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A Disrupted World and the Future of the Liberal Order

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Contents

1 Executive Summary

In 2018, the jury is still out on where a disrupted world is heading: Illiberal forces are on the rise, both within democracies and in a global context, and violent conflict continues to flare up in many parts of the globe. People seem to feel that the world is out of joint, that something new is afoot – yet they differ on what this may mean for them, both at a personal level and within their societies. While some countries are closing off in response, rejecting migration flows as much as economic openness, others are trying to foster multilateral cooperation to be stronger together.

Against this backdrop, 61 young women and men, coming from all corners of the globe and with considerable professional experience in politics, business, civil society, academia, and the military, embarked on two intensive weeks of discussions in Hamburg, Berlin, and Paderborn. The 2018 Bucerius Summer School focused on crucial issues such as multilateralism, the role of emerging powers and global governance; globalization and the state of finance; the volatile situation in the middle east; transnational topics such as terrorism, extremism, and cyber security; as well as the economic and political developments in Europe and worldwide.

This report presents the essence of their deliberations, each session summarized by one volunteer rapporteur from the group. This executive summary is meant to put these individual reports into perspective, though without possibly doing justice to the richness of the discussions among the participants.

Broadly speaking the debates focused on three overarching themes:

- What to make of the visible disruptions of the liberal international order 'as we know it'?
- How to deal with challenges that continue to exist regardless of this meta-transformation, such as violent conflicts or persisting inequalities?
- And what possible solutions could this group of promising and dynamic achievers come up with?

The main question regarding the current disruptions was whether liberal democracy was 'only' under a periodical threat or at an historic turning point. The latter is underscored by a parallel drawn to previous periods of upheaval, such as how the invention of the printing press led to the Reformation and the Thirty Years war in Europe, and how the ensuing industrialization created social and national conflicts that ended in two world wars. Yet for now it seems impossible to fathom the depths of the current changes.

With regard to why the liberal model is under threat, the responses differed. One fundamental change appears to be the United States' newly displayed unwillingness to underwrite the liberal system of global governance it helped create 70 years ago. While some argued that this was a recent – and possibly not lasting – trend, others said that *America First* was simply a return to earlier times that were overshadowed by the (seemingly) multilateralist, melting-pot America of the past half-century.

A second factor in weakening of the liberal order is the changing role of China. Generally understood to be the next big global power, Beijing does accept a rules-based, global liberal economic order for states, even asking for more power *within* it. Yet it denies the universality of rules guaranteeing individual rights and liberties.

The current period of socio-economic disruption is accompanied by a rapid shift of balance of power towards not just China but also to emerging powers more broadly.

In raw numbers, western democracies' share of the world's economic production has dropped over the past 30 years from 80 to 47 per cent, with further decline expected. Crucially, with its remarkable economic transformation, China has disproven the Western belief that innovation requires freedom. Developing economies in particular therefore look to the Chinese model combining economic and technological progress with strict political control as a viable alternative.

Thirdly, ten years after the onset of the financial crisis, it has become clear how destructive major societal and economic changes have been even while seeking to improve quality of life. Though millions were lifted out of poverty, others suffered setbacks, in particular the global middle class. Thus, whether someone considers the recent past as a challenge or opportunity, largely depends on where in the world they live. And still, much of the current boom is – unsustainably – debt-financed: Debt is at an historic peak of 164 trillion US dollars, or 20 per cent of the global economy.

In short, the liberal world order has failed to deliver on some of its promises. Being less inclusive than it initially appeared, liberalism fostered inequalities between economic 'winners' and 'losers'. This in turn has fueled populist and nationalist tendencies in many parts of the world, as some people now associate the removal of borders with job losses and the erosion of national identity. It has furthermore allowed societies to establish 'silos' of poorly connected publics. In these, otherwise reasonable people have become consumers of disinformation and populist polemics.

While polarization has been highest in the two 'heartlands' of liberal democracy, the United Kingdom and the United States, also broader Europe has been affected. In particular the young democracies in central and eastern Europe have witnessed a backlash against globalization, driven by persistent growth gaps vis-à-vis their Western neighbors, a shorter institutional memory of democracy, and possibly a nostalgia for the 'quiet old days' of communism.

Thus even in Europe the center is shrinking, but it is still holding. The middle class has not contracted as much as in the United States and social welfare is upheld, meaning less economic disaffection. Rather than provoke a further splintering of the EU, Brexit – and the difficult state of the negotiations about Britain's withdrawal from the EU – is actually bringing member states closer together. At the other end of the spectrum, the EU is nowhere near overcoming the nation state; instead, it was created to protect the latter – a task in which it has been so effective that people in Europe fail to see its original contribution.

Besides this very fundamental shift in the global power balances, a number of challenges – both traditional and new – persist. The middle east continues to be volatile and violent, as it provides a stage for receding powers such as the United States, resurgent ones such as Russia, and emerging ones such as China and Turkey. Comprising very different countries and territories, from Qatar with the second highest per-capita income in the world to Yemen where an average citizen lives of roughly a dollar per day, the region defies easy definition. Yet every nation there is close to conflict in some form or the other, thus providing testimony to Leo Tolstoy's famous the quote that "all happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way."

Despite those differences, extremism – both politically motivated and fueled by religion – constitutes a region-wide phenomenon. While being largely defeated on the battle field, the self-styled 'Islamic State' is not yet dead; its inherent idea is merely mutating. It is hard to battle a radical ideology that is rooted in the faith of more than one billion people without limiting the liberties of those who are merely pious

followers. At the same time, counter-terrorism operations have also brought an abuse of powers and human rights. More broadly, so-called 'fragile states' are vulnerable to risks regarding political, societal, economic, environmental, and security issues while lacking the capacity to cope with them.

Then again, individual countries seem to struggle with very 'normal' problems even in a conflict-ridden region like the middle east. Iran is a complex society facing the contradictions of modernity as it strives to preserve its unique historical identity and Islamic traditions. Simultaneously, its people are searching for 'normality', e.g. openness to technology, political freedoms, and better economic opportunities. Israel, for another, is undergoing a societal transformation in response to the global disruptions of the liberal order: More and more Diaspora Jews choose to leave their country of origin for fear of persecution and start a new live in Israel, while the more liberal and younger Israeli citizens emigrate from there to other (European) countries due to a right shift in country's political environment. Thus, immigration and emigration both intensify an existing trend towards social conservatism.

In particular from the point of view of Europe and the United States, Russia remains a challenge. The Cold War, it seems, is not over yet: For Moscow, the real confrontation is still with the West. That is why it keeps stoking conflict in eastern Ukraine and destabilizing European societies through disinformation campaigns, all while re-gaining its foothold in the middle east via its involvement in the war in Syria.

However, Russia also continues to be relevant because it is a nuclear weapons power second only to the United States. While recent disarmament talks between those countries have gone nowhere, Washington's withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal as well as ambivalent remarks of the U.S. president about the value of security assurances to Washington's Asian and European allies have created new anxieties. In an environment where nuclear non-proliferation has come under threat, any discussion about "global zero" disarmament appears unrealistic.

Women leadership, in contrast, constitutes a cross-cutting challenge for all societies. Unconscious biases and gender stereotypes persist throughout the world, leading to low numbers of women in executive and leadership positions and thus a lack of role models to empower future generations of female leaders. More fundamentally, though, any discussion about liberal democracy needs to recognize the pivotal role of women: They are the key players relating to more than half of the world's population.

Lastly, digitization enters the social world not through mindsets but through fast-changing technological developments. It may bring benefits such as cloud platforms, web applications, and the Internet-of-things, but also social exclusion, information insecurity, and the monetization of big data. Striking the right balance between these effects is crucial for every society, whether already advanced or still developing.

In the face of such challenges, the future liberal order should rest on an encompassing approach that could be labelled "inclusive multilateralism". Rather than taking governments as sole or even primary parts of the international system, the world needs to embrace the tenets of liberalism and include other actors – from global companies and influential foundations to civil society organizations, the media, and citizens themselves – to work towards creating a global society.

This should start in the very unit where liberalism was born and where most people of this planet soon will live: the city. Cities are the places to which people have been migrating for decades, so they have for a long time been coping with many of the challenges that states are now facing. They should strive to become a more permissive and generous environment for newcomers and at the same time engage

in multilateral cooperation in an ever more protectionist world. Cities are the place where liberal democracies need to deliver the living standards and freedoms their citizens expect. At this level, also the benefits of involving the corporate sector as well as civil society are obvious, and actionable strategies to master digitization can be directly applied.

Violent extremism, hate speech, and disinformation campaigns cannot be tackled by governments alone, even if they cooperate across borders. Instead, citizens and corporations need to come in and confront extremists at the local level, in schools and cultural institutions as much as at the work place. Even diplomacy, the age-old domain of inter-state relations, could receive a bottom-up boost, such as in finally creating peace between Israel and Palestine: With the wrong government incentives on both sides, the population should seek peace and security within their respective territories, sparked by the innovative ecosystem around Israel's tech start-ups.

If and when individual governments choose to support a multilateral approach, that is of course welcome too. Germany favors multilateralism because of the country's history but also because it responds to multi-faceted identities and provides stability. To strengthen the existing networks and build new ones, Berlin seeks to bolster both the EU and the UN as well as to work through flexible coalitions with like-minded countries. India could be one such partner, as it sees itself as a possible mediator trying to prevent a military confrontation between the United States and China. It is not only the largest democracy in the world, but also brings unique values to the table such as non-violent resistance to oppression, and inclusion.

Finally, the question of identity is crucial. Life on the European continent has long been characterized by the simultaneous presence of various identities, and people have individually been able to maintain multiple identities. The current migration debate calls the peaceful coexistence of such identities (plural!) into question. As a response, identities should be redefined in as inclusive a way as possible.

Rather than 'going back' to what was the liberal world order of the past decades, the world needs to go forward to achieve a new inclusive multilateralism. Advancing beyond the state-centric system, it should more systematically include civil society and the private sector. On the level of geopolitics, it should include non-Western countries by granting them legitimate power and the responsibility that comes with it. Economically speaking, it will have to be inclusive as to lift all boats when the tide is rising, not just the yachts while the sloops are drowned.

The Summer School's participants already have the open professional minds and the global spirit that it takes to address these challenges. Time for them to assume the institutional positions and operational means to put their ideas in practice.

Berlin, October 2018

2 Session reports

2.1 The Illiberal Disruption: Hard Choices for Europe

Speaker:	*Robin Niblett*, Director, Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London
Rapporteur:	*Andreas Audretsch*, Germany
Session 1:	Monday, August 13

After the cold war liberal democracy was thought to be the only possible world order. Today we see that idea being proven wrong. Illiberal politicians and thoughts are getting stronger, taking over the public debate. Yet we don't know if this is just a period of time or an historic turning point. In this opening session participants discussed the characteristics of liberal democracies and reasons for today's development.

What are the fundamental characteristics of a liberal democracy, Robin Niblett asked the group? The core of liberal democracies centers on the rule of law, the separation of powers, and a free civil society including media freedom.

This model is under threat because of fundamental changes in global governance. First, the United States is no longer willing to guarantee the liberal world order. Worse, the doctrine of „America First" is actually destroying it because a system based on rules for everybody cannot work in a setting where the only world power puts every other country on second (or third, fourth etc.) place. If might rules, then rules do not count anymore. A very strong example of this tendency is Washington's use of extraterritorial sanctions to impose its will on other countries (including allies such as Europe, Japan, and South Korea) to enforce its policies vis-à-vis a third country (say, Iran).

Second, the role of China is changing. The Middle Kingdom is set to be the next big global power. While it does accept a rules-based, global liberal economic order for states, it refuses the universality of rules guaranteeing individual rights and liberty.

Between a receding superpower and an emerging global power, Europe already feels the impact of the new situation. There is less security, given that the United States is no longer protecting Europe as reliably as before. Europe thus has to spend more on finding its own voice, but also on maintaining its security. This includes developing a coherent policy towards Russia as well as to its neighboring countries, both in the East and South.

More fundamentally, Europe has to clarify its concept of political integration. Should this continue at the present pace? Should it be limited to certain areas? What role do social issues play? Does it, ultimately, require some kind of European identity and how should this be defined? Either way, Europe will have to be the one to stand up for liberal democracy, especially if the United States does not.

The ensuing discussion further developed these points. A number of participants saw populism – from the right as well as from the left – at the center of these developments. This highlights the fact that the old division between left and right can no longer describe the situation; instead, one should talk about the division between open and closed societies.

One particular question posed was whether liberal democracies developed too fast and, possibly, too far in terms of their openness, beyond the point that the people were comfortable? More generally, can liberal democracies still deliver to their citizens the living standards and freedoms these expect, and is this model still attractive for other countries to follow?

The crisis is severe enough that we have to deal with it now, touching at the core of open societies' identity. Some wondered whether liberal-minded people are too pessimistic now, or whether they have been too optimistic 20 years ago? Others argued that, even though the liberal world is going through a fundamental crisis, one should not only ask for the minimal standards such as the rule of law and the separation of power, but continue to fight for women's rights, gay rights, against racism and climate change.

