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BUCERIUS SUMMER SCHOOL ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

2017 Conference Report

Multilateral Cooperation in an Ever More Protectionist World

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1 Executive Summary

2017 is still somewhat sitting on the fence: Will it become another ‘annus horribilis’ like recent ones or even worse, with ‘fire and fury’, thus confirming the glum views of many commentators from the beginning of the year? Or will it be the first year after the ‘crisis climax’ of 2016, in which a populist wave shook the foundations of the liberal world, violent conflict engulfed much of the Middle East and Africa, and global migration reached new heights? Put another way, are the countries of the world closing off, rejecting the openness of globalization of past decades and becoming ever more protectionist again; or is there a chance to overcome the current malaise precisely through more, not less multilateral cooperation?

Such were the questions that the participants of the 2017 Bucerius Summer School pondered during two intensive weeks of discussions and deliberations in Hamburg, Berlin, and Paderborn. 56 young women and men, coming from all corners of the globe and spanning the worlds of politics, business, civil society, academia, and the military, explored the state of global governance and debated their own proposals for improvement. This report presents the essence of these debates, each session summarized by one volunteer rapporteur from the group. This summary tries to put these meetings into perspective, though without possibly doing justice to the richness of the discussions among the participants.

One underlying thread of the discussions was the question whether the liberal international order “as we know it” was merely on pause or actually in retreat. Much of the current anxiety about world affairs relates to a widespread feeling of vulnerability in the countries that see themselves at the core of this order. Between them, these countries share three basic characteristics: They champion individual and minority rights, subscribe to the value of free markets, and build on the rule of law and a free press. At the international level, they created an interwoven system of global governance structures regulating economic matters, addressing climate change and environmental affairs, and promoting security or global transport. Power in this system is mostly defined as the ability to set the rules; a system that has given Western countries – i.e. mostly the United States and Europe, but also their allies such as Canada, Japan, and Australia – an advantage.

This order is under pressure from a number of related, and actually reinforcing developments. Political fragility and hence lower prosperity in some newly democratic states stands in contrast to the economic success of illiberal societies such as China and Russia. This not only makes the latters’ models more attractive, but has also resulted in a decline of self-confidence and trust in political institutions in the West. Moreover, the global governance structures instituted by liberal democracies are increasingