accept that it needs support from allies at a global scale, and that it needs to do more to acquire the buy-in from other countries.

2.7   Breakout Session: The Danger of New Arms Races

Speaker: *Dominik Jankowski*, Political Adviser and Head of Political Section, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, Brussels

Rapporteur: *Michal Madl*, Czechia

Session 7:   Tuesday, April 5

The breakout group focused on the question of the (in)evitability of arms races in the current era of global instability, approaching the topic from a broader perspective. The participants underlined that there will be a painful need for compromises in the coming age of great power competition, with an increased number of countries wanting to assert their influence on the world stage.

It appeared to the group that some internal compromises and sacrifices are a necessary precondition for Europe to be taken seriously by other actors. Solid anecdotal evidence offered by participants confirmed that emerging adverse powers like Russia and China have demonstrated limited interest in diplomatic discussions with the West, which they perceive as weak and divided. For this reason, the inevitable trade-offs will most likely involve a decrease in wealth and an abandoning of certain economic opportunities as Europe will need to increase its defence spending. Simultaneously, it will have to apply more restrictive trade and economic policies vis-à-vis authoritarian countries. In addition, Europe and the United States will also have to consider giving up some of their normative influence on the world stage, where a tremendous power shift is underway.

Even though some compromises will have to be made, they must be carefully evaluated. While increases in European defence spending are much needed, they should be proportional to other expenditures aimed at education and environmental protection, which are necessary for maintaining strong, resilient societies. Moreover, while Europe's outlook on international relations will have to consider a redistribution of global power, there should be no compromises on core principles simply to appease an aggressor.

Finally, the group touched upon the role of nuclear weapons in the emerging world order together with danger of nuclear proliferation. Whereas a nuclear deterrent is a necessary precondition for the overall deterrence of an opponent, it must be supported by conventional and non-conventional means of defence to achieve the necessary degree of security against potential aggression. It is thus clear that there are no quick or easy solutions, and the upcoming era in international relations will present the world with dilemmas and challenges unseen in the last thirty years.

2.8 Breakout Session: Arms Control and Non-proliferation

Speaker: *Ulrich Kühn*, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, IFSH – Institute of Peace Research and Security Policy, Hamburg

Rapporteur: *Krishn Kaushik*, India

Session 8:   Tuesday, April 5

Today's structures of nuclear non-proliferation are ineffective, and the ongoing war in Ukraine will likely make any efforts to strengthen current non-proliferation procedures even tougher. At the same time, many non-nuclear weapons states have come together and signed a new Nuclear Ban Treaty. This should put pressure on the nuclear states that have so far failed to meet their commitment towards disarmament.

The mood in the room when discussing the consequences of Russia's war in Ukraine for nuclear non-proliferation was very grim. Neither the participants, nor the speaker could share a positive outlook for the coming years. The existing Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is weakening without any replacement in sight.

After Ulrich Kühn's initial presentation, laying out the past, present, and future of nuclear non-proliferation, participants divided into three groups. Each team was given a set of questions regarding the outlook for nuclear as well as conventional arms. They all had to come up with possible scenarios of how things would play out from here.

It turns out that there is an actual possibility of a limited nuclear strike by Russia if the war drags on. In the event of such a tactical strike (i.e., on the battlefield), a US or NATO response at the same level would soon lead to a much larger nuclear exchange (possibly including strategic targets like entire cities). However, war-gaming exercises have shown that if the West responds conventionally, possible off-ramps exist. An important waypoint will be the NATO meeting in Madrid in June, where the alliance is expected to take decisions regarding a bolstering of its Eastern flank.

Regardless of the war in Ukraine, however, many non-nuclear weapons states are getting impatient with the nuclear weapons states not having met their commitment under the NPT to disarm. Some of these signed a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in 2017, a legally binding international agreement to ban any such weapons. However, none of the nuclear weapons states (or indeed their allies) is a signatory of this ban treaty, which is why so far the latter has so far only served to increase political pressure on the 'nuclear haves'.

Given how the Ukraine war has changed existing security scenarios, a new arms race is highly likely, possibly also with more countries aspiring for nuclear weapons. With Russia's disregard for the global order leaving existing security guarantees ineffective, countries like Taiwan could feel encouraged to start a nuclear weapons program. In addition, talks with Iran about the country's nuclear activities in Vienna appear to have hit a roadblock, not least because of the volatility in the American foreign policy. With US mid-term elections in November and the possibility of a leadership change two years down the line, there is a lot of uncertainty about the country's future direction. In particular the potential 2024 election of a president wary of America's commitments abroad is casting doubts, including on arms control.

2.9 Breakout Session: Democratic Resilience

Speaker: *Oana Popescu*, Director, Global Focus Center, Bucharest

Rapporteur: *Solomon Allotey-Pappoe*, Ghana

Session 9: Tuesday, April 5

Overshadowed by the war engulfing Ukraine and threatening neighbouring countries, this breakout discussion focused on the sustainability of democracies. Participants analysed the key pillars of democratic resilience as different from the concept of good governance, and how the actual quality of democracy can be measured.

The distinction between good governance and democratic resilience is sometimes overlooked, as the two terms are perceived as synonymous. However, while they have high degrees of correlation in substance, they generally differ by their time horizon. Whereas good governance is the process by which public institutions conduct their affairs and guarantee the realization of human rights with due regard for the rule of law *at a given moment*, democratic resilience focuses on *trends over time*. Therefore, the quality of a democracy as measured by good governance standards does not reflect its long-term sustainability.

A democracy's sustainability and resilience are grounded on its ability to bounce back following a shock arising from political, economic, social, or external issues. In fact, Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be depicted as one of those (politico-military) threats to a country's democracy. Whether and how an attacked country can rebound will determine its position as a democratic society and the degree of its resilience.

As is widely known, democracy offers the opportunity to change leadership per the choice of the people. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee good (or bad) governance. The absence of democratic resilience, in turn, leads to a gradual decline in the quality of democracy, a process known as 'democratic backsliding'. If unchecked, such backsliding results in a state becoming an autocracy by losing its democratic qualities. This process can be influenced by allies or adversaries as much as by regional or global institutions. The UN Security Council, the European Union, the International Criminal Court, the UN Human Rights Council, the African Union, and others all have relative influence over determining a country's socio-political fate. However, a positive effect of their actions on democratic resilience cannot be taken as a given.

The growing ruthlessness associated with authoritarian leaders over the past 15 years has accounted for a decline in worldwide democracy. This is particularly visible in how Russia's autocratic President Vladimir Putin has attacked a nascent democracy next door. Indeed, he has portrayed himself as a leader who consolidated power over two decades, rebuilt Russia's military, and weakened his enemies in a bid to repeatedly undermine democratic movements and popular uprisings from Syria to Belarus and from Kazakhstan to Venezuela. Under Putin's leadership, Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Crimea as well as Eastern Ukraine in 2014. He also actively interfered with elections in Western democracies, such as in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Should he be successful in Ukraine, this would mark the violent end to one of the world's young democracies, brought down from the outside.

One way to measure a society's democratic resilience is by using the 'democratic resilience index' developed by Oana Popescu's think tank, the Global Focus Centre. This is a quantitative instrument based on an expert perception survey. By looking at different factors – including the political (institutional) landscape and economics,

external affairs, the media, and civil society as important drivers of a country's democratic resilience – a matrix highlights how each of these factors supports or hinders democratic resilience. The survey includes dozens of questions addressed to experts with diverse backgrounds and across party affiliation, with some quantitative data factored in to further reduce potential biases. It is recommended to be re-calibrated every two years or after an immediate shock event, whilst observing long-term trends rather than at a point in time.

The index was first piloted in Moldova and Hungary, with future rollouts planned for other EU countries and the Western Balkans. The initial objective was to better target interventions in the European neighbourhood by identifying elements which could prevent democratic backsliding in a given country. Over time, the data gathered seem to predict higher variations in democratic resilience for younger democracies and lesser variations in mature democracies. These have been benchmarked against similar key indices, e.g., from the Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank, thus proving the instrument's worth.

During the discussion, participants suggested further elements to consider, such as the transparency of a country's electoral system, fair access to the media – prior to and after an election –, the level of socio-economic inequality leading to captive electorates, the church's (or patriarchate's) alignment with the government, and the need for international oversight, as it can help to achieve the status of a mature democracy. All told, there was broad agreement that the methodology is useful if adopted to a country's unique political landscape.

2.10 (Un)Peace in the Middle East

Speakers: *Cornelius Adebahr*, Political Analyst and Entrepreneur, Berlin
Netta Ahituv, Senior Writer and Editor, Haaretz Newspaper, Tel Aviv
Ali Fathollah-Nejad, Fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs of the American University of Beirut (AUB), Beirut
Rapporteur: *James Maher*, Ireland
Session 10: Wednesday, April 6

This session looked at the Middle East from three different perspectives: The national level with a particular focus on the role of Iran; the view from Europe on the region with its past two decades of near-continuous conflict; and the personal impressions from someone experiencing some of the turmoil first-hand.

Opening the discussion, Ali Fathollah-Nejad explained how the Middle East has been undergoing a process of transformation since the Arab Spring of the early 2010s, followed by an 'Arab Spring 2.0' from 2018 onwards in countries largely untouched by the first wave. He zoomed in on Iran by noting how a similar process of unprecedented working-class protests against the regime there has been underway as part of a "long-term revolutionary process". Concretely, he identified a three-fold crisis: First, a socio-economic "ticking time bomb", where more than half of Iranians now live below the poverty line and the lower classes, once viewed as the regime's social base, taking to the streets *en masse* since 2017. Second, a political crisis instigated by the "illegitimacy of the autocratic leadership and its inability to bring about real reform". And third and last, an ecological crisis, including severe water scarcity among many other environmental issues like dust storms and desertification.

Iran's political crisis is exacerbated by the stalled talks with world powers on the country's nuclear program. Even if the 2015 deal were to be restored, this would likely exclude the dire human rights situation as well as Iran's regional policies. Especially with a new deal in place, Fathollah-Nejad warned, Iran would use any resulting economic benefits to continue its "expansionist policy", including its ballistic missile programme. At the same time, he felt that the sanctions targeting Iran at some point may reach a threshold at which the economic pressure would become unbearable for the regime. The earlier "rally round the flag" effect is gone, with many Iranians now laying the primary blame for their economic malaise squarely at their own government.

From his position as an outside analyst, Cornelius Adebahr took in the long-term view by exploring how a perceived "asynchronicity" has shaped the past 20-plus years of European interaction with the region. This concept, first developed by Ernst Bloch, a Marxist philosopher, to describe the Germans' falling for the Nazis in the 1930s, denotes how contemporaneous events are based on seemingly contradictory logic. This is the case when, for example, terrorists armed only with knives bring down four passenger aircraft in an attack on the financial and political heart of the world's superpower, as they did on 9/11. Also, the use of social media and other modern technology in the Arab Uprisings of 2011 that ended the reign of long-standing dictators marks such separated time strains. Lastly, the current situation where an advanced democracy like Israel is making 'peace' with partly modernised Gulf monarchies that are at the same time waging a brutal war in the poorest country on Earth, bombing Yemen back into the Middle Ages, as it were – that's another example of how different

events are falling apart on an historical scale. In short, "it's 2022" does not mean the same thing to everyone in the Middle East (or globally, for that matter).

This concept of asynchronicity became even clearer when Netta Ahituv shared several anecdotes underlining how "(un)peace" prevailed in the region. Her parents had recently visited Dubai, which was previously unthinkable for any Israeli and only made possible by the 2020 Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Part of the rationale for this agreement is the commonly perceived threat from Iran, as evidenced by a new Mossad-inspired spy thriller, "Tehran", becoming the latest hit series in Israel. There again, the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict is coming to the fore, as heightened tensions around the start of Ramadan resulted in a spate of deadly attacks in recent weeks. And, finally, the most personal anecdote was one where she became friends with a fellow participant from Gaza at the Asian Forum for Global Governance, as the two "refused to follow the mainstream of dehumanising the other".

The ensuing discussion touched on a number of issues, from the outlook for the nuclear talks (so-so) to the widespread use of the Israeli-made Pegasus spyware by autocracies worldwide (possibly one of the reasons for the Emirati government to sign the Abraham Accords) to Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory (remaining controversial in Israel despite having the most progressive government in a decade and a half). That, Netta Ahituv said, is particularly disheartening because many of the issues at stake – borders, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian statehood – could be solved in principle. At least, though, she concluded, there is a paradigm shift detectable in Israel where it is now increasingly acknowledged that the occupation amounts to "apartheid". That in itself may not yet bring peace but is at least a step towards a more just resolution.

2.11   Global (Dis)Order: The World yesterday and today

Speakers: Open discussion after five impulses given by participants
Rapporteur: *Lara Klossek*, Germany
Session 11:   Wednesday, April 6

The open discussion on Global (Dis)Order enabled participants to look at global governance from diverse perspectives both in terms of geographical locations and topics. The group discussed the enormous challenges the world is facing from climate change to pandemics, which all require more rather than less global governance. At the same time, there was large agreement that the current world order with its governance mechanisms is failing. It has not been able to find creative solutions to humanity's common problems but is still based on a security order and on an idea of power distribution that are no longer valid. It was important that all voices were represented equally at the table when discussing possible ways forward.

Global supply chains and interdependence are limiting the room for countries to manoeuvre. The war in Ukraine shows some countries' dependence on certain energy sources as well as the importance of increasing self-reliance. Voices within the group underlined, however, that deciding to move towards more self-reliance is already a position of strength, as some countries would require more time. Moreover, given today's crises such as climate change, global pandemics, and internal conflicts, the inward-looking behaviour from a move towards self-reliance and a new Cold War with rigid opposing blocs will not bring about the solution. On the contrary, debating global challenges without having everyone at the table will not solve any of those problems.

A more pragmatic approach is needed, without entirely neglecting the value base. For many technologies such as crypto currencies and artificial intelligence (AI), only a proactive approach towards their development and possible regulation can impact on their eventual use. Moreover, democracies must overcome any feeling of power-lessness to deal with complex crises, because if they become too slow in their reactions, autocracies will increasingly move to fill the vacuum of their inaction.

In a forward looking and action-oriented manner, participants put forward several ideas and solutions to address global (dis)order. Firstly, the question was raised whether sometimes disruption is the only way to bring about fundamental change to a system that has not been serving the world for quite some time now and that is characterised by unequal power distribution. There are two different ways to look at disruption: Some form of disruption can bring about creative solutions and lead towards out-of-the-box thinking. Other forms of disruption, however, could also affect central global values such as humanitarian principles (humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence). This would not be a desirable outcome. Order and disorder were thus equally needed in moving forward.

Secondly, participants underlined that humankind's thinking needed to shift towards long-term considerations, considering the needs of future generations. Thirdly, given the interconnectedness of the world's ecosystem, it is no longer sufficient to rely on an understanding that countries have ownership over their natural resources, and should rather move towards the idea of stewardship. Lastly, as with any new developments, participants stressed the importance of not immediately focusing on the disadvantages and possible negative impacts of change but rather of working on its positive aspects.

2.12 Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Succeed

Speaker: *Yascha Mounk*, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Washington, DC

Rapporteur: *Jeannette Gusko*, Germany

Session 12:   Wednesday, April 6

Yascha Mounk's talk focused on migration and diversity, and how democracies deal with challenges arising from within in different ways. Three main points stood out: First, nobody planned for the dominance of migration issues in the political debate, as they follow from various small policies rather than a grand design. Second, widespread, deep-seated pessimism prevails in the migration discussion. And third, the way forward should lie in building societal models based on multiple identities – a real mix rather than a monoculture.

In his introductory speech, Yascha Mounk presented several reasons for the recent rise of populism: economic disadvantages, the rise of the Internet and social media, as well as the "experiment" (as the title of his latest book has it) to turn monocultural into multicultural societies. For him, an experiment in this context can have two meanings: Either a deliberate plan to demonstrate political will and the corresponding course of action; or an undertaking, not always deliberate, without knowing the outcome. Either way, increased immigration has created a situation without precedent in the relatively homogenous democracies of the West.

The main conceptual idea follows three themes. First and foremost, nobody planned for today's situation. Rather than the result of an encompassing program of change, it is the consequence of various policy decisions that affect immigration and thus, sometimes in contradictory ways, the fabric of democratic societies. The 1960s reform of the U.S. immigration act brought such changes, even to a country in which the Black population had been dominated and exploited for centuries. In Germany, which with the war and the Holocaust had tried to create an ethnically pure society, the 'guest workers' scheme of the 1950s and 1960s brought millions of migrants, mainly from Southern Europe. Therefore, the idea of deliberate politics working downstream is simply wrong, Mounk argued.

The role of unintentional developments notwithstanding, most people tend to either underestimate or overestimate the effects of immigration, built on strong ingroup-outgroup behaviour. As it happens, both the Left and the Right harbour strong pessimist assumptions about migration. The Right sees it as diminishing the cultural inheritance that made Western countries, for example former colonial powers like France and the United Kingdom, successful. The Left retorts that immigrants and their descendants remain excluded from society and need special support and affirmative action. More realistically, Mounk argues that while first generation migrants from poorer countries struggle in education and income, their second and third generation offspring advance socio-economically precisely thanks to better education and income. In the United States in particular, social success does not depend on one's country of origin: Today's non-European immigrants integrate as well and as quickly as the Irish or Italians did over a century ago.

Whereas even free societies carry a set of norms and rules that are reinforced by certain penalties if violated, they also allow for a healthy competition between the state and the citizens. The most important question therefore is about the 'glue' that can

hold a society together, which in the German debate is often labelled as "Leitkultur", or lead culture. This can be achieved through different forms of patriotism, e.g., of the (traditional) ethnic variant or in cultural terms. The latter, however, is rapidly changing in a dynamic environment, which is why the third variation of civic or constitutional patriotism is gaining traction.

Finally, Yascha Mounk touched on the fundamental what-to-do-now question. Only a few democracies are still homogeneous, with Japan being a case in point, whereas for most the trend is towards more diversity. And while democracies can of course fall apart, the re-homogenisation of an already diverse society only works through massive violence, possibly even genocide. Built on philosophical liberalism, the solution would therefore be for every individual to freely contribute to its (chosen) host society. The result would be neither a melting pot nor the persistence of parallel lives, but a society where people have multiple identities and in which nations have a real role – that could be an answer.

2.13 Keynote and Discussion: Afghanistan and Ukraine as viewed from the Development Ministry

Speaker: *Niels Annen*, Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), Berlin

Rapporteur: *Carolin Wattenberg*, Germany

Session 13:   Thursday, April 7

The session with State Secretary Niels Annen focused on three major issues: First, the current situation in Afghanistan, in particular the possibilities for, and limits to, working with the Taliban as well as a reflection on Germany's past and present engagement there; second, the war in Ukraine and international – mostly Western – sanctions on Russia; and third, the development ministry's current strategic priorities, both in terms of the overall framework and its cooperation with specific countries.

The discussion on Afghanistan centred on what the international community could do to support the country without legitimizing the Taliban de facto authorities and without limiting itself to humanitarian aid and short-term measures. Niels Annen argued that Afghanistan has mostly disappeared from public attention due to the war in Ukraine (the same is true for the war in Yemen). Nonetheless, humanitarian assistance alone would not be sufficient to rectify the situation. The Taliban's recent ban on girls' secondary education (despite earlier pledges to the contrary) has made it very difficult for the German government to deal with the Afghan authorities. In future, Berlin will be looking for ways to directly support local communities without subsidizing the government in Kabul, meaning that it would have a diplomatic presence in Afghanistan again but without formally recognizing the Taliban.

According to Niels Annen, the international community including Germany have made several mistakes in the past. For example, they have not been able to address corruption in an effective manner; nor have they fully grasped the situation in the entire country (e.g., in rural areas) because of the focus on bigger cities like Kabul. This notwithstanding, he is hopeful that the German Bundestag can bring some clarity into what went wrong with two special instruments: a committee of enquiry into the military evacuation last summer and a thematically broader investigation to evaluate the country's 20-year-long engagement in this conflict zone. That said, should Afghanistan not stabilize in the near future, it will have dramatic effects on regional stability. The speaker pointed out that regional coordination is crucial. Hence for Germany it will remain important to work with neighbouring countries, e.g., with Pakistan and Iran to address the refugee situation.