Given that much of the world is increasingly interconnected, the question whether people can develop their identity (or rather, identities) across borders, is crucial. Very often, (national) myths are part of such identities, providing the glue for a country or people. One participant asked whether "Verfassungspatriotismus", the German concept of patriotism built on a liberal constitution rather than a national narrative (let alone blood and soil), could possibly be attractive enough to hold people together, even though it is much more abstract than national stories.

Despite such soul-searching, the group concluded that, from an overall perspective, the world is a better place now compared to 30 years ago. Yet liberal democrats would have to look at reality in a much more detailed way. The many disruptions of the past have made people feel set back, betrayed and diminished. In order to keep the liberal world order, leaders have to give people a viable perspective within liberal democracy – both economically and emotionally.

2.2 The Illiberal Disruption: Temporary Detour or Historical Turning Point?

Speaker: *Charles A. Kupchan*, Senior Fellow, Council of Foreign Relations (CFR), Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Rapporteur: *Learta Hollaj*, Montenegro

Session 2: Monday, August 13

In pursuit of understanding whether the illiberal disruption we are facing today is a temporary detour or a turning point, it was considered essential to reflect on some of the reasons that brought us up to this point. In doing so, two main issues were outlined: First, how destructive major societal and economic changes have been even while seeking to improve the quality of our lives; and second, how the current world order is essentially framed by a rapid shift of in the global balance of power.

The world has conceivably reached a reflection point, Charles Kupchan started out. Values such as liberal democracy and multi-pluralist societies could no longer be taken for granted. In trying to fathom the reasons for this development, he drew a parallel between the world today and the one during the onset of the printing press and, later, industrialization. The former led to Reformation and the ensuing bloody Thirty Year war; the latter created social and national conflicts ending in two World Wars. The period beginning now possibly is as disruptive as the previous two and could cause even greater social dislocation all in pursuit of a better quality of life. It is therefore imperative to understand how to better adapt the socio-economic foundations of today's societies.

On top of this, the global balance of power is shifting. Once mainly concentrated in few global strategic centers, power has now radically shifted: Thirty years ago, western democracies would represent roughly 80% of the world's GDP; the share has now shrunk to 47% and is expected to decline further. Thus, the current period of socio-economic disruption is accompanied by a rapid shift of balance of power, underlying just how profound the re-distribution of power is.

In the discussion, participants further explored how this disruption is playing out on two sides of Atlantic. The two countries hit hardest by the late upswing of populist anger happen to be two-party systems, i.e. the United States and the United Kingdom. Here, angry voters have only two options to choose from. In particular U.S. President Donald Trump has known how to use the disappearance of the political center to his benefit. In particular, the disaffected voters 'left aside by globalization have his back, as Trump asked particular questions that had been out there for long without anyone daring ask them. How can the average American worker earn a living wage? Is the immigration system working? What are U.S. troops doing in Afghanistan?

Even though the president himself does not have good answers himself, he at least asks the questions that many Americans wanted to hear. Trump has provided a platform for 'unheard voices' to express themselves. While seeking to understand why similar questions have not been posed before, participants brought forward the argument that elite groups often are trapped in a bubble and do not understand the level of discontent outside that cocoon.

Moreover, Trump is tapping into part of the American identity that few non-Americans are familiar with. Many people around the world, Kupchan argued, see the United States as multilateralist, deeply internationalist, an advocate of democracy and pluralism, a melting pot, etc. This, however, is the recent America of the past half-century, while Trump's politics threaten to bring back an earlier America of white working-class Americans. Nonetheless, the fact that the United States is growing younger and less white, the pendulum is set to swing back – though it is uncertain as to how far it will actually swing back.

Europe, in contrast, appeared to be in a somewhat better political shape than the United States. With multiparty systems in place in EU countries, voters have the chance to support smaller parties, hence enabling the center left and center right to survive. The center may be shrinking, but is still holding. Moreover, social welfare is upheld, and the middle class has not shrunk as much as in the United States, meaning that economic disaffection is less. Still, the speaker and participants advised Europe to a) Do a better job in claiming back the pro-EU narrative; b) Step forward with regards to issues such as the integration of migration, defense, and economic policies; c) Stand up to the illiberalism prevalent also in Europa, and finally d) Not to give up on the transatlantic alliance.

At the global level, much more should be done to force collaboration between current and emerging (liberal) powers. China and America, the two leading powers, should consider working together to enable a peaceful environment in the face of current disruptions. One major question is whether democracy can function without political equality? Others argued that identity and economic prosperity go hand in hand, the latter activating the former. Or put the other way round: When people's needs are not met, then they start to care more about status. Participants therefore argued in favor of identities that are widely inclusive.

On a final note, it appeared that this particular political moment is the most serious crisis of the 'western world' in modern history. Only renewed activism – speaking up, and standing up, for dignity, tolerance, for facts over fiction, for the core values of democracy – can help us preserve societies that function across race, community and ethnic divides.

2.3 Ten Years after the Global Financial Crisis – Future Risks of the Global Economy

Speakers: *Karim Fonda*, Associate Fellow, Global Economy and Development, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
Paul Hiebert, Head of Systemic Risk and Financial Institutions Division, European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main
Thomas Mirow, Non-Executive Director and Senior Adviser, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of HSH Nordbank AG, Hamburg
Steffen Kern, Chief Economist and Head of Risk Analysis, European Securities and Markets Authority, Paris
Julia von Maltzan Pacheco, Associate Dean for Global Affairs, Fundação Getulio Vargas; Professor, São Paulo School of Business Administration, São Paulo

Rapporteur: *Afërdita Pustina*, Kosovo

Session 3: Monday, August 13

The speakers reflected on various issues that relate to the risks of the global economy, mostly from the financial perspective. Whilst the presentation revolved around lessons learnt from the financial crisis ten years ago, the latter's impact can still be felt today – worse, it might occur again.

Thomas Mirow highlighted that the true risks for another financial crisis are unclear and that forecasting the next one is difficult. However, reliable information such as the International Monetary Fund's 2018 reports show that global debt is at an historic peak of 164 trillion US dollars, or 20 per cent of the global economy. Debt comes in various shapes and forms, be it public or corporate debt or in the financial sector, including China's issuing of bonds and individual loans. These various types of debt could be a source of another financial crisis because of the speed of their growth and the lack of a clear strategy on how to deal with them. Whilst debt in general is needed to spur growth in an economy, when the ratio of debt to gross domestic product (GDP) is increasing, the likelihood of a bubble bursting is high.

The panel also highlighted the context and the relevance of regulatory processes in the financial industry. The financial crisis has caused insecurity among the general population, and it has weakened the social fabric resulting in populist movements around the globe. The financial markets have reflected these problems in the various contexts of financial and monetary policies including the recent 'Brexit' decision in the United Kingdom. It was noted that the EU would become a weaker player in the financial markets mostly due to a cut in capital markets by half, thus repositioning Brussels from an economic giant to a very inferior position in the global context. Moreover, the EU needs to be prepared for other potential departures from its membership and these will reflect on the bloc's financial capacity.

A third point mentioned by the panel was the importance of the emerging markets and developing economies. These constitute 60 per cent of global GDP, including new emerging powers such as Brazil and Turkey. In reality, however, the expected growth did not sufficiently materialize to catch up with advanced economies, not least because of persistent social inequality in these countries. AS a result, emerging economies still fail to reach the standard of developed economies for the general population. On more technical terms, the panel questioned the current methods of

GDP measurement, saying it is unclear whether they actually give us a clear picture of the global economy.

A final point related to how professions are changing due to technological advancements and their direct relation to the emerging markets. In 2020, employees in emerging economies will have to be very mobile and work in at least two to three professions in life. This is why education and learning are extremely important, and this is so far lacking in emerging markets. On the other hand, various developments such as automatization in the car industry have not decreased the number of jobs, but rather moved them to other sectors such as IT skills.

As a conclusion, the world needs more flexibility and mobility. It has to be ready and attentive to changes that are provoked by developments in the financial sector, due to its integral importance in the economy. Finally, the developing economies should support a growing workforce to adapt to the coming disruptions in order to be resilient and adapt quicker to rapid changes around the globe.

2.4 Are Nuclear Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Dead?

Speaker: *Gary Samore*, Executive Director for Research, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA

Rapporteur: *Tim Rauschan*, Germany

Session 4:   Tuesday, August 14

Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation, two corner stones of the liberal world order based on bilateral and multilateral treaties, remain alive for now. Nuclear disarmament continues to be a long-term goal without short-term implementation in sight, but bilateral arms control measures between the United States and Russia have a chance of regaining traction. Historically speaking the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been tremendously successful, but the current U.S. administration is changing the ground: by creating new dynamics with North Korea, yet without denuclearization being likely; by reneging on the Iran nuclear deal despite Tehran's continued compliance; and by questioning existing security alliances with Europe (NATO) and East Asia which so far incentivized allies not to pursue nuclear weapons. How severe these challenges will turn out to be largely depends on whether President Trump will win a second term.

To start a meaningful discussion on such an elaborate topic, some basic definitions are in order. *Nuclear arms control* refers to limiting the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons for those countries who already have acquired them. *Nuclear disarmament* means to reduce existing stockpiles, possibly towards complete *denuclearization*. *Nuclear non-proliferation* is about preventing non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring them in the first place. In total, there are nine *nuclear powers*: The United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France (as the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and officially recognized nuclear weapon states) as well as India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea (as unofficial nuclear powers).

All nuclear powers are likely to retain their weapons, which they regard as essential to their security. So far, no reliable international security assurance has been presented which would make any of them likely to change their mind. While nuclear disarmament is thus not realistic for the time being, "arms control is not dead" yet, as the speaker said. Especially Russia and the United States, who between them own nine out of ten of the world's nuclear weapons, have the opportunity to revive existing arms control treaties, such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, despite recent challenges.

Also nuclear non-proliferation has been "remarkably successful" according to Gary Samore, in particular thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970. Before, then-U.S. President John F. Kennedy had warned of two dozen nuclear weapon states by the 1970s. Instead, many developed countries possessing the necessary economic and industrial base as well as mastering civilian nuclear technology to theoretically build nuclear weapon systems chose not to pursue this path based on American security guarantees. As a result, most areas of the world are not at risk of nuclear proliferation. Iran's nuclear program and North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons, however, create pressure on other actors in the Middle East and East Asia to pursue nuclear weapons. While Iran has – so far –

successfully been prevented from acquiring these, North Korea is an obvious case of failure.

The current U.S. administration has inserted new dynamics into the field of non-proliferation. It has questioned historic alliances and agreements with consequences yet to be determined. Its stance on North Korea has been unconventional and had some initial success with Pyongyang destroying test sites and announcing a moratorium on nuclear tests. However, the regime is unlikely to move much further. In the end, the standoff comes down to a question of sequencing: While Washington says "give up nuclear weapons and we'll be nice to you", Pyongyang responds "be nice to us first, only then we'll give up nuclear weapons", Samore paraphrased. On Iran, the Trump administration left the Iran deal, also known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and unilaterally resumed tough economic sanctions. This has alienated European allies and deepened the transatlantic divide, with Iran still complying with the terms of the deal trying to wait out the current administration.

The damage, however, goes further, as the historic deal of providing American security guarantees in exchange for the non-pursuit of nuclear weapons is in danger as well. By proposing that allies should obtain – and pay for – their own nuclear weapons, the U.S. President has created enormous uncertainty and a hitherto "unknown level of European distrust towards White House". If these threats have so far only had limited impact, it is because people perceive a discrepancy between the president and his administration at-large. Many policymakers in East Asia and Europe still believe that the U.S. government remains committed to these alliances and that the president's personal views are merely aberrations.

This, however, would change dramatically with the further consolidation of Trump's views on the administration and, ultimately, his re-election in 2020. In that case, the pressure for nuclearization would increase for industrialized countries in both East Asia and Europe. A similar logic applies to Turkey if a deterioration of its relations with the United States and European countries were to jeopardize its NATO membership. These countries have the basic capabilities to purse nuclear weapons within a short time-frame, as they can fairly easily acquire sufficient amounts of nuclear fissile material and weaponize it. At the same time a second term would also force Iran to reconsider its continued compliance with the JCPOA, bringing American and Israeli military action back on the table.

In this fragile environment, the discussion on "global zero" disarmament appears unrealistic. New and credible security guarantees for North Korea are unlikely to materialize, and the recent track record of countries abandoning their nuclear weapons (programs) is not promising either: Both Libya and Ukraine faced a military invasion after doing so. International non-proliferation agreements such as the JCPOA are brought down despite proven compliance by the country in question. And recent "very hawkish" efforts by non-aligned countries, such as Mexico, South Africa and Brazil, joined by Norway, to push for complete nuclear disarmament will most likely not bear fruit vis-à-vis the actual nuclear weapon states.

In the spirit of ending every session on a positive note, the discussion concluded with some uplifting facts. Despite all fears and negative predictions, non-state armed group actors, such as terrorists, have yet to acquire nuclear weapons, and the risk of nuclear war, while not being zero, is generally rather low. None of this is reason to become complacent, but it further underlines that mechanisms of international cooperation have largely been successful in the past and deserve to be preserved.

2.5   Debating Current Issues in the Near and Middle East

Speakers: *Cornelius Adebahr*, Political Analyst and Entrepreneur, Berlin
Netta Ahituv, Senior Correspondent, Haaretz, Tel Aviv
Muriel Asseburg, Senior Fellow, Middle East and Africa, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin
Mohamed El Dahshan, Managing Director of OXCON Frontier Markets and Fragile States Consulting, Oxford

Rapporteur: *Prasanna Karthik*, India
Session 5:   Tuesday, August 14

The middle east is one of the most conflict-prone zones in the world. Comprising of 18 nations, with a population of over 411 million people, with the bulk of the world's oil supply, peace in middle east is an important global geopolitical necessity. The region has Qatar, the nation with the second highest per-capita GDP in the world, and Yemen, where an average citizen lives of roughly a dollar per day; hence there is no one way to define the middle east. But every middle eastern nation is closer to conflict in some form or the other. And the region stands as a testimony to the adage that all happy families are happy for the same reason, while all unhappy families are unhappy for different reasons. During the session, participants looked at the major theatres of conflict and explored their causes.

The first theatre of conflict that was discussed is Iran, which in the present times is often associated with geopolitical and regional conflicts. But for Iranian people, there is a rich past to their nation, and this past defines their conflicts in historical proportions. The Persian empire began ruling the country in the 6th century BCE and continued till the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy in 1979. During this time and thereon, Iran has considered itself a special country with a singular history and refused to engage in the geopolitical power struggle between the United States and Russia. Iran is a Shia majority Islamic Republic, unlike most of the states in the Gulf, which are Sunni dominated monarchies.

However, while the Islamic Revolution is still deeply ingrained in and influences the political psyche of the nation, many Iranians were born after that period. For these young Iranians, the political leadership's economic mismanagement has taken an extreme form, as a result of which there is huge discontentment against the establishment. In particular, the Revolutionary Guards are seen as one of the biggest beneficiaries of the present state of affairs.

In its quest for regional hegemony, the Iranian Government is engaged in proxy wars in theatres outside its borders such as Gaza, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. In response, some Iranians, unwilling and unable to cope with the crumbling public infrastructure and poor state of the economy, have taken to the streets shouting, "No Gaza, No Lebanon, No Syria, My life for Iran!" Such an inward looking view of the majority of Iranians is in contrast to the slogans such as "Death to America, and Down with Israel," that were once very common in Iran. Today, most Iranians reject the expansionist tendencies of their government. However, elder citizens who supported the revolution see the current protests as an insult to 'old school Iranians' and their political struggle.

The economic situation of Iran has been exacerbated by the sanctions recently re-imposed by the United States, on account of Iran's alleged interest in developing

nuclear weapon capabilities. For Iran, in contrast, developing *civilian* nuclear capabilities is also about the pride of building such program despite international pressure and sanctions against it. With Washington pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal and the European Union committed to its survival, it remains to be seen how it will impact the geopolitics of the region.

The second theatre of conflict that was looked at was Israel, a nation that has been an epicenter of the middle east conflict. After long periods of war, fear, conflicts, and tensions, many Israelis saw peace as a realistic possibility in the run-up to the Oslo accord. However, with the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995, the Oslo accord got derailed and lapsed five years later. After the failure to revive the accord at the 2000 Camp David Summit, the second Intifada broke out and the peace process reached an irreversible deadlock. From then on, the situation in the Palestinian controlled parts of the region has steadily deteriorated, especially since the consolidation of power by the Israeli right-wing-cum-populist government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The Nation State Law, passed by the ruling coalition after cobbling together a narrow majority thanks to a deal with the ultra-orthodox group in the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, has given room for growing social tensions within Israeli society. The law denies citizenship to the members of the Druze, Circassian, Arab, Christian, and Muslim communities of Israel, even if they volunteer for the military service. Recent protests in Tel Aviv against this law, which saw the waving of Palestinian flags, have further complicated the situation, as has the "anti-normalization movement" in Palestine. The latter defines any joint Israeli-Palestine activity that deviates from the struggle against Israel's occupation as collaboration with the occupier. This hardening of positions at the political and societal level is in no way leading to resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. Instead, the deadlock is exploited by Hamas which is diverting funds away from development, and directing it towards attacks aimed at Israel.

The third theatre of conflict under consideration was Syria, where a civil war has been raging since 2011. What started as a protest against the Assad government, led to an armed conflict in the region with several geopolitical ramifications. The Syrian government, which is fighting against the rebellious Syrian Democratic Forces as well as the self-declared Islamic States (IS) and various Salafi Jihadist groups, receives support from Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah. Russia entered the Syrian conflict in an effort to match up to the United States in regional terms, starting to conduct air-strikes in 2015. The Washington-led international coalition has also led strikes against IS as well as against government and pro-government targets. Since 2016, Turkey has also been actively involved in the conflict by fighting against the Syrian Democratic Forces, which comprises primarily of Kurdish militia. Israel, finally, rejects any Iranian presence or influence in Syria, which is leading to a forward defense using proxies to fend off threats.

The Syrian war is also seen as a fight for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Through the Astana talks, efforts have been made to resolve the conflict and de-escalation zones have been established. In the summer of 2017, Russia and Syria declared the civil war to be over. However, this is both true and not true: true because President Assad won the war and his opponents are defeated, and not true as armed conflict continues. With the government still trying to gain complete control of the territory, 40% of which is outside its control, a life of peace and normalcy is still far away for an average Syrian citizen.

The group's discussion also touched on other conflict zones in the middle east. Libya is currently witnessing massive protests over unemployment and crumbling public infrastructure, some of which are organized by local municipalities against the national government. Iraq too has seen public protests over unemployment, poor infrastructure, and water shortages. Yemen has been torn apart by an internal conflict, and negotiations to resolve it are under way in Geneva. In Tunisia, the armed forces did not intervene during the so-called Arab spring of 2011, while in Egypt, the army did play an active role. However, many believe that life after this rebellion is not much different from what it was before. Economic growth, resource distribution, and civic rights determine how peace will unfold in these two nations. And like any transition country, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, and other nations in the region that have been directly affected by war and other forms of conflicts have some distance to cover in putting out their fires and embarking on a path towards peace and growth.

2.6   Iran – Breakout Session

Speaker: *Cornelius Adebahr*, Political Analyst and Entrepreneur, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Colette Morris*, United Kingdom

Session 6:   Tuesday, August 14

The workshop discussion revolved around three key themes: Iran's role in the region, particularly its links with other regional powers as well as its position as an outsider; modern Iranian society and its relation to religion; and the 2015 nuclear deal, officially known as Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The discussion broadly concluded that Iran is a complex country – a modern society facing large contradictions as it strives to preserve its historical identity and Islamic traditions – but was overall not a threat to world peace. The group unanimously agreed that the JCPOA was worth preserving.

The discussion highlighted Iran's regional role and its position as an "outsider". On the one hand, Iran sees itself as a dominant power in the region, specifically in opposition to Saudi Arabia, the other main power. However, Iran also is an outsider in several respects. Firstly, ethnically speaking, Iran with its Persian culture and majority Farsi language, is unlike its predominantly Arab and Arabic-speaking neighbors to the West and South. Secondly, Iran can trace back its history for thousands of years and has an ancient culture. Thirdly, Iran practices Shiite Islam, compared to the dominance of Sunni Islam in the region. These factors together give Iran a feeling of exceptionality and uniqueness. Paradoxically, in many ways, its population is also searching for "normality", e.g. openness to technology, political freedom, and better opportunities than is currently the case.

Iran has used its uniqueness in the region to build alliances. Specifically, Iran has supported Shiism in the region, for example in Bahrain, Iraq, or Yemen (via the Houthis). The Islamic Republic also supports the Palestinian cause, as it claims to help the oppressed around the world. Iran's relationship with other regional powers, Saudi Arabia and Israel, is tense and complex. Given Israel's close ties with the United States and western powers, Iran treats Israel with significant suspicion, mistrust, and hostility.

Beyond the region, Iran has an influential role with non-state actors and is suspected of funding large-scale criminal and terrorist networks (e.g. Hezbollah) across the world, in favor of Iranian interests.

With regard to Iranian society and religion, there has been a move towards more conservative religious practices, particularly since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. For example, women are obliged to wear headscarves, a rule that is equally applicable to non-Iranian women. Indeed, foreign journalists reporting to domestic audiences must wear headscarves, which has been subject of recent debate in Germany.

Despite this conservatism, certain religious minorities are present and indeed recognized; their houses of worship – e.g. churches and synagogues – can be seen in Iran. However, there are cases of persecution of other faiths, e.g. the Baha'i. Some ethnic minorities, such as the Kurdish, Arabic or Balouchi populations in the respective border regions, are often seen as a possible internal threat should they renounce their "Iranian-ness".

Although Iran is not a democracy in the Western sense, people do have the possibility to participate in elections, and to exercise their right to vote; thus, they can – to an extent – influence the course of the government. Iranian society is therefore

more pluralistic than might at first be assumed. Many urban elites are generally open to reform; this, however, is likely to be confined to reforms *within* the Islamic Republic, because in general, people do not want to re-live the tumult of another revolution. Further, while some – particularly in the large Iranian diaspora – might want to see regime change, few Iranians welcome outside interference; if regime change is to happen, it would have to happen from within Iran, rather than from outside influences.

In comparison, the rural poor are increasingly moving to urban areas in search of better economic opportunities. The lack of work, poor salaries, and growing cost of living, however, are driving frustration among these lower classes. Street demonstrations and growing dissatisfaction with the governing elite is becoming more common. These demonstrations are more fundamental in their approaches as they oppose the entire system of the Islamic Republic compared to less radical opposition movements in the past.

Despite such frustrations, Iranian society is undergoing technological advancement; many young, well-educated people are connected to social media, and are increasingly exposed to western trends, fashions, and technology. The use of the Internet is thus tightly controlled: while the main sites are available, they are often censored, and internet users often hit the government firewall. Circumventing the latter by using virtual private network (VPN) connections is common, but still content is tracked, controlled, and often used as a tool of repression. In addition, Iranian-developed apps – of which there is a growing number – have often been refused by global platforms, for fear of sanctions repercussions, resulting in a double discrimination for Iranian netizens.

The image that the Islamic Republic wants to portray, therefore, is tightly controlled, and often does not accurately depict reality.

Finally, the original purpose of the nuclear deal was to offer sanctions relief to allow Iran to develop economically, in return for securing commitments that Iran would not pursue nuclear weapons capabilities. Consequently, the deal did not seek to address Iran's role in the region, nor the broader implications of Iran's actions. Indeed, an argument against the softening of sanctions in the JCPOA was that allowing Iran to develop economically would result in greater funding to Hezbollah and criminal organizations. This said, there is general consensus that the JCPOA was a deal that represented a fair compromise between all parties. During the short time that it had been in effect before Washington's withdrawal in May 2018, the JCPOA had facilitated increased trade between Iran and European countries including Germany and France. The International Atomic Energy Agency, charged with policing the JCPOA, continues to confirm that Iran is complying with its commitments.

With Washington out of the JCPOA, the future for the deal is uncertain, despite – in particular – the European members' efforts to preserve it by protecting their companies' interests in Iran. Clearly, the snapback of sanctions will make it harder for foreign companies to do business in Iran, and many are already pulling out. The forthcoming sanctions on oil and gas reserves in November are anticipated to have a significant effect on Iran's economy, particularly in the reduction of exports, which could harm economic growth, contribute to increased national debt, higher food prices and potentially civil unrest.

Despite all this, it is unclear what President Trump's ambitions for U.S.-Iran relations are. Does he have a "grand plan" for Iran, such as forcing regime change, or is the

objective purely about personal gain through a highly publicized summit, akin to the U.S.-North Korea Singapore summit?

Finally, there is a question of whether it is desirable to force regime change by starving it of funding, resources, and pushing people to the streets, or whether it is best to keep the deal going and consequently accept that it would prolong the life of the regime.

In conclusion, it appears that Iran is a modern society facing large contradictions and an uncertain future as it struggles with modernity, while preserving its historical identity. It is likely to face even greater economic hardships, which will put pressure on the existing leadership. However, Iran may still feel that it has something to offer: a model for an "Islamic democracy" that combines modern demands with Islamic traditions.

2.7   Fragile States and Post-Conflict Transitions – Breakout Session

Speaker: *Mohamed El Dashan*, Managing Director, OXCON Frontier Markets and Fragile States Consulting, Oxford

Rapporteur: *Elisa Schultz*, Germany

Session 7:   Tuesday, August 14

In 2016, 24 per cent of the world's population were living in fragile contexts according to the United Nations' World Populations Prospects. As this figure is projected to increase further within the next years, the question how to create stability in those states was the central aspect of this session. The discussion focused on three different aspects: the expectations of the population having lived through conflicts, the involvement of third parties, and environmental aspects.