Concerning Ukraine, the Federal Ministry for Development Cooperation (going by the German acronym BMZ) is currently working with its Ukrainian partners to reprogram part of its portfolio. This will include the respective development agency GIZ and the development bank KfW, both of which have been active in Ukraine. It will require a coordinated international effort to rebuild the country's infrastructure and flattened cities like Mariupol.

The war in Ukraine has already caused pressure to reprioritize Germany's "energy transition" towards renewables. On the one hand, the country is speeding up the process to become energy-independent; on the other, it is discussing about keeping coal-fired power plants on the grid for longer. However, Niels Annen was clear that it would be a dramatic failure if the war re-opened the door for old fossil energies. To

him, the energy transition is equally about building new jobs and keeping an innovative momentum going.

The State Secretary also expected additional sanctions on Russia to come but urged to carefully think about a potential embargo and its effects on the German economy. Asked whether Russia's frozen assets could be seized to rebuild Ukraine, he was undecided. Annen said he did not support the United States' decision to use confiscated Afghan assets to compensate American victims of the 9/11 terror attacks because the money ultimately belonged to the Afghan people. According to him, it is important that every government measure has a sound legal basis.

In terms of BMZ's strategic outlook, the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have had and will continue to have a major impact. For many years, there has been considerable progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially regarding the fight against poverty and hunger. Now, however, the world faces serious setbacks. Among others, the war in Ukraine is leading to a severe crisis in food availability. Additionally, the UN are facing an existential crisis because of Russia's open rejection of its Charta and its "Cold War mentality". Niels Annen pointed out that the international community will not be able to effectively work on its global agenda, which includes combatting climate change, if China and Russia are not part of it. Addressing global challenges and basic human needs requires leadership and a certain level of cooperation and communication.

Asked about a range of specific countries, Niels Annen mentioned Germany's partnership with South Africa on the just energy transition. If German funding aligns with the political will of partners in South Africa, the collaboration could potentially have a positive effect on other African countries relying on fossil fuels. Germany is also willing to provide resources to Brazil, for example to protect the Amazon, for the country's own development as well as for global climate efforts. The speaker high-lighted the importance of continued dialogue and mutual respect, but also pointed to difficulties in Germany's dealings with the current government in Brasília. From Niels Annen's point of view, China will be one of the major challenges for decades to come – both for German and European policy. Accordingly, it is important to follow Chinese politics closely. Still, he also asked for a realistic assessment of Germany's weight and what it can achieve, as it, after all, lacks the power to change Chinese policies.

In general, the State Secretary emphasized that development cooperation has never been more important. In line with the Federal Foreign Office's "feminist foreign policy agenda", the BMZ is also striving for equal representation and empowerment on the one hand, and basic human rights on the other hand.

2.14 U.S. Political and Foreign Policy Outlook

Speakers: *Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook*, Non-Resident Fellow Global Public Policy Institute, Berlin;
Robin Cammarota, American Council on Germany, New York

Rapporteur: *Anne Dreessen*, Germany

Session 14: Thursday, April 7

Speakers and participants discussed general features of current U.S. foreign policy, considering in particular the domestic state of affairs, expectations towards Europe's role in global affairs, and the war in Ukraine.

The two speakers shared their respective assessment of the current situation in the United States, also analysing factors leading to recent challenges for its democracy. One speaker gave an overall positive outlook, highlighting the nation's achievement of being one of the oldest democracies worldwide. The country is undergoing the biggest transformation in its history, she said, as it will be the largest multicultural, democratic society in the world. This development appears to threaten some parts of the U.S. population, leading to radical movements. The other speaker presented a comparatively self-critical assessment of the 'state of the nation'. The United States is "tearing itself apart", she said, as it struggles with domestic politics which do not allow for strong, reliable engagement abroad. The ongoing transformation of society does indeed weaken the country, but that is because "U.S. politics has always been based on racism", according to her. Upholding this structure now is increasingly impossible, as it is challenged by globalisation, the media, and the Internet.

Regarding foreign policy, one speaker argued that the "rumours of a decline of U.S. powers" are highly overrated. According to her, United States remains the only non-regional power to exert influence in regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Both speakers detected worldwide "systemic competition", with one wondering whether world politics currently experiences a "cold war" between democratic and autocratic systems.

The speakers agreed that American expectations towards Europe's role in global affairs, particularly regarding security in Europe, have clearly increased. One argued that "Europe and the Global South need to step up", given that the United States can no longer be a reliable partner. It will stop playing "Big Brother" to Europe and "do everything in world affairs". The other also called for a stronger Europe, suggesting inter alia that Europe should strengthen its economic links to the Indo-Pacific region. This should include U.S.-EU cooperation in the region and "catching up on tech".

As for the war in Ukraine, one speaker argued that Europe's actions, in particular by France and Germany, would be crucial for the further developments in the region. She advocated for Germany to become a strong leader rather than limiting its role to being a mere consensus-builder. The other concurred by saying that "Germany has been pacifist for way too long."

Participants then joined the discussion with short interventions on the role of the United States in Southeast Asia, the Western Balkans, and South America.

2.15   The War against Ukraine

Speaker: *Hans-Lothar Domröse*, General (ret.), former Commander of Allied Joint Force Command, Brunssum

Rapporteur: *Alexandra Sitenko*, Germany

Session 15:   Thursday, April 7

On the 43rd day of Russia's war against Ukraine, the speaker and participants discussed ongoing operations as well as the potential for conflict resolution. They also elaborated on the war's wider implications, whether in the Far East where China is threatening Taiwan or in the High North where the next confrontation with Russia could take place.

In his keynote address, General Domröse provided an assessment of combat operations in Ukraine to date and of their possible outcome. Among other things, he highlighted the poor performance of the Russian army: In his opinion, it has not only overestimated its own capacities and underestimated the scope of Ukraine's abilities, but more generally looks unfit to fight a war of the 21st century. "Russians are destroying everything because they are not successful", was one of the central messages in this regard, although a not particularly nuanced one.

Both the keynote and the ensuing discussion revolved around the potential global consequences of the war in Ukraine. It is likely to contribute to the global power shift towards an emerging bloc formation pitting democracy against autocracy, one led by the West and the other by Russia and China. Another consequence is that the EU must do more in terms of its own security: the share of U.S. spending on defence among NATO members has hovered around 70 percent over the past two decades, which means that the other 29 nations reach only 30 percent combined. Numbers aside, if the EU strives for 'European sovereignty', it must invest more in its security.

With a view to an eventual end of war in Ukraine, General Domröse saw May 9th, the Soviet Union's victory day in World War II, as the key moment. At that point, Russian President Vladimir Putin would need some sort of "victory", which is why the fighting could end then. The most important question for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky will be how to guarantee Ukraine's sovereignty while making territorial compromises. Putin wants to retain the Crimean Peninsula (annexed in 2014) and the entire Donbass region (already claimed by two separatist republics), and possibly also the strategic port city of Odessa on the Black Sea. This is exactly what Zelensky rules out. So, for now there is no area of common interest; instead, it is a zero-sum game.

Even though a battlefield compromise will be necessary at some point, Putin is no longer a partner for the West. Should he politically survive the war he started, it will be necessary for NATO to better protect the Baltic States, Poland, and other countries on its Eastern flank. For an aggressive Russia, it would be very easy to invade the small countries on its Western border, like Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania.

Another issue discussed was the war's effect on the probability of China attacking Taiwan, which the general saw as low. First, Taiwan had been completely "Americanized", as its army was well equipped with highly sophisticated U.S. weapons and trained with U.S. counterparts. Second, beyond looking militarily well prepared, the country is an island, which is not so easy to attack. Third, China would not dare such an ugly adventure as Russia has just done. It would not rush into anything, remaining calm and patient for years, if necessary. Fourth, China knows that the West would not leave Taiwan alone in case of an intervention. Based on the commitments

made in the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington would instead immediately rush to help. China's President Xi Jinping does not want to take the risk of provoking a major war.

Lastly, Russian military activities in the Arctic have increased over past years. To prevent any surprise, NATO needs to install better warning systems in that region. One question is whether Washington should redeploy soldiers to Iceland, a country that is part of NATO but does not have its own military. The U.S. has air force bases outside Reykjavik and conducts military exercises there from time to time but has not had permanent troops there since 2006. A redeployment of the U.S. Navy to the High North would be another tangible consequence of Russia's brutal war in Europe's East.

2.16 Regulating Big Tech: Ways to restore trust in the public sphere?

Speakers: *Paula Cipierre*, Head of Privacy and Public Policy (Germany & EU), Palantir Technologies, Berlin
               Anya Schiffrin, Director for Technology, Media, and Communictions, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York

Rapporteur: *Carolin Victoria Schürg*, Germany

Session 16:   Thursday, April 7

The discussion about the need for regulation of Big Tech and social media companies took 2016 as a starting point. That year, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States in a surprise to many. Much of the campaign had taken place on social media, where so-called 'fake news' spread. As a result, trust was lost not only in social media, but also in public media in general. From here on, the session looked at different pillars of trust in the media and in information platforms, whether current regulation – such as the EU's AI Act, the Digital Markets Act, or the Digital Services Act – is suitable to restore trust, and whether social media contribute to a greater polarization of society.

Anya Schiffrin started off the discussion by posing, and answering, the question why quality journalism currently cannot function properly. In her view, the 2016 campaign and its aftermath resulted in a loss of trust in the media quite generally due to social media being used for misinformation, 'fake news', and manipulation. This clearly demonstrated the concentration of power of Big Tech and social media companies in the sphere of public opinion making. She outlined three dimensions of trust: the credibility of the source, the content of the message, and the audience's characteristics. The first dimension explains why people have become more sceptical towards Big Tech companies ever since. Other reasons why people distrust such firms have to do with concerns about employees losing their jobs to machines, lacking transparency in the use of algorithms, and tax avoidance. Whereas she thus argued that all kinds of regulations are needed to restore trust in Big Tech companies, Paula Cipierre maintained that many tech companies like Palantir, the leading data-analytics company she works for, embrace regulation, and find it important in its own right.

The EU is now preparing several pieces of tech regulation, putting it ahead of the United States in that respect. The Digital Services Act (DSA) for instance obliges large platforms to assess the risks their services impose on society and come up with respective solutions on a yearly basis. While Anya Schiffrin regretted that the legislation was not as strict as it could be due to effective lobbying from tech companies, she still viewed it as a step forward that will hopefully entice Washington to come up with better regulation. Already the EU's general data protection regulation (GDPR) was a watershed moment and a huge success, Paula Cipierre added, especially in influencing data protection legislation around the world. Another upcoming EU regulation is on artificial intelligence (AI), with the AI Act attempting to classify different types of AI and determine how to deal with them. This effort notwithstanding, Paula Cipierre warned that AI is a fuzzy term that is not easily defined, making the legislation vulnerable to over- or under-exclusion.

Given Anya Shiffrin's repeated criticism of Palantir co-founder Peter Thiel for his financing of Donald Trump's election campaign, the group then debated whether companies can be considered separate from its leaders. Paula Cipierre argued it was

dangerous to conflate the two, since any firm is made up of more than just a single individual. She felt that corporations need to welcome a diversity of views given the complex topics they work with and face in this world. Moreover, she argued that singling out individuals exacerbates the polarization of society, losing the ability to talk to on another especially when people disagree. The two speakers concurred on this point about polarization, but Anya Schiffrin insisted that some individuals like Thiel are far away from the mainstream of discussion and powerful simply because of their wealth. In the end, she argued it should not be private money ruling the public sphere.

2.17 Democracy and pandemics

Speaker: *Laura Spinney,* Science Journalist, Novelist, and Non-Fiction Writer, Paris

Rapporteur: *Ilaria Del Vecchio*, Italy

Session 17: Friday, April 8

The keynote touched upon one of the hot topics globally of the last two years: the interaction between states and pandemics. In particular, it focused on the benefits of autocracy versus democracy in the governance of such plagues. The outcome of Laura Spinney's studies demonstrates that democracies, contrary to what one may think, are far from a helpless, hopeless case when compared to autocracies.

Laura Spinney waded through the issue of democracy vs autocracy in times of pandemic by giving an overview of how different countries dealt with the coronavirus disease. She also underlined some of the elements that should be considered in the post-Covid-19 phase.

Over the past two years, there has been some debate as to how various governments responded to the pandemic, and why. Some scholars assume that democracies are helpless in an epidemic, while autocracies can be forceful and responsive. Democracies, they surmise, tend to attribute emergency powers to the government but policymaking itself is still elaborate; autocracies, in contrast, are free to adopt radical and swift policies in response to a spreading pandemic. Others, like Eberhard Sandschneider, the Summer School's co-dean, claim that a pandemic is not a good case to compare democratic and autocratic systems, as each country responded to it differently regardless of its political system.

The speaker, instead, made her case by stating that a pandemic accentuates trends that have already been in place before. The way this reaction in turn affects the economy and civil liberties, for example, is shaped by the political nature of a country. An autocracy does not have to comply with the rule of law and can simply refuse to disclose data about the virus. China, for example, suppressed most of the information about the SARS virus that spread in 2002-2004, leading to a hard hit in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Despite such secrecy, China as well as other Southeast Asian states afterwards invested in better healthcare systems. Western democracies, in contrast, were not used to epidemics, whether originating from a virus or bacterial infections; consequently, hospital there were not ready to address Covid-19. Other democratic countries of the Global South, in contrast, like Senegal, learned a lesson from the Ebola epidemic in 2014, providing for better governance in case of health emergencies.