Fragility can be defined as a combination of being exposed to risks and the insufficient capacity of coping with these risks. As fragile states often fail to mitigate upcoming risks, fragility can lead to disruptions, such as violence, breakdown of institutions, humanitarian crises, etc. Fragility itself is a multidimensional phenomenon; it can be approached by looking at five dimensions: fragile states are vulnerable to risks regarding political, societal, economic, environmental and security issues. As fragile states are very heterogeneous in terms of their fragility, there is not one single dimension to focus on when trying to stabilize a country. Hence, the decision of which is the most important depends on the state's individual situation.

After having gone through a period of fragility and having transitioned into a post-conflict situation, the population often has high expectations in terms of change: people want to see fast improvements. The dilemma is that long-term investments often take some time to pay off – possibly too long to satisfy the population. To avoid popular dissatisfaction with the transition process, a balance has to be found between offering short-term aids to quickly satisfy basic needs and developing long-term targets to sustainably implement improvements.

When looking at outside actors involved in the attempt to stabilize a fragile state, a lot of different parties can be identified, such as – but not limited to – international and regional (non-)governmental organizations as well as private corporations, global powers and neighboring countries, etc.

Three basic requirements should guide the work of (non-)governmental organizations in fragile states. First, one very important aspect discussed is to listen to the needs of the fragile state's population. This is not as simple as it sounds because sometimes the population itself cannot clearly define their needs. Nevertheless, it does not help to start with what the third party considers to be the most important issue. This is often closely linked to the aspect of accountability: governmental organizations are accountable for their actions towards their government and not towards the fragile state, and the former might have a different focus than the latter. The closer the help of a third party is to the needs and risks a fragile state is facing, the more sustainable this help is going to be.

Second, ownership and early involvement of locals should be a significant element. One example discussed was the building of hospitals, which should also include the training of local staff to independently run the hospitals in due course. Letting people own their achievements sustains long-term responsibility and continuation of the

measures. Third, when a state faces a fundamental crisis, often different organizations are involved at the same time. In this case, a proper and aligned project management focusing on cooperation is needed to ensure a consistent approach in assisting to stabilization.

Furthermore, involving the private sector in the stabilization of a fragile state often is ambivalent. On the one hand, private investments can offer a fast way of satisfying the population's needs, e.g. in terms of telecommunication, infrastructure, or financial services. On the other hand, companies are driven primarily by financial results, so the focus is on returning at least their investment. Hence, cash often leaves the state and might not be reinvested sustainably internally. The question was raised whether stronger regulations of private sector investments could help limit this ambivalence, but was considered difficult to address.

When comparing the list of fragile states established by the OECD and the climate change vulnerability index of the World Bank, there is a strikingly huge overlap between the countries on both. In fact, climate change might have a massive impact by destabilizing those states even further. Hence, climate change itself and its environmental effects should not be treated as a "luxury" or secondary topic but as a serious issue, especially when it comes to stabilizing fragile states.

In conclusion, stabilizing fragile states is extremely complex. Due to the heterogeneity of the fragile states, there is not a "magic formula" to apply to establish more stability. Figuring out the nature of fragility and then applying the right countermeasures is an individual approach.

2.8   Israel and Palestine Conflict – Breakout Session

Speaker: *Netta Ahituv*, Senior Correspondent, *Haaretz*, Tel Aviv

Rapporteur: *Klara Körber*, Germany

Session 8:   Tuesday, August 14

Participants discussed the Israel and Palestine conflict trying to find out-of-the-box solutions for this omnipresent trouble spot in the Middle East. In light of the ever-growing complexity of the conflict, the group touched upon current challenges and discussed possible underlying interests of the parties involved as well as the potential success of different conflict resolution processes.

The speaker as well as individual participants shared their views on emerging trends in Israel influencing the current development of the conflict. Whereby the Israeli economy is growing and Tel Aviv has become a vivid cultural metropolis, the playground of a growing start-up ecosystem and of tech industry, the Palestinian territories have not yet been able to develop a stable economy. Rather than allowing the population to benefit from a comparable quality of live, their economic development still faces multiple challenges.

Netta Ahituv reported on the rise of right wing political forces in Israel, including ultra-orthodox and racist movements. In the light of this year's Summer School topic, the group discussed this development in the context of the global disruptions of the liberal order. One possible cause of this trend in Israel is the increasing immigration from the Diaspora. More and more Jews worldwide choose to leave their country of origin to start a new live in Israel, some of them due to racist experiences. In addition, the demographical change within Israel's population gives rise to a political shift: (Ultra-)Orthodox families traditionally have up to seven children per family, whereby the average fertility rate is three children born per woman. Furthermore, human rights NGOs recently received a more disadvantageous status in Israel due to changes in the legal framework, decreasing the presence of diverse social-political players. In the light of these emerging trends and the consequential right shift in Israel's political environment, the more liberal and younger Israeli citizens emigrate from Israel to other (European) countries, further intensifying this trend towards social conservatism.

On the ground of this description of the status quo, participants discussed the underlying interest of the involved conflict parties, in particular the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority (PA). On the one hand, given the prosperous economy and continuous international aid in effect relieving the Israeli budget from the financial burden of the ongoing conflict, some participants challenged the actual will of Israel to seek peace. They discussed factual incentives for Israel to fully embrace the task of resolving the conflict and proceed towards a peaceful solution with the PA. On the other hand, participants asked the question to what extent the enduring conflict is at the same time a proxy war between the 'Muslim world' and its Western counterpart. This would increase the complexity of challenges ahead of a successful conflict resolution process in the Middle East.

When looking at the underlying interests driving the conflict, both Israel and Palestine share a mutual mistrust towards the other side. This derives – among other things – from the failure to resolve the conflict in previous attempts. With a view to the history of the Israeli and Palestinian people and the fate of the Jews during past centuries, participants discussed whether this mutual mistrust also extends towards external

players, allies, or international institutions. In the view of some participants, such fundamental lack of trust risks that an eventual peace treaty may not be implemented, notwithstanding its content currently being entirely unpredictable.

The group concluded that not least due to this lack of trust, the initiation of a peace process by external international parties and institutions – regardless of the likelihood of that happening – is unlikely to be successful, both from an Israeli and a Palestinian point of view. Moreover, in order to be effective, Israel and Palestine would need to take steps towards each other, whereby some participants opined that Israel being in a position of power and economic strength should make the first step towards a peace process. However, due to the lack of incentives for the Israeli government, participants concluded that such move is more likely to be made by the population of Israel seeking peace and security within the territory in the form of a bottom-up approach. Considering the innovative ecosystem around Israel's tech start-ups, some participants wondered whether new technologies and social media could help to intensify existing bottom-up initiatives for the peaceful co-existence of Israelis and Palestinians in the future.

Yet, the overall question remains: Does Israel want to solve the conflict and what could be the content of a mutually acceptable conflict resolution?

2.9   The Rise of China

Speakers: *Theo Sommer*, *DIE ZEIT*, Hamburg
Eberhard Sandschneider, Professor for Chinese Politics and International Relations, Otto-Suhr-Institut, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Sarah Mie Nass*, Germany

Session 9:   Wednesday, August 15

In their conversation Theo Sommer and Eberhard Sandschneider discussed China's rise as an economic superpower and its resulting political, geostrategic, and military ambitions. Due to its interdependence with China, particularly on an economic level, the West should assume a neutral position towards China's ascent, engage rather than contain the country, and aim to understand the pragmatism that underlies its expansionist efforts.

China's economic rise has caused a dramatic shift of power and wealth within the international community. Over the last decades, China has become the largest trading power, and it is likely to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy within the next ten years. Based on its increased economic power Beijing is extending its geopolitical influence and military strength. Particularly its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an international development plan that includes huge infrastructure projects across Eurasia, demonstrates its global ambitions. These projects will serve, among others, as an outlet for China's excessive steel production, create several hundred thousand jobs for its workers, and open up new markets for its companies. On a geopolitical level the initiative will allow China to expand its influence across Eurasia.

Sommer and Sandschneider described China's growing political ambitions as a "normal" and, in a way, foreseeable development in international relations. In the past rising powers used to swing between two extremes: becoming a world ruler or collapsing. In the case of China, however, neither is to be expected. Rather, Beijing follows a pragmatic approach, expanding one step at a time while carefully calculating its international moves. Even though the country continues to face internal challenges such as corruption and corporate debt, it has been able to maintain its national sovereignty and internal stability through pragmatism and caution.

The extension of China's political influence and its military development inevitably challenge the "unipolar moment" of the United States. Conflicting economic and geostrategic interests, for example in the South China Sea, could increase international tensions. A war between Washington and Beijing, however, is *not* inevitable, both speakers argued, and the future stability of the world order will depend on China's relations with its neighboring countries and with the West.

According to Sommer and Sandschneider, the West will only be able to protect and further its core interests through engagement with China. Trying to contain it would come at the cost not only of hurting Western economies, but also of slowing progress on climate policies, free trade, and the maintenance of peace. The speakers advised Western nations to take a neutral position in their relations to China, to understand the country's pragmatic approach to world affairs, and to handle its rise with neither obsessions nor illusions.

2.10 Emerging Powers and Global Governance: A China-Led World Order?

Speakers: *Husain Haqqani*, Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute, Washington D.C.
Ann Lee, Expert on China's Economic Relations, CEO, Coterie, New York
Samir Saran, President, Observer Research Foundation, Delhi
Frances Yaping Wang, Senior Editor, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C.

Rapporteur: *Binh-An Dang*, Germany

Session 10:   Wednesday, August 15

The panel discussion shed light on the question whether a China-led world order will overtake the existing Western-dominated rules-based system. With its economic rise, China increasingly demands a greater share in global governance. The ambition is mainly perceived as a threat to Western democratic values and the liberal world order. While China's growing political importance is not questioned, its intentions and leadership are seen with skepticism. In order to defend the existing world order without entering a real war, Western countries are taking a high risk with global stability being at cost.

China's emergence as global superpower does not come as a surprise, as the country is benefitting from the rules-based world order. Western dominance in shaping the rules alone is coming to an end, as growing Chinese economic power is translated into the country's more prominent role in world politics. Although Beijing's growing power is accepted as a fact, its leadership and intentions are questioned.

With its remarkable economic transformation, China has disproven a core tenet of Western belief: that "innovation requires freedom". The Chinese model of practicing dictatorship while leveraging technology has become a viable alternative for underdeveloped countries to be innovative but still control power. From a Chinese perspective, authoritarian measures are needed to provide for citizens' basic needs and to ensure national security. At the same time, China is relying on an international system to further grow economically and is increasingly demanding for stronger boarding power in this system.

China's political ambitions are perceived as a threat to the existing world order, as they go beyond the existing balance of arrangements towards a more holistic and continental approach on Eurasia. If Beijing – as it envisages – comes to dominate this entire landmass, it will determine the future of the transatlantic relationship. Current politics under President Donald Trump take China as a peer rival and do not allow for a co-managed world order. This perception is particularly fueled by growing populism and already put into action on the topic of trade. At the same time, Europe is struggling to find a unified answer due to its fragmented nature.

The world therefore finds itself in a (not always carefully) managed strategic conflict between China and the United States, with an unpredictable outcome. Although no real war is expected, the costs for global stability are likely to be high.

2.11   Unresolved issues: Europe, Ukraine and Russia

Speakers: *Katja Gloger*, Editor, Stern, Hamburg
              Hanna Shelest, Editor-in-Chief, Ukraine Analitica, Kyiv
              Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow

Rapporteur: *Olena Shepetiuk*, Ukraine

Session 11:   Wednesday, August 15

The conflict between Ukraine and Russia still remains one of the most pressing unresolved issues in Europe. Russia continues to escalate the situation in eastern Ukraine in order to keep the country from joining NATO and to destabilize the situation in Europe. The Cold War, it seems, is not over yet: For Russia, the real confrontation is still with the West. In this context Ukraine needs political support from the EU, as the unity of European countries can bring much-needed stability and integrity for the whole Europe.

In 1994 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons, then the third largest arsenal in the world. In return, the so called Budapest Memorandum granted the country security assurances by the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. Yet in 2014, Russia broke this agreement and violated international law by annexing Crimea and invading eastern Ukraine. The panelists' views on this were divided: One argued that the people in Crimea had chosen to be the part of Russia and this decision would have to be respected. Another disagreed saying that the referendum was held under unfair circumstances.

After four years of war, Moscow continues its constant attacks despite having signed the Minsk ceasefire agreement in 2015. Until today, the conflict with Russia has resulted in thousands of dead and wounded civilians, about one million internally displaced citizens, and more than 80 Ukrainians detained in Russia because of their pro-Ukrainian position. In response, Ukraine sued Russia in the International Court of Justice for the alleged support of terrorism in eastern Ukraine and for racial discrimination in particular in the annexed Crimea. In a preliminary decision, the judges ruled that the Russian side must provide the residents of the peninsula with access to education in Ukrainian language and enable the operation of the local parliament, the Mejlis.

For Russian President Vladimir Putin, the main goal of the annexation of Crimea was to keep Ukraine away from NATO. In the end, however, it was argued that Ukraine itself did not really matter for him: The real confrontation is still with the West. "In fact the cold war that Western countries thought to end in 1991 is not over," one of the speakers underlined. Thus escalating the conflict in eastern Ukraine is an opportunity for Putin to destabilize the broader situation in Europe. He is also likely to continue to escalate the situation in Ukraine as well as to finance populist movements to disrupt European institutions, the NATO alliance and, more broadly, the world order.