Covid-19 has spread far and wide enough to prioritize the governance of a pandemic as a fundamental global challenge. Yet, the World Health Organization (WHO), the intergovernmental body created with the purpose of addressing and preventing global health emergencies, has failed in this task. With some countries accusing it of being partisan and cutting its budget substantially, it appears to have lost the level of trust and legitimacy needed for joint action. In addition to improving the response at country level, strengthening global mechanisms before the next pandemic is key.

2.18 Crossing Borders – Where is Europe's Migration and Asylum Policy Heading?

Speakers: *Theresa Breuer*, Journalist, Activist and Founder of "Kabul Luftbrücke"
Lara Chedraoui, Musician, Intergalactic Lovers
Anne Koch, Associate, Global Issues, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP)
Larry Macaulay, Founder „Refugee Radio Network"
Shila Behjat, Journalist and Author, ARTE (moderator)

Rapporteur: *Solomiya Borshosh*, Ukraine

Session 18: Friday, April 8

The panel discussion touched upon the question of migration and asylum policies in the European Union. The refugee crises of today as well as previous years prove that the EU needs to fundamentally reconsider its policies to respond more effectively, more efficiently, and in a more just and equitable way to future migration flows.

The Russian war against Ukraine has caused yet another wave of refugees in Europe. In contrast to previous 'refugee crises', most EU member states have demonstrated a high level of hospitality toward Ukrainians, at least in the first two months of the war.

However, this appears to be rather an exception than a sign of fundamental change in the EU's current migration and asylum policies. The latter prove to be an example of constant disregard of the principle of equality before the law that is one of the essential components of rule of law. That is despite the existing international legal framework, the 1951 Refugee Convention as well as a set of other human rights conventions, asking states to help – rather than to erect obstacles for – those seeking refuge or asylum.

Therefore, the EU not only has to fundamentally reconsider its migration and asylum policies to allow for justice and equality for all, but also to be able to respond to future migration flows. The latter will most probably get only more frequent and impactful, whether due to climate change, enduring armed conflicts, or other causes. Such policy change can be achieved if both political *and* humanitarian dimensions are considered.

For new policies to be more effective and just, a long-term framework should be embraced. The following factors should be considered when developing new regulations:

- The unused potential of refugees is one of the most striking neglects of the current "quota-based and unwelcoming policies", as one of the speakers called them, under the current Dublin Regulation framework. Refugee ghettoization in camps exacerbates the problem even more. Thus, how to better house and integrate refugees should be a priority in finding new solutions.

- Civil society is already a very active actor in helping those fleeing conflict zones and seeking refuge in the EU. Sometimes civil society organisations are the *only* actors that approach refugees with a humanitarian perspective. Thus, better cooperation between them and governments is needed, helping to channel the support they provide more efficiently and to achieve better outcomes in a long run. Besides, a mechanism for governments to take over civic initiatives of refugee support so that they live up to their legally defined responsibility in this sphere should be developed. This is expected to ensure the comprehensibility and sustainability of actions taken.

- While some observers may see the externalisation of the previous refugee crises to transit countries outside the EU as a pragmatic and effective solution, this approach at least must comply with the spirit and the letter of the existing legal framework, including the EU's own laws.

- Finally, migration and asylum-seeking should also be considered from an economic perspective. "While some people are taking boats or hiding underneath trucks just to pass a border, other refugees can order first-class transportation", one speaker said. Both groups are usually in desperate need of saving their lives by taking refuge outside conflict zones, but each of them has their own economic needs. Thus, a more detailed analysis of refugees' needs may help to understand and help the poorest, and thus make the public budget spendings more efficient.

2.19 Europe after Putin's War on Ukraine

Keynote:	*Timothy Garton Ash*, Professor of European Studies, University of Oxford
Panelists:	*Haki Abazi*, Member of Parliament, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo
	Maria Mezentseva, Member of Parliament, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine
	Wolfgang Schmidt, Federal Minister for Special Affairs and Head of the Chancellery
	Soren Urbansky, Research Fellow and Head of Office, Pacific Regional Office of the German Historical Institute Washington
	Ali Aslan, International TV Host and Moderator (Moderator)
Rapporteur:	*Mahima*, India
Session 19:	Friday, April 8

With the war in Ukraine still raging, this session tackled one of the most pressing challenges of our time – how to stop a war without further escalation? Only when the war has ended, can Europe's post-war future be thought of. For this, there are mainly two options: Imposing sanctions on Russia and providing weapons to Ukraine to defend itself. While it could be argued that the West is not doing enough on either account, the reality is far more complex. The session also discussed the potential role of China in ending the war in Ukraine.

With Ukraine fighting for its sovereignty against Russia's aggression for more than 40 days, Timothy Garton Ash demanded three things from 'the West': tough sanctions, heavy weapons, and a clear recognition of Ukraine as an EU candidate country. He noted that while the sanctions imposed on Russia are unprecedented and more severe than the ones imposed during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, they are clearly not enough to stop this war. Whereas the United States banned imports of Russian oil and gas, European states have avoided such measures for fairly obvious reasons: they are hugely dependent on these imports.

The recent hikes in energy prices have in fact weakened the sanctions already imposed. Moreover, by continuing to buy crude from Russia, Western Europe is in effect co-financing the aggression against Ukraine, Garton Ash argued. Stopping Russia militarily therefore requires a halt to energy imports from Russia, as economic concerns should not trump the saving of a nation. Further, the West in general and NATO in particular have not been too generous in providing weapons to Ukraine either, he continued, allowing Moscow to carry on its invasion. Only by imposing immediate severe sanctions on Russia and providing heavy weaponry to Ukraine can the West make a sincere contribution to help Ukraine defend itself against Russian aggression.

Wolfgang Schmidt responded that Germany is doing the best it can to support Ukraine. It regularly supplies weapons but does not make a press release each time because of security concerns. The issue of imposing an energy embargo on Russia, in turn, is a more complex issue, he opined. Yes, western Europe is heavily dependent especially on Russian gas, the majority of which comes through pipelines running from east to west and therefore cannot easily be re-routed. Further, there is only a given amount of gas available to the world. A global embargo on Russian gas would therefore mean to reduce the world's supply of gas, making already soaring energy prices skyrocket. With

a global food crisis emerging due to constraints in wheat supply (on account of the war but mainly driven by high energy and transportation costs), the world will witness a catastrophe if the West were to impose a gas ban. Thus, energy sanctions, and in particular a ban on gas imports, does not offer an easy solution.