Seeing America as the only threat for Russia, Putin will try to embrace U.S. President Donald Trump, even though they will never be able to agree on a solution for Ukraine. That is why panelists agreed that the situation in Ukraine and in Europe is unlikely to change soon. As a consequence, Ukraine needs political support from the EU. Only the unity of the European countries can bring stability and integrity to the whole Europe, including Ukraine. Such support can be provided by imposing more economic sanctions on Russia, stopping the construction of the Russian gas pipeline Nordstream-II, and providing weapons to Ukraine.

2.12 Extremism

Speakers: *Virginia Comolli*, Senior Fellow for Conflict, Security and Development, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Husain Haqqani, Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute, Washington DC
Alastair King-Smith, Head of International Counter-Extremism, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Günther Sablattnig, Adviser to the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Brussels

Rapporteur: Lena Kampf, Germany

Session 12: Thursday, August 16

Radicalization after the fall of Islamic State – *quo vadis*? The Summer School's discussion on extremism centered on Islamist terrorism and radicalization, especially after the recent military successes against the terrorist movement.

After the successful push back against the self-declared Islamic State, Ambassador Haqqani cautioned that it is much simpler to destroy a (quasi-)state than an ideology. The Islamic State as an idea is not yet dead, he declared; it is merely mutating. Any attempt to declare victory would be "premature". According to him, the West's problem is that this radical ideology is connected to the faith of more than one billion people. He asked: how do you deal with ideological extremism without limiting the liberties of those who are pious or conservative Muslims?

Hence, a broader approach going beyond cooperation of governments is needed, seeking allies in the Muslim world who disagree with violence and are ready to confront extremists. This will probably be a much longer struggle than many thought it would be. All actors involved will need to understand that 'deadlines' by which the ideology should be eliminated are unhelpful, as the latter is always reshaping itself.

Günther Sabblattnig too pointed out that the threat of the Islamic State had not vanished; the work would simply continue online for the time being. He presented the European Union as an actor on extremism and related security issues. In 2015, EU leaders released a statement on 'prevention, protection and prosecution'; there is an anti-terrorism committee in the European Parliament; and of course increased cooperation and data-sharing take place between police forces through Europol.

One of the challenges in particular for Europe is the threat posed by home-grown radicals. It is crucial to find out what triggers an individual to turn violent: When are they "only" radical, and at what point are they taking it to another level? The work has a special focus on returned foreign fighters and their family members, including children who may have received training when they were ten or eleven years old. There are currently around 5000 foreign fighters who have travelled from Europe to Syria or Iraq; about eight percent of them have returned to their countries of origin in Europe. Günther Sablattnig stressed that going beyond repressive approaches, governments also need to work with schools and cultural institutions. So far, however, member states have responded very differently to this threat.

The EU is looking at radicalization in prisons and online, but also concerned about drones and chemical as well as bioactive warfare agents that could be used in a potential terrorist attack. It also explores the interoperability of data and how they are

collected: Thus far, a silo approach prevailed: there was data for crime and for migration, with no exchanges between data bases. The goal now is to develop a new architecture to bring together existing data and to invest in cyber investigation.

Virginia Comolli focused on the Sahel region in Mali and Niger, which shows a wide array of Islamist groups. She stated that the region had seen a huge increase of attacks, and previously unaffected countries such as Ivory Coast or Burkina Faso are now also in the focus. The reasons are manifold: a convergence of jihadist groups and conflicts, climate change and ensuing desertification and human displacement, and lack of food security. Many displaced people join violent groups because of a lack of viable alternatives. The region has a very complex security situation and is highly militarized, with the G5 Sahel force of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger as well as the UN multidimensional integrated stabilization mission in Mali (MINUSMA) trying to contain the violence. In fact, MINUSMA is the UN's deadliest peacekeeping mission with so far 150 fatalities in only five years.

The concentration of troops nonetheless did produce some results: arrests, terrorism trials, and judicial agreements have helped counter the trend. However, there has also been an abuse of powers under the guise of counter-terrorism operations and widespread human rights abuses have alienated population. Also, this regional cooperation overshadows the need to understand the local dimension: more than ideology, the fighters care about jobs. Criminality fuels conflict in Northern Mali, and groups such as Boko Haram are highly adaptable, shifting their methods from wielding machetes to carrying out sophisticated attacks.

Alastair King-Smith claimed that extremism is the most challenging issue demanding a UK government response. While the threat assessment is changing, the fundamentals are not. Instead of asking what the UK government could do, he invited the participants to ask what *they* could do? Given a prevalent risk of complacency, the question is how to prevent terrorism worldwide? His response was to look at the wider context of development and impacts on the United Kingdom, using a broad definition of extremism as vocal opposition to fundamental British values. With regard to individuals, he identified two underlying factors: a wish for a sense of belonging and identity, and a wish for achievement and purpose. King-Smith then pointed to the centrality of national action plans comprising not only security-related measures but also education and employment aiming to boost resilience in communities in the long term as well as to promote economic development in key countries.

The EU, it was pointed out, set up a radicalization awareness network, in which authorities work with NGOs and fund different projects. Actors need to be vetted as authorities need to know who they are working with. Preventive measures are hard to evaluate if they are working and efficient. With regards to technology, it was stated that investigators will always be a step behind the next method of radicalization or attack: mining the data is good but it might be yesterday's method.

Finally, panelists also alerted the group to the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism. Most South Asian terrorism comes out of Pakistan; the elephant in the room is Turkish president Recep Erdogan as a sponsor of terrorist groups; and *S*audi Arabia provides direct assistance to Bosnian Salafists, while EU states cannot offer an alternative. Extremism can take many forms.

2.13 Europe and its Dissenters

Speakers: *Kinga Brudzinska*, Senior Research Fellow, Future of Europe Program, Globsec Policy Institute, Bratislava
Josef Janning, Head of Berlin Office and Senior Policy Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Jovan Ratkovic, International Secretary, Social Democratic Party, Belgrade
Jon Worth, Political Blogger and Freelance Communications Consultant, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Vera Kiss*, Hungary

Session 13: Thursday, August 16

The panel focused on the internal tensions of the European Union and how they affect the region's immediate neighborhood, specifically the Western Balkans. The panelists were in agreement that the EU's most recent challenges are fundamentally political with economic ramifications related to the backlash to globalization, including people's association of the removal of borders with job loss and the erosion of national identity. Participants discussed these issues in multiple dimensions, ranging from operational and structural issues, dissent in Eastern European member states, national and European identity, and the need to better communicate the benefits and shared vision of the EU.

In the context of operational challenges, Josef Janning highlighted that political fragmentation within the EU limits consensus-based joint policy construction. Following the 2004 enlargement, there had not been sufficient adaptation in the way the EU operates. A formerly implicit consensus between member states no longer exists; thus negotiations acquire a heterogeneous and conflictual character. Most member states sit on the fence on key issues and without a clear political center guiding the possibility of broader consensus.

In this context, political fragmentation emerges as the single biggest problem. Member states now focus on their own issues and there is no structural consensus on constructing policies together. Underlining the impact of transforming political arrangements in Europe, Jon Worth commented on how traditional left-right divisions are no longer valid at the member state level, adding to the complexity of the EU's political functioning. Nonetheless, the further splintering and collapse of the EU is unlikely, considering that the unresolved state of Brexit is bringing member states closer together. On this, participants pointed to the difficulty in deciding in efforts to legitimize the EU towards the general public, which issues and processes to Europeanize or not. One suggestion was to strengthen the European Parliament to become more responsive to citizens.

The discussion also addressed the dissenting voices of Eastern European member states as a challenge, specifically coming from the 'Visegrad 4' countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). They have an agenda of rejecting the EU's immigration policies, with a rhetoric against multiculturalism. Kinga Brudzinska analyzed the drivers of this process, which include a shorter institutional memory of democracy, Western political culture being less established, nostalgia for communism in some countries, and negative sentiments regarding the persistent economic gaps between East and West, in spite of relatively high economic growth rates in recent years and being net receivers of EU funds. To these resentments, participants added a sense of not being treated equally, as evidenced by claims

related to lower food quality standards of Western companies operating in Eastern member states. Similarly, these countries do not want to share the burden of taking in refugees, claiming that this is the responsibility of former colonial powers. These sentiments can be easily exploited by local political actors.

Jovan Ratkovic's presentation considered how the EU's internal troubles affect the Western Balkans, specifically regarding a decreasing appetite for EU enlargement. Such weakened prospects of joining the EU one day have negative consequences as the incentive of membership is no longer compelling enough to restrict autocratic tendencies in these countries. This also means that current EU interventions in the region will have lower impact. It also runs the risk of increased geopolitical gains for China and Russia through investments in the countries of the region, which currently do not access the EU's structural funds. Therefore, the EU's internal problems impact its immediate neighborhood and geopolitical balance.

The session also touched on the challenges related to identity, including tensions over national identity and sovereignty and how these relate to a shared European identity. Discussing how to define European identity and what the EU should do to promote this, the panelists generally felt that an "EU myth" was not the solution; instead, European identity should be figured out by citizens themselves. Europe has long been characterized by the simultaneous presence of various identities, and people have individually been able to maintain multiple identities. The current migration debate is powerful exactly because it denies the possibility of multiple identities coexisting peacefully. Europe needs unity to confront these issues, which includes making sure it does not overshadow economic processes.

Having a stronger and united Europe was also discussed in the context articulating and promoting European sovereignty. As Josef Janning highlighted, the broader geopolitical context makes it important for member states to work together on a more focused approach. Yet even when French President Macron talks about European sovereignty he cannot make a strong impact on other member states. Janning also argued that the EU is not about doing away with the nation state; it was in fact created to protect the nation state – a task in which the EU has been so effective that it has shielded our consciousness from its own benefits.

The need to bring to the public mind the benefits of the EU and communicating it with more impact came up throughout the entire session. As one participant put it, the EU was presented as a shining example of success before the early 2000s. Despite some of the problems, on a factual basis the EU continues to deliver but it is now perceived differently, raising the question of how Europe can 'shine again'. As Jon Worth highlighted, communicating the benefits of the EU was clearly one of the key challenges of the Brexit debate. The referendum result at its core was a rejection of the British establishment, yet it was turned against the EU because people were not sufficiently aware of its benefits.

The role of facts about the EU and how to communicate them were also discussed, including in the context of fighting disinformation. It was suggested that rather than getting caught up in throwing facts at skeptics not necessarily receptive to factual information, a better strategy would be to have more compelling pro-EU arguments. As Kinga Brudzinska concluded, to succeed Europe needs to be humble, continue to deliver, and fight fake news.

2.14 The Everyday Odds and Ends of the Grand Coalition – An Insider Story

Speaker: *Wolfgang Schmidt*, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Finance, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Fedor Basov*, Russia

Session 14: Friday, August 17

The two main events that continue to affect the political system of Germany are the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 and the migration crisis of 2015. They have led to the rise of populism and to a fragmentation of party politics. Yet the German political system is still stable thanks to existing checks and balances, a readiness for compromise, and its federalist structure.

Among the 16 federal states, there are 13 different coalition governments. This is the visible evidence of fragmentation in the German political landscape. Traditionally, one of the two larger ("people's") parties builds a coalition with a smaller one in the federal parliament, the Bundestag. The liberal party FDP is the preferred coalition partner for the conservative CDU/CSU, and the Green party is the usual partner for the social democratic SPD. More and more often, however, non-traditional coalitions have been formed, yet one-party-government is quite impossible due to Germany's system of checks and balances, especially the role of the second chamber, or Bundesrat.

Earlier this year and for the first time in German history, a 'grand coalition' of the two larger parties formed for a consecutive term, despite the social democrats strongly disliking their role as junior partner. After finishing the last federal election with the worst result in its history, the party saw its place in the opposition. However, when coalition talks between the CDU/CSU, the Greens and the FDP failed, the SPD reluctantly continued to govern with the conservatives. That said, today there are more misunderstanding between the two conservative sister parties than between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. Still, the federal system of Germany is not in danger. It is working, the speaker explained, because the federal states are closer to the people. This helps to prevent situations such as the dispute between Catalonia and Spain.

More broadly, progressive parties are in trouble around the world because of globalization and digitalization. The economy may be doing fine overall, but not for everyone. The SPD is struggling to convince voters that it has the best polices for dealing with the modern economy, while also appealing to those that have an interest in truth and progressive values. If the party fails to choose its discourse, the speaker argued, this will become a problem for Germany's entire political system.

On the international level, Germany is not only a leading economic and financial power in Europe, but also has all the conditions to be a leader of the liberal world. The country weathered the global economic crisis because it made big investments in the economy. It also supported the creation of an EU fiscal union, with a banking union coming up next. Now, Berlin needs to also invest in the Future of Europe, in particular by strengthening the Euro currency. It should use the current momentum to prepare for the next crisis, possibly coming in a short time.

2.15 Germany in the Security Council: Why Multilateralism is still the Best Answer

Speaker: *Andreas Michaelis*, State Secretary, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Aline Dessarzin*, Switzerland

Session 15: Friday, August 17

Germany strongly supports a multilateral approach for three reasons: because of German history, because multilateralism responds to current multi-faceted identities, and because it also provides stability. Multilateralism must be strengthened through ensuring a strong and sovereign EU, redefining the transatlantic relationship, strengthening the UN system, and working through flexible coalitions with like-minded countries.

Multilateralism for Germany means more than just state-to-state coordination, for example in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It includes a rules-based international system grounded in cooperation through institutions, in contrast to simply pursuing bilateral relationships.

Germany, which has recently been elected to serve a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSC in 2019/20, sees three main reasons to support multilateralism. First, multilateralism allowed the country's way back into international politics after the second World War. Second, today's identities are not only national, but also European, which is mirrored in multilateralism. Third, a multilateral system is inherently more stable than a system based on bilateral relations, which are easily damaged but hard to repair in the absence of an independent third actor.

Over the coming years, Germany intends to preserve and even boost multilateralism through a number of initiatives.

At the core of the country's foreign policy approach is the creation of a strong and sovereign Europe, especially in the areas of security and defense as well as trade. The former may seem unrealistic, but so did the monetary union – until the introduction of the Euro. The difficulty with the latter is that EU member states at times have diverging interests and are often differently affected by challenges: U.S. tariffs on car imports, for example, do not affect all member states in the same way.

The second pillar of Germany's international position, the transatlantic relationship, needs to be redefined in the face of recent American policy changes. Washington has crossed several red lines, even damaging joint initiatives built up with considerable investment over years such as the Iran nuclear deal. The EU should best adopt a compartmentalized approach towards the United States: In more and more policy areas it needs to do things alone, leading other countries where Washington has left a vacuum. On some policies, there is a need to even push back against the United States, while in many other fields transatlantic cooperation is still possible and desirable. Germany itself, however, will not take on a leading role, mostly due to its history and a certain dislike of political dominance.

Thirdly and obviously, strengthening multilateralism also means to contribute (more) to the UN system, including towards its funding. The UNSC is still very relevant, even though questions about how fairly it represents the family of UN countries are relevant. Germany is in favor of a Council reform but accepts that this will take time. In the meantime, the focus should lie on strengthening the role of non-permanent UNSC members, which Germany is actively promoting.

Finally, building alliances of like-minded, multilateralist countries is crucial. This can be done in a flexible way and for specific areas of common interests, such as climate change and migration. The recent shocks to the EU's 'Dublin system' of asylum registration have shown the importance of fundamental reform. To prepare the ground, like-minded countries should work together while also acknowledging their differences. As a case in point, the EU's incoherent response to migration from Libya was mentioned, where Italy and France do not follow the joint European approach.

2.16 How to Respond to Hate Speech, Populism and Fake News

Speakers: *Maria Adebahr*, Spokesperson, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin
Georg Mascolo, Journalist, Hamburg
Oana Popescu, Director, GlobalFocus Center, Bucharest
Rapporteur: *Manu S Pillai*, India
Session 16: Friday, August 17

Hate speech, populism, and fake news cannot be discussed as fringe issues anymore. In a formidable and dangerous union, they have become one of the most pressing problems of our time, perverting established institutions and destabilizing conventions earlier believed to have been firmly settled.

The panel discussion was largely unanimous that countering these trends remains work in progress—the strategy is often to react in the short term to fake news and hate speech, while actively pre-empting populism has to build on a long-term strategy. In the short term, then, those fighting increasingly powerful and organized efforts to disseminate fake news and hate speech are at a disadvantage. Still, there is hope that in due course, transparency, facts, and the plain truth will pay its just dividends, thereby resetting the correct order of things.

The panelists provided interesting insights from their respective fields of work. Maria Adebahr explained how the very term "fake news" must be challenged, because even employing the word "news" in this context lends it an inadvertent legitimacy. "Disinformation", she argued, is the more appropriate term that forcefully communicates the negative impact. Such plain lies thrive, the panel agreed, on breaking down trust that exists in institutions, casting shadows, and, indeed, throwing enough mud at people as well as systems till some of it sticks (at least in the imagination of large numbers of the target audience). With technology amplifying the process many times over, the problem grows even more acute, and while peddlers of disinformation and hate speech have few ethical restraints, those attempting to fight them are bound by standards and codes. This further tilts—in the immediate term—a precarious balance towards a grave imbalance and leads, in the words of Oana Popescu, "towards more tribalization in society": people form rigid views, reinforced in artificial echo chambers.

Challenging fake news is complicated. Governments can put out the correct facts on a certain subject, but this does not travel with the force or speed of disinformation put out in a multi-pronged approach by the interested party. Similarly, there are fine lines that must not be crossed: hate speech must be condemned, but at what point, the panel discussed, does any formal regulation cross over into censorship? As a participant asked, while we may want to combat disinformation, does anybody have any justification to assume the right to "govern the truth"? Any solution to the threat of fake news, hate speech, and the populism that drives it must be democratic, enshrining the best values of a free society. In addressing a problem, elected governments and the state cannot succumb themselves to illiberal solutions, even if they appear to be more effective in the immediate term and might deliver instant results.

The long-term answers require, it was agreed, a degree of introspection: where has society failed that so many people, otherwise reasonable, are happy to become consumers of disinformation and the worst kind of populist polemics? What are the imbalances in the way technology companies negotiate existing legal frameworks, so

that—as in the case of Facebook—they become the greatest content platforms without creating content of their own, and are therefore not bound by basic ethical considerations of traditional media? How is it that society is "filtering" itself into silos, not to speak of parallel social spheres where digital and technological literacy is so low, that the very idea of fake news or disinformation is not even an easily understood concept? How, when many societies fight more existential battles, can something like this even be digested in a meaningful manner?

The panel ended not so much on a tone of optimism, but on an understanding that caution and sustained work alone would help address the problem at hand. It would need institutions and organizations, from governments to companies, to work together; it would need greater education where, for instance, school children are given the resources to be able to discern what information can be trusted, and what is not reliable. Most importantly, while populists nourish themselves on narratives of self-righteous fury, on a fight against "the elites", and other grand stands, are we creating a narrative that celebrates the truth? Is it not time, it was asked, we reasserted the importance of the truth and, by upholding the best standards, regained the legitimacy for facts that populists constantly hack away at?

The fight, then, will be a long one, and in the interim much will need to be done, in a variety of ways. The ultimate point, therefore, was this: each one of us must do what we can, when we can. The problem will not go away on the initiative of governments or organizations alone. To combat fake news and hate speech, every voice matters—and from that elementary lesson alone can we build a clearer solution. To fight disinformation, we must be ready to go back, where necessary, to the basics.

2.17 A World on the Brink? Strategic Challenges for German and European Foreign Policy

Speaker: *Wolfgang Ischinger*, Ambassador, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Munich

Rapporteur: *Katherine Polin*, Germany

Session 17: Friday, August 17

Ambassador Ischinger gave the keynote speech summarizing well the day's prior conversations on the challenges and current situation in Germany, locating the discussion into the Summer School's overarching topic, "A disrupted world and the future of the liberal order". Setting the stage, he posited that current threats to global order are like none we have seen; they are more serious than the breakdown of the Soviet Union. He outlined three examples of these threats and what they mean specifically for Germany: (1) a crisis of the international system; (2) a crisis of the Europe-Atlantic system; and (3) the rise of China. Participants built on this framing to discuss the uncertainty facing the world order, new narratives, the current nature of conflict and the role of traditional nation-states, Germany's future role in the world and Europe, and Europe's position on China.

A new era is beginning in international affairs; however, while the old one is ending, the new one is not yet visible. And this uncertainty defines our time. The international community can no longer rely on instinct or experience in deciding what to do. As such, we are presented with a picture of a threat more serious than the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

Significant threat comes from several places. This includes a weakening of the current international system, as evidenced by the dysfunction of the UN Security Council, and the fact that there have been no real advances in arms control or confidence building measures between states. It also includes a strained transatlantic system concomitant with a threatened transatlantic relationship. Under United States' president Donald Trump, the idea of solidarity upon which NATO was built is no longer perceived as a credible foundation. The organization cannot be successful—even if its members spend more on defense—if this sense of solidarity does not exist and is not nurtured.

Additionally, the NATO example is one of many suggesting a fundamental shift in the common values and commonly-accepted wisdoms of the international community. The role of the nation-state is another. From the divergent narratives around Russia's occupation of Crimea to global companies with strong purchasing power, influential foundations and other organizations, the sophistication of non-state actors overall challenges the traditional primacy of the nation-state as the primary actor in international affairs. Indeed, there is no longer a single conflict in the world between state actors only, and existing international law is not set up to address this.

Further, with all this as a backdrop, the rise of China and its alternative model of operating, especially internationally, is increasingly threatening the international rules-based order and the relationships between nation-states.

For Germany, whose foreign policy has assumed the precondition of European integration and a strong transatlantic relationship, this situation is not only worrisome, but also requires action. Germany has long been complacent, considering itself surround by nine friendly neighbors—all of whom are members of NATO or the EU,

except Switzerland—and not at the front lines of global challenges. However, it is time to defend these friends, to become more responsible for its own and Europe's security. Indeed, 80 million Germans and 500 million Europeans are currently outsourcing their security to the United States, a country on other side of the world; of course, a farmer in Kansas will think twice about this.

In terms of Europe, member states must accept a qualified majority voting on security. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas as well as Chancellor Angela Merkel have both rhetorically supported this idea, and the Munich Security Conference has lobbied for this: it is time to be bold. It is time to think about the things we cherish most and which we must defend. We definitely must try and maintain a rules-based international order, and we must avoid a break-up of the EU. Further, it is an essential precondition of the EU that is must be taken seriously as an international actor to succeed. Divisiveness from within does not help at the moment, as seen in the fragmented approach to a China policy. Luckily, China takes Germany seriously enough to conduct yearly bilateral talks, but this is not sustainable on its own.

2.18 Science. Fiction. International Politics: Visible and Invisible Borders

Speakers: *Nadine Godehardt*, Deputy Head of Research Division Asia, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin
Uri Aviv, General Director, Tel Aviv International Film Festival for Science Fiction and the Fantastic Genres, Tel Aviv
Martin Rein-Cano, Landscape Architect, Director TOPOTEK, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Liang Liu*, China and *Marc Nussbaum*, Germany

Session 18: Saturday, August 18

This session provided perspectives on visible and invisible borders on spatial, social, cultural, technical, and economic levels through science fiction films. In a presentation and an ensuing workshop, participants looked at the fictional narratives and places as well as the societal focus of such movies. In particular, they discussed social control, racism and post-colonialism, as well as city-periphery relations in an abstract and "fictional" way without reference to a specific government or country of origin.

Nowadays, the average person is more exposed to science fiction (sci-fi) films and television series than to the literature. What is less known is that sci-fi movies also provide a perfect environment for studying politics.

Borders are places of separation as well as contact. They can be visible and physical like a material barrier or wall, or they can be invisible and fuzzy. They are not fixed; they demand a constant process of bordering and ordering. Borders are a way to deal with otherness; hence, they are places where identities are continuously at play. By introducing two sci-fi films – "Black Panther" and the Nosedive episode of "Black Mirror" – Nadine Godehardt raised many questions about borders: Where do they start and end? Who sets them? What type of invisible borders are out there? How do we deal (legally and otherwise) with the in-between space that borders characterize? Moreover, it was described how the perception of borders developed from a „fixed container" to other concepts like „virtual borders" or „social borders", which are constantly changing especially driven by digitalization and globalization.

Uri Aviv further expanded on the political aspects of sci-fi films. "Black Panther", playing on the movement created in the 1960s by black Americans, takes the supernatural, extraordinary stuff of modern myth and gives it to a group of non-white characters — including women. This is the first Hollywood movie to display a black society and especially black women as a "super-power". "Black Mirror", in contrast, considers the murky relationship between humans and technology, the latter of which often threatens to progress so quickly that our ethical frameworks cannot catch up. "Elysium", another sci-fi movie, is set in a future in which the wealth gap has manifested itself in the most extreme way imaginable. The wealthy and the impoverished masses no longer dwell on the same planet. The rich have decamped for an orbital space station called Elysium, while the poor dwell in decaying and overcrowded cities. Elysium is perpetually threatened by infiltration of "illegals", as the earthlings who come to Elysium are called. This creates politically instability between liberals who want to treat the illegals humanely, and conservatives who fear that they pose a threat to the Elysium way of life.

The discussion showed a number of critical threads. First, it seems that the modern idea of technology is becoming dangerously warped. Instead of developing new technologies to achieve public goals, technological advancement is treated as an end in itself. Without a strong cultural and political context to determine what should be invented and why, powerful new technologies operating according to their own logic risk undermining both our civic culture and our democracy. Technologies like virtual reality and social network rankings – blindly adopted in the belief that they will make life better – gradually become vehicles for authoritarian social control, and even the enslavement of their owners.