Russian President Vladimir Putin made a calculative decision to go to war against Ukraine. He understands that, historically speaking, embargoes have failed to quickly end a conflict. Most of the outside world want this war to remain between two nations only, which means that Ukraine will have to fight for itself. The West will only help Kyiv as much as it can without risking further escalation. Some nonetheless argued that France and Germany had an additional responsibility to stand for Ukraine as they vetoed the country's NATO application in 2008, thus making it vulnerable to Russia in the first place. Moreover, Europe missed the moment of imposing an embargo in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea, or when it intervened in Syria in 2015.

Participants also discussed China's role in the ongoing war. Put simply, Beijing wants the war to end soon but with a weaker Ukraine as neither part of the EU nor of Russia. It already has invested heavily in Ukraine on account of its Belt and Road Initiative, so a weakened country would be ideal to help it develop on Chinese terms. Moreover, given its interest to take over Taiwan, Beijing watches very carefully how broad-based economic and financial sanctions affect Russia. This only makes it more important for Europe to put China in its place with a tough stance against Russia, one of the speakers argued.

Lastly, it was noted that China and Russia are building a strategic partnership based on similar geopolitical interests. Both countries have a common enemy, the United States, and their economic interests overlap too. However, trade relations between China and the EU plus the United Kingdom are ten times the size of Sino-Russian ties. Europe must leverage this superior economic relationship to make China understand that it is not a good idea to be an ally of Russia. A potential solution to end this war would require China to get closer to the Western position as this would isolate Putin. It is also important for Europe to have a united stance against Russia now to ensure a safe future for Europe against potential Russian attacks in future.

2.20 Forced Movement. How to deal with imminent streams of migration?

Facilitators: *Björn Warkalla, Helen Böhmler,* and *Tabea Böker*, Associates, Planpolitik, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Syed Mafiz "Onik" Kamal*, Bangladesh

Session 20: Saturday, April 9

In this workshop, participants took up the roles of high-level EU decision-makers having to react to a crisis under time constraints. One "situation room" tackled Russia's war against Ukraine, the other the EU's asylum and migration policy. What was interesting is that every participant used their personal experiences to come up with solutions that were idealistic and built on diverse inputs. Plus, they all assigned a critical role to Germany as the pivotal European actor.

In a mix-and-match setup, participants worked consecutively in different small groups and on either challenge. Prepped with a relevant factsheet on the given policy challenge containing 'lines of discussion', i.e., the most pressing arguments for or against any changes, the groups were asked to come up with a solution via three tweets. The whole idea was to find solutions fast!

As a response to the war in Ukraine, the EU has triggered its long-dormant "Temporary Protection Directive" whereby it opened its doors to refugees from non-EU countries. The group's task as part of the European Commission's crisis unit was to give three recommendations fitting into 144 characters. The tweet which got the most 'likes' proposed an EU-wide system for mandatory registration and data-sharing and to provide minimum quotas for migrants. Most groups suggested an EU-wide platform for data, possibly as a blockchain-based platform. A quota system, in contrast, was broadly discussed but ultimately not proposed, as it did not look "implementable." One group focused on building public private partnership in refugee management projects, especially to activate shared-economy actors like Uber.

Interestingly, the discussion mostly focused on short-term strategy rather than looking into long-term solutions. Yet, the main question is how long will countries be welcoming refugees? The current honeymoon will not last long, and frictions will emerge in host communities. Just like in similar situations around the world, post-war rehabilitation and solving issues of migration and return must be part of same deal. The lowest common denominator for now was that there had to be better data-sharing, like securing accessible data hubs for migrants and refugees. This notwithstanding, the working groups also yielded some interesting hashtags: #InformedSolidarity, #EU4UA, #BalanceofFreedomFund, and #EuroSystem.

The situation room tackling the EU's common asylum and migration policy considered reforming the current Dublin System regulating the current approach. Interestingly, while everyone agreed that the system needed reform, nobody proposed an actual agenda for change. Almost all proposals were about local level improvements, including better information dissemination to both immigrants and hosts. In other words, the solution was to mainly create a "welcome culture." Broadening the discussion beyond the Ukraine crisis, participants acknowledged that Eastern European countries, which previously were opposing any liberal migration policy, might now become more moderate as they understand the need for burden-sharing. One interesting idea that came up was to facilitate asylum-seeking by setting up "EU migration desks" in high-risk hotspots around the world.

In both situation rooms it became clear that Germany needs to provide leadership on the migration issue, given the resources at its disposal. The role of civil society was also commonly acknowledged, given how such organizations can translate ideas into groundwork across Europe. Improving existing legislative frameworks and treating migration as a human right will also facilitate better policies. As it happens, the Ukraine crisis is the golden opportunity for broadscale migration policy reform thanks to widespread public support.

2.21 Trying to find Europe's Identity – Searching for a European Public

Speakers: *Erik Kessels*, Artist, Curator and Communication Designer, Amsterdam
Wolfgang Bergmann, CEO, Arte Germany
Susan Neiman, Director, Einstein Forum

Rapporteur: *Viet-Chi Pham*, Germany

Session 21: Saturday, April 9

What are European values, and how do they make up the foundation of the European identity? This panel taking place during EuropaCamp 2022 discussed the importance, and relative neglect of the existence of European values. While it sometimes seems as if these are entrenched in the European way of life in all things cultural, political and economic, the appreciation for those values often only comes to light when people realize that these are being taken away from them.

Erik Kessels started off the session with a keynote speech, demonstrating through examples of his past work in advertising how to explore the varieties of European identity. This has allowed him to experience how truly diverse European culture is.

The long-discussed question whether a European identity actually exists came up again during the current discourse about the war in Ukraine. In response to Russia's aggression, people of all walks of life hear of, and call for whatever they perceive as European solidarity. Here, speakers agreed that European identity is the refutation of any single identity. Its true significance is that European identity is an overarching term for an incredibly heterogonous mixture of *identities*, all based on the same set of values.

Some people, however, posit that there is no such thing as European values. It was argued, in turn, that one has to take a closer look at the discourse outside of Europe to understand and appreciate what makes up European values – which is a set of democratic rights that may be completely absent in non-European countries. As it happens, European citizens rarely take the time to appreciate what they have already achieved so far. Yet, it is exactly this acknowledgement of progress that Europeans need in order to move further in their debate about European identity.

The discourse about European values and identity should move away from an inflexible political definition as much as from the economic union concept which is regarded as the building block of European identity. The panelists argued that the war in Ukraine should be a wakeup call to all Europeans to take this moment as a starting point to rebuild the idea of what European identity and values are. In the end, what counts more than any top-down paper tiger concept of the EU is how identity and values can be lived and experienced as a bottom-up emotion.

2.22 No end in sight for the EU's democracy crisis?

Speakers:	*Markus Kotzur*, Professor for International and European Law, Hamburg University; Director of Studies, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg
	Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, Professor of European and Comparative Law, University of Gdánsk; Principal Investigator, RECONNECT H2020 Research Project
	Zsuzsanna Végh, Researcher, European University Viadrina
	Julia Strasheim, Deputy Managing Director, Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt Stiftung (Moderator)
Rapporteur:	*Vera Kadas*, Hungary
Session 22:	Saturday, April 9

The panel attempted to unveil the underlying causes behind the unravelling of the rule of law in some EU member states. The discussion focused on how illiberal democracies could develop in Hungary and Poland, and what this means for the EU at large. The speakers provided insights into what could be done to resolve the democratic crisis in the EU, for example by supporting grassroots level action and encouraging citizens to take active responsibility for the continuation of the European project.

One of the main questions centred on how Hungary and Poland ended up as illiberal democracies, even though the latter used to be a "poster child for democratization" as Julia Strasheim put it. Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz explained that Poland until recently fought hard against allowing a single political entity to have absolute power. Accession to the EU was the manifestation of its people's will to become part of a community of law, justice, and respect for all. However, since 2015 the Polish government has not only been violating EU law but has effectively operated under a different definition of rule of law. In his view, the EU's 'rule of law crisis' is in essence equal to an identity crisis.

Zsuzsanna Végh described the methodical dismantling of Hungarian democracy and rule of law beginning in 2010. She explained how the Hungarian government has since viewed the Western community as losing against other rising powers and decided to pursue a policy of 'Eastern opening'. This, however, endangers the EU and NATO by giving political favours to partners such as Moscow (e.g., by turning a blind eye on a Russian hack of the country's own Foreign Ministry). While the Hungarian government has condemned Russia's aggression in Ukraine, it does not consider the war as having anything to do with Hungary. Such rhetoric also dominated the last stretch of the 2022 electoral campaign, in which the governing Fidesz party painted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as an opponent and vowed to protect Hungary's economic interests (which are tied to Russia).

Markus Kotzur ventured that the EU could in fact have prevented Poland and Hungary from becoming illiberal democracies. First, it should have been more cautious in the enlargement process, ensuring that not only economic but also political integration is accounted for. Second, it should have better understood the differences among member states as regards the rule of law, given that the EU's legitimacy also depends on the constitutional infrastructure of its member states. Third, once the two countries had embarked on their illiberal paths, the EU should have been more outspoken and less afraid of confrontation. He considered that strengthening the EU means strengthening its institutions, as "functioning institutions help solve conflicts in a

peaceful manner". Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz recalled that when the EU's construction was based on a 'never again' pledge, no one would have anticipated illiberal democracies among EU members. He explained that as younger generations had not witnessed the war and its aftermath leading to the EU's founding, the European project needed to find a new story to inspire its citizens. After all, "the EU will not be saved by von der Leyen or faceless bureaucrats, but by us, EU citizens".

In conclusion, the panellists concurred that the EU is at a critical juncture, with populism rising not only in Eastern Member States, but also elsewhere. Therefore, all citizens would have to do their part to ensure that the European project can continue its successful path.

2.23 Advocating for a More Inclusive Transatlantic Partnership

Speakers: *Timothy Rivera*, Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Advisor to the CEO, World Learning & School of International Training (SIT)
Maryum Saifee, Senior Policy Advisor, Secretary's Office for Diversity and Inclusion, U.S. Department of State
Rapporteur: *Elisa Seith*, Brussels
Session 23: Saturday, April 9

"Diversity is a national security imperative." Hence, the session centred on how diversity and inclusion can make for a more resilient, creative, and solution-oriented (transatlantic) society. So far, however, despite being acknowledged as a crucial element for democratic institutions to adapt and thrive, diversity remains the 'underdog' of everyday business, organizational management, and development strategies. To overcome this, the conversation explored issues related to re-discovering one's history through a new lens, looking at structural inequities and actively overcoming them, and, foremost, changing the culture of how diversity is valued in the societies on each side of the Atlantic.

The White Man has had a great life so far. White society as a whole has profited significantly, building systems that have brought wealth and kept accelerating a particular segment of society upwards. It even provided the opportunity to 'volunteer' and give back to those that this system has left behind. Unfortunately, by only including the White Man's view, an impressive number of problems have been created that the White Men alone cannot solve. The actual solution, then, is counter-intuitive: Sharing the 'great cake' with many more, long excluded segments of society. Of course, this means running the risk of losing significance, power and most of all, money, in the process; however, it is the only solution to this mess.

Investing in diversity and inclusion is an intrinsic interest for societies that aim to find better solutions, be more creative, effective, resilient, adaptive, innovative, productive – and the list could go on forever. There is no 'catch' with diversity, it was argued. So why is it still so widely opposed? All over the United States and Europe, a growing divide is emerging between those who think it is time to solve our problems with all the brainpower we can tap into, and those who fear they will lose their dominant role in society in the process. How to get out of this conundrum?

The overarching theme of the discussion with Timothy Rivera and Maryum Saifee was that with time and active agency from excluded groups, a lot can be achieved. The world is witnessing the beginning of a diversity revolution, where people that have previously been excluded are finally getting into positions of power. They are fighting like lions for the right not to have to fight all their lives. Therefore, a new transatlantic narrative is needed, one that makes diversity, inclusion, and equal rights a new, unique selling point for the West. This would also lend a competitive advantage in a world without compass, providing a moral centre of gravity. Timothy also brought up an interesting point of learning from each other in a transatlantic community, which could redefine the present understanding of what it means to be European or American. The significant cultural power of influencing worldviews through the film industry will also play a role in how quickly people can re-think inclusion and diversity.

The world is facing a moment of historic alignment, as Maryum put it, meaning the critical point of uncovering the full extent and impact of structural inequalities is near. In particular, a new era of mass migration movements is about to emerge, not only the

one currently sparked by Russia's war on Ukraine but also others. These will be triggered by the effects of climate change as well as a great push for urbanization as a result of massive population growth.

To overcome these structural inequalities, action is needed mostly on two levels: First, by empowering communities from the bottom-up, adapting inclusion and diversity strategies to local conditions, needs and priorities. Because the one-size-fits-all approach is responsible for the current calamity, the key now lies in finding targeted and contextualised solutions. Second, by making policies not just *for* excluded segments of society but *with them* and *by them*. This means to give all those a voice who have been silenced in the process for so long.

The question on how to leverage data was another big topic. Only precise and disaggregated, but anonymous data on society, and on how White-dominated power systems affect its composition, can help develop targeted measures and include the right groups in the process. This, however, requires a careful balancing act of harvesting data without building boxes and potentially creating more bias within technological solutions.

Finally, the session highlighted the power of representation. How a society chooses its leaders today can lay the foundation of how children will be enabled to dream about their future. Having the first Black female judge appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in the institutions 233-year history (as happened during the seminar) can serve as a living example of this. The session eventually concluded on a hopeful note, given that despite so many challenges, society may just stand a fighting chance to solve them – through the power of diversity and inclusion. Still, the question remains – why start only now?