Sci-fi has been an important driving force of providing such context – as a language and a vocabulary for the unknown. Authors have used science fiction to 'invent', 'design', and 'imagine' our future. Tangible examples are the "Star Trek" series with an early display of mobile phones, tablets or 3D-printers as well as the movies "Terminator" and "RoboCop" with early allusions to the capabilities of the emerging augmented reality technology. By these means, movie directors enabled conversations which were previously impossible to have; hence, they helped to discover the unknown.

Second, cities – the places to which people will continue to migrate well into the future – need to become a more permissive and generous environment for newcomers. As it happens, racism, or the fear that exists between cultural groups, often occurs when there is no interaction between those groups. What is needed is the sense that everyone can show themselves in public space and become part of it. Martin Rein-Cano argued that cities have two choices when it comes to immigration and inclusion: Its citizens can be generous, or they can have turmoil. In fact, cities are the front line of migration. Good cities are places in constant change in which the immigrant population is invited to bring out their culture into the public space.

Finally, cities could engage in multilateral cooperation in an ever more protectionist world. Conflicts create opportunities. Immigration is rich when it is capable of creating this kind of hybrid between different worlds. This is a shift in how to cultivate conflicts rather than avoiding or repressing them. The difficulty, however, is to make them more acceptable and give them a chance to change the situation of a neighborhood. Ultimately, such reasoning is in open contradiction to the prevailing thinking that only order and harmony will prevent future conflicts.

2.19 Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Cyber-Security

Speakers: *Maggie Sprenger*, Managing Director and Co-Founder, Venture Fund, Green Cow Venture Capital, San Francisco
Stefan Jansen, Founder and Lead Data Scientist, Applied AI, New York
Émelie Potvin, Director, Public Policy and Strategy, APAC, Uber, Singapore

Rapporteur: *Tatiana Turculet*, Romania

Session 19:   Monday, August 20

The session focused on the issues of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and cyber-security. The panel delivered an overview of the current trends and challenges posed by the rapid technological development and its disruption power in a comparative approach, based on the experiences gained, mainly from the private sector, in various jurisdictions.

"Robots will steal our jobs", "robots are evil" and "data is the new oil" are just a few examples of people's perception about the current developments in the industry and the complex process of digital transformation. These fears are augmented by the recent scandals regarding data privacy, elections interference, and cyber-attacks, especially on critical infrastructure.

The amount of data created over the last decades has expanded dramatically. Apart from its size, data also generates value for both business and governments. At the same time, people remain statistically weak, prone to errors, and biased. Sophisticated threats, such as social engineering, financial fraud, and data breaches have increased as well. Moreover, protection of data in general, and personal data in particular is lagging behind in the fight against malicious actions of some individuals and even governments.

Supervision in this field, such as by the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, is a significant step in establishing certain requirements, namely through "data protection by design" and "data protection by default". However, there is still room for improvement, on both the individual level – by raising awareness – and the inter-governmental level – by creating a multilateral framework. In fact, the initiative to call for a "new Digital Geneva Convention" came from the private sector, namely Microsoft. However, people's attitude regarding personal data as well as the respective national legislative system differ widely, ranging from strict rules on data protection in the EU to a lax approach in most of the United States and Asia. The issue of whether we are ready to give up on certain rights and data ownership for the sake of comfort and technological improvement remains open.

While in the short-term certain jobs might become obsolete and thus increase (technological) unemployment, artificial intelligence and machine learning will also lead to multiple benefits. They also require new skills and thus the demand for labor will increase. In this sense, special attention has to be focused on education. Currently in most countries there is a discrepancy between the school curriculum and business needs. Hence the educational system shall be adapted to the needs of tomorrow. The bottom-up approach should be complemented by political will – there is a need for competent policy experts with a thorough understanding of informational technology security and the risks posed by digitalization and automation.

The question of liability remains an issue too. Algorithms have been applied on a large scale in recent years; however, the "logic" behind their decision-making is not always clear and thus can be abused. The use of crypto-currencies has also been on the rise lately. Built on the block chain and distributed ledger technology, they provide new means of payment and could offer solutions in various fields. Also technological breakthrough, if applied properly, has proven to serve the underprivileged – some examples being UN's project for refugees as well as Iceland's citizen participation initiative, both based on block chain platforms. Yet at the same time, if mishandled, these solutions might pose significant risks and could be exploited, such as bitcoin being used as payment means for criminal purposes on the dark web.

All in all, in the wake of fast-changing technological developments such as cloud platforms, web applications, and the Internet-of-Things, the benefits of innovation ought not be overwhelmed by its negative impacts, such as social or financial exclusion, weak information security, and the monetization of big data. Risks need to be "translated" into actionable strategies for individuals, business and governments. Understanding, communicating, and prioritizing are key elements for solving the most critical issues as well as elaborating a sound long-term strategy.

2.20   How to Foster Women Leadership?

Speakers: *Priyanka Chaturvedi*, National Spokesperson, Indian National Congress, Delhi
Clarissa Rios Rojas, Founder and Director, Ekpa'palek International Development, The Hague
Amanda Sellers, Director, NATO-Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Regional Centre, NATO International Staff, Kuwait City
Katja Gloger, Editor, *Stern*, Hamburg (Moderator)

Rapporteur: *Noura El-Haj*, Austria

Session 20: Tuesday, August 21

The open discussion on fostering female leadership touched upon the most challenging issues encountered by women today aiming to advance and pursue leadership positions in the workforce. These include the low number of women in executive and leadership positions, unconscious biases and gender stereotypes, the need for female role models to empower the next and future generations of female leaders, and the need for open communication with colleagues, employers, and governments alike to urge them towards concrete action to support the mitigation of gender disparity. Speakers and participants discussed their experiences, challenges and suggestions to highlight the most important issues that are fundamental to women within the framework of career progression and equality.

Many women, as accomplished and dedicated as they may be, still face challenges when it comes to advancing in executive and managerial positions and taking on roles that have remained male-dominated. This includes, for example, running for political office, becoming member or chair of a corporate board, advancing in the military, becoming chief executive of a company, or any other position of power. Though there is by far no lack of qualified women to take on the responsibilities of any of these jobs, as proven through a steadily, albeit slow, increase of the number of women in leading roles across the workplace spectrum, there remains the challenge for many to make the same salary that men make for the same job, and to attain the promotions that will place them in leadership roles.

No person, man or woman, is free of unconscious biases—even the best-intentioned people. This also plays out in everyday lives, interactions, and decisions sometimes made at the workplace. Working women often deal with other people's beliefs regarding their competencies, and stereotypical assumptions prevail that women, unlike men, do not have the 'default' style when it comes to their ability to lead effectively or are governed more by their emotions. For example, women often are judged as being too harsh, too nice, too blunt, or even too soft-spoken. It is important to confront these biases by openly addressing them, aiming to create an environment where both women and men, together, can have transparent conversations about inequities on an organizational as well as operational level. Additionally, it is important that this discourse happens on a more personal level too, as women confront their own internal biases which could limit them in speaking up, expressing their opinions, or otherwise make them feel that their voice is not being heard.

Flexible work arrangements would allow women to best manage their career and personal priorities. Women are still considered the primary caregivers in many parts of the world, and having a system in place that supports women in their work-life balance can enable women to attend trainings, conferences, and activities that will

help provide them with equal opportunities for growth and development as the rest of their colleagues. This would help ensure that women do not lose the momentum of their professional development, thus closing the experience gap that is often created when women are forced to step out for maternity leave and then re-enter the job market at a later stage. Furthermore, this would help ensure that women remain in the workforce and that they can partake in the high visibility and mission-critical roles that are important to reach the highest levels of leadership.

One of the greatest obstacles today for career development is a lack of senior or visibly successful female role models. Role models can have a very powerful effect, functioning as a source of inspiration and aspiration for young women looking to pave their career sometimes in predominantly male-dominated careers. It is instrumental for aspiring leaders to be mentored, and have someone against whom to model themselves, or identify role models who could possibly advocate for them and provide the needed visibility and encouragement for professional growth. For this reason, investing in female role models means to invest in the future. Corporations, organizations, and governments must make the effort to take a conscience decision to appoint highly qualified women to boards, governments, and other positions of power. By serving in such professional capacities, they also function as examples of successful women leaders for many young women.

When it comes to defining ourselves and our values, our core environment such as our family, friends, and colleagues is a good starting point to raise awareness about conscious or unconscious biases and inequities. It is here where we can adjust the many times deeply-rooted forms of self-criticism and doubt women are exposed to. Though this core environment presents plenty of opportunities to review and refine our behavior, hopefully with the aim of becoming the best version of ourselves, it is inevitable that we have these conversations also on the policy level to ensure that efforts are synchronized to sensitize organizations and corporations. While we may have advanced in ensuring that more women are present in the room, we still have not ensured that they are also part of the conversation.

Ultimately, there cannot be a discussion on liberal democracy without recognizing the pivotal role of women. Beyond the principled importance of ensuring equal opportunities, women are the key players in discussions on topics relatable to more than 50 per cent of the world's population. Diversity of thought is very important but more than that, inclusion is vital. In the words of Valentine Moghadam, a renowned feminist sociologist and activist: "The empowerment of women and the establishment of gender equality are crucial to democracy. Democracy is as much about citizenship rights, participation, and inclusion as it is about political parties, elections, and checks and balances. The quality of democracy is determined not only by the form of institutions, but also by the extent that different social groups participate in these institutions."

2.21 Survivors Breaking the Silence on Child Sexual Abuse – Book Discussion

Speakers: *Eirlani Abdul Rahman*, Executive Director, YAKIN (Youth, Adult Survivors & Kin In Need); Program Director, Kailash Satyarthi Children's Foundation, Singapore
Two anonymous survivors and contributors to the book

Rapporteur: *Sascha O'Toole*, Ireland

Session 21: Wednesday, August 22

The discussion centered around Rahman's book, which contains testimonials from five men and seven women who are survivors of child sexual abuse, told anonymously. Rahman discussed her reasons for writing this book, touching on her own experience of abuse and her desire to give a voice to those who suffered in silence for so long. Two of the contributors to the book attended the discussion and gave the audience an overview of their experience, reading extracts from their contributions to the book. There followed a discussion on how to identify signs that a child might be vulnerable to this abuse, or that a child had experienced it, as well as how to support loved ones who might have been through this abuse.

The two survivors told stories of their own experiences of abuse and dealing with that abuse, as well as their family history and how it affected them. The discussion then moved to how to support loved ones who may be survivors of such abuse.

The most important thing, according to Rahman and the survivors, is to tell them "I believe you". The second thing that can help is to have a safe word that the survivor can use if overwhelmed in any situation, to help them to feel in control and to be able to escape when they need to.

Children who have been neglected by their families are very vulnerable to abusers, as they seek attention. The group heard from the author and the survivors that if you know a child in this situation, to look out for them as they may be targeted. If signs of grooming are noticed, take action.

Helping children to establish boundaries and teaching them at a young age about consent was also raised as an important part of preventing such abuse. In particular, allowing children to say no to expected cultural norms such as kissing or embracing elders was raised as important.

Finally, several signs can help to identify a child who may have been a victim of sexual abuse. These include: regressive behavior; inappropriate knowledge about sex and sexual acts; or being sexually active from a very young age.

2.22   Refugee Policies and Human Rights

Speakers: *Anna von Bayern*, Journalist and Author, Munich
              Clément Kanamugire, Policy Analyst, United Kingdom
              Department of Health and Social Care, London
              Astrid Ziebarth, Senior Migration Fellow, Europe Program, The
              German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Umut Azak*, Turkey

Session 22:   Wednesday, August 22

In the panel, the EU's policy framework on migration and its deficiencies as well as the German asylum system were discussed. Participants argued that the EU migration framework is not applied equally by all member states; as a result, Germany with its flexible asylum system faces an economic burden while increased migration flows resulted in populist discourses and a rise of far-right political parties. In addition, the discussion elaborated on economic migration in the African context, political implications of migration, and global initiatives to handle migration flows.

The EU migration framework has many deficiencies. The Common European Asylum System with its fingerprint database Eurodac and the Dublin regulation to establish the member state responsible for the examination of the application is not effective and often not applied at all. Member states do not register fingerprints or do not supply the requested information to the system. Migrants, on their part, avoid providing information and giving their fingerprints. There is no infrastructure to identify migrants, so in some rare cases migrants abused the EU system and applied for asylum in more than one state, one speaker argued. Also the relocation of migrants was not implemented successfully, and there are many questions on the 'disembarkation platforms' to be built in third countries to process migrants' applications, as procedural details still remain to be decided.

Despite having been on the agenda for a long time now, the EU's refugee policy has seen little improvements, some argued. Instead of multilateral solutions, bilateral solutions have emerged. Yet there have been positive results too, as the number of migrants arriving to Europe has fallen by half over the past years. Some participants also objected to the claim about widespread abuse of the system, instead pointing to the many success stories of the migrants they see: So far, a quarter of those who arrived in Europe between 2014-2016 are now integrated into the labor market.

Also the German framework for migration has its problems. The German constitution is very open to granting asylum and the overall asylum system is very flexible. Asylum seekers are not required to prove their country of origin or identity, and even the ones that are prohibited from re-entry to Germany have the right to apply for asylum. However, the process takes a long time, eleven months on average for the first decision and, in the case of an appeal, it takes six months more. Deportation of migrants is not very common as they usually travel to the neighboring countries after the rejection of their applications.

Germany ignored the migration issue for a long time, but nowadays it faces an increasing economic burden. Berlin has spent 30 billion euros so far, and a refugee family of five may receive financial support that is greater than the average income of a sole-earner family. Spending on refugees also had a negative effect on external aid

as Germany and Switzerland reduced their share by half. Switzerland also has taken further measures to prevent refugees from entering the labor market.

In short, migration policies in Europe are unsuccessful and Europe cannot help the ones in need in their home countries. As described by one participant, "the weakest are left alone". Still, participants emphasized the importance to differentiate between migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees as defined by various international regulations. (Economic) migrants come to Europe to attain better living conditions; whereas asylum seekers have to be able to claim individual persecution based on political activity, race, ethnicity, gender, or religion; while refugees usually flee wars or natural disasters.

Africa has become the main source of economic migration. The media has played an important role in boosting economic migration. Western media presents Africa as the land of desperation and devastation, whereas local media in Africa portrays Europe as the land of milk and honey, downplaying the difficulties to get – and stay – in Europe. Participants also argued that development aid to Africa has had a negative effect on migration, as it increases the level of migration rather than providing real support to African economies. Given the direct relation of global migration to foreign and trade policy, involving civil society organizations in designing policies can produce effective results, one participant argued, as they have the capacity to propose applicable solutions. Others argued that the United Nations achieved considerable success to determine standards for migration issues through the Global Compact for Migration, even though the document is non-binding. Also other agencies such as the International Organization for Migration and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees have been very active in migration crisis management.

Finally, the migration issue has also had an impact on the political sphere as an element of election campaigns. Throughout Europe, anti-migration parties achieved considerable successes in recent elections. One speaker stressed that populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany receive greater support from wealthier regions of Germany, i.e. those that harvest the benefits of migration.

Conservatives and right-wing parties are expected to increase their number of seats in the upcoming 2019 European Parliament elections. Anti-migration parties also look toward the Austrian Presidency of the EU to strengthen their position. As such, all while differentiating between outright racists and migration skeptics, it is fair to say that the migration issue has already contributed to the polarization of European society.

2.23 India and the World

Speaker: *Rahul Gandhi*, President, Indian National Congress, Member of the Indian Parliament, Delhi

Rapporteur: *Melanie Müller*, Germany

Session 23: Wednesday, August 22

Rahul Gandhi is the president of the Indian National Congress, a political party in India which is now part of the opposition in the Indian parliament. The session with Gandhi was the only public session at this year's Bucerius Summer School and took place at the Kampnagel International Summer Festival. It was also broadcast via livestream which explains why the speaker referred mainly to domestic politics in India in his speech, rather than addressing the question of India's position in the world.

Rahul Gandhi started his talk with a comparison between India and China. He spoke about the different political and democratic trajectories that both countries have taken. He described the transition from rural India to an urban India after independence in 1947 and emphasized the democratic transformation of the country, contrary to China's rather authoritarian way of development. Gandhi emphasized the importance of building and maintaining democratic structures in India today which he also sees as a base for equal representation of the Indian federal states in a decentralized political system.

In his talk, the opposition leader addressed three main topics: 1. the failures of the current government to create social equality in the country, 2. the relationship between inequality and violent protests in India, and 3. the principle of non-violence. First, he accused the current Indian government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi of having neglected poor people in India and thus having contributed to a broader divide within Indian society. He emphasized the need for an implementation of basic social rights and the creation of an environment that supports social mobility. He criticized the current Indian government under Modi for not pursuing the interest of the people of India but rather supporting elitist structures.

Gandhi then spoke about the risk of increasing political violence in an environment of social inequality. He referred to the formation of the self-styled Islamic State which in his opinion was the result of insurgencies and the exclusion of large parts of the population in Iraq and Syria. The increase of anger, riots, and attacks on people is a result of the increase of inequality in India as well, said Gandhi in his charismatic speech. He promised that his party would fight for more social equality in India and that his party would create opportunities for poor and excluded people.

Finally, Gandhi strongly advocated the principle of non-violence. His family has been involved in Indian politics for more than 70 years. His grandmother is Indira Gandhi, the first female prime minister of India. His father was Rajiv Gandhi, who succeeded his mother Indira as prime minister. Both his grandmother and father were assassinated. Rahul Gandhi emphasized that even though he himself had suffered from political violence, he would not support violent reactions – even if violence is being applied by political opponents.

With his remarks about a social transformation and the principle of non-violence, he connected his current party program to the traditional values of the Congress Party, which was founded in 1885 and developed as an anti-colonial movement. It based its value system on the principles of Mahatma Gandhi who had been advocating for

non-violent resistance against the colonial power. Therefore, at the international level, Gandhi envisaged India's role as a broker between the United States and China, saying that the worst thing to happen would be a political conflict between both countries. India could mediate between different interests and political perspectives because it brings certain unique values to the mediating table that were developed by Mahatma Gandhi – non-violence, listening to people.

2.24 The Future of the Liberal Order – A view from the Foreign Office

Speaker: *Niels Annen*, Minister of State, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Evie Ruymbeke*, Belgium

Session 24: Thursday, August 23

Niels Annen painted a complex and layered view on the future of the liberal world order. He analyzed the general dynamics of today's environment such as an increasing speed of change and complex and unpredictable challenges as well as a new quality of this transformative evolution. The discussion about the resulting opportunities and threats for German foreign policy was vivid and riveting, as Annen illustrated his points with examples from his wide-ranging political experience.

The first eighteen years of the 21st century can read like a long litany of crises. Gone are the structures "in which opportunities are seized together and in which risks are faced together", Annen said. This idea of multilateralism centered on a rules-based order that his generation took for granted is at best questioned and at worst undermined. Instead, an increasingly fractured international community has again fallen for zero-sum thinking, and nationalism is resurfacing again in Germany, Europe, and the wider world.

The main characteristics of the current era consist of first and foremost the speed of change, where unpredictability and complexity leave little space for reflection and understanding of what is happening. Secondly, the much debated 'demise of the West' as the inventor and cornerstone of the liberal order worries the public and politicians alike. Yet whether someone considers the recent past as a challenge or as an opportunity, largely depends on where in the world this person lives. The changes of the past two decades do mean that millions have been lifted out of poverty, but the liberal order as such has not always been so inclusive.

Annen also argued that the evolutions observed are of a fundamentally different quality: the liberal world order's recent setbacks are multiple, be it in the field of human rights, international law, or international trade. This is particularly relevant for an open economy and democracy based on the rule of law like Germany and a city like Hamburg. Built on republican values, the Free and Hanseatic city benefits enormously from global trade.

The impact of the current changes on Germany is potentially profound. The country itself remains very much committed to a just, rules-based international order. Inspired by the political consequences of the Second World War, the destruction of Europe and the Nazi dictatorship, it sees itself as a strong pillar of such a system and that "it cannot *not* choose sides". Other countries are looking at Germany for strong leadership, most prominently in the EU's foreign and defense policy, as was the case during the polarizing Ukraine crisis. Germany's moderate position managed to keep EU member states united in their Russia policy around a careful compromise: To resist from harshly punishing Russia and instead opting to keep a dialogue channel open, while also stepping up assurances to NATO members such as the Baltic countries, and introducing economic sanctions.

This being said, Russia remains a challenger and the two-track policy of dialogue and economic sanctions continues for the time being. The latter do not only hurt Russia, they also come at a certain cost for all European member states. Also the controversial Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project was raised, which Germany mainly

sees as commercial in nature, while Annen confirmed that even with an increased capacity going through the Baltic Sea, gas deliveries would continue to flow through Ukraine.

That Germany and the EU are now challenged not only by the Russian Federation but also by their traditional ally, the United States, is indeed a qualitative change in the international environment. Washington more recently has called into question the fundamental interests of Germany as well as the cornerstones of the transatlantic relationship. On the day before the discussion, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Heiko Maas had spelled out his vision for a new 'balanced partnership' with Washington in an op-ed article in the German newspaper *Handelsblatt*.

China too is increasingly seen as a challenger. Germany's new China policy takes into account the intra-Chinese decision to abandon the collective leadership as well as its foreign policy projects, including its 'Belt and Road' infrastructure initiative, amongst many other evolutions such as the setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. At the same time, Berlin keeps an eye on Chinese ventures in Germany, making investments in sensitive sectors subject to government approval. Annen stressed that the government uses its close relationship with China to offer a European perspective to the Asian giant, and that it systematically addresses issues of human rights.

As a consequence of the changing nature of the international environment posing different challenges, previously rather consensual German foreign policy has become an object of vivid debate again, both in the Bundestag and in German public life. Foreign policy practitioners and politicians not only need to deal with increasingly complex problems of the international arena itself, but also take part in the public debate as to defend and explain why certain choices needed to be made.

With regards to the election to the European Parliament coming up in May 2019, Annen argued that the EU needs broad support within the population. Instead, right-wing parties intend to use the vote to break the power of the "ruling elites" while offering no sustainable solutions themselves. For the European right, populism is a matter of growing political power and survival, which is why it keeps the debate focused on migration. According to Annen, European moderates need to mobilize the 'silent majority' and at the same time find real solutions for those who lost out on the gains of globalization.

Even though the liberal world order has not always been inclusive, effective multilateralism is the only way forward when it comes to solving the big international questions of our times, Annen concluded. Germany's election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2019/20 should be an excellent occasion to not only put this into practice but also strengthen the world organization as a whole.

With expectations for Germany being high, the Foreign Office is determined to use its temporary seat to speak out for more multilateral action including at the Council itself, which is often challenging to put into practice.

2.25 The Liberal World Order under Threat? Populism, Trumpism and the Future of Multilateralism

Panelists: *Thomas Conzelmann*, Professor of International Relations, Associate Dean for Research, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University, Maastricht
Aleksandra Dier, Political Advisor, United Nations Secretariat, New York
Jana Puglierin, Head of Program, Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin
Jan Techau, Director, Europe Program, and Senior Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin
Shashi Tharoor, Member of the Indian Parliament, Chairman, Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, Delhi

Rapporteur: *Joanna Osinska*, Poland

Session 25:   Thursday, August 23

The panel discussion concluding this year's Bucerius Summer School focused on two major issues: current challenges to the liberal world order and the future of multilateralism. One of the most important challenges is economic inequality, which has contributed to populist tendencies observed in many parts of the world. Also, the traditional role played by the United States on the global scene has changed, while other actors are either unable (Europe) or not – yet – ready to fill the gap (China). The panel concluded that the liberal world order cannot be preserved in its current shape but rather needs to be reformed towards a more inclusive multilateralism.

The liberal world order, as we have known it, is increasingly challenged. In many parts of the world it faces an economic as well as cultural backlash. While it constituted a highly aspirational attempt from its inception, the liberal world order has failed to deliver on some of its promises, in particular leading to inequalities between economic "winners" and "losers". This in turn has fueled populist and nationalist tendencies that we are currently observing in many parts of the world.

Taking a closer look, one could argue that the liberal world order is in fact a somewhat convoluted concept as it includes an inherent tension between "liberal" and "order". The balance between these two components has been evolving over time and currently we have entered another transition phase. The traditional role of the "reserve power" played by the United States, which underpinned the liberal world order in the past, seems to have ceased now, leaving a vacuum which will have to be filled by other actors. Europe – or, in its political form, the European Union – appears unable to fill this gap, struggling with challenges of its internal multilateralism. In turn, China is an emerging power that will decisively shape the future world order depending on how it will fill the global leadership vacuum. In particular, the panelists wondered if China would (or rather not) pursue a "soft touch" approach favored in the past by the United States. For the time being, however, China is not (yet) ready to become a world leader.

Zooming in onto the German and European perspective, the EU should ideally be strong and unified in order to be a credible global actor. The reality, however, is far from this ideal given the diverging views between EU member states on key issues, including the transatlantic relations, or the lack of joint political will in the area of

security and defense. In this context, it was deemed regrettable that Germany does not meet the NATO target for defense spending of two percent of its GDP (despite some progress in that direction), and some considered its army to be insufficiently equipped. Without a more determined approach on the side of Germany, it would be difficult to develop a stronger European position. Germany as a country that has been always very committed to, and at the same time significantly benefitting from, the liberal world order should take more decisive action and strengthen its own contribution.

Looking ahead and against the backdrop sketched above, the panel concluded that the liberal world order could not be simply preserved or restored; instead, it needs to be reformed. In other words, "going back" is not an option, but the world needs to "go forward". The main direction of such reforms of the liberal world order should be to achieve a new *inclusive* multilateralism, addressing the shortcomings of the current system. Firstly, it should go beyond the state-centric system, paying greater attention to non-state actors including civil society and the private sector. Secondly, it would inevitably include a redistribution of power, granting legitimate power – and the related responsibility – to the non-Western world, e.g. in the international financial organizations. Thirdly, economic justice should be at the core of the economic system to help those who were left behind. Fourthly, the system has to tackle and adapt to new challenges related to the artificial intelligence and the future of work. Finally, "sovereignty" is the core concept which needs to be redefined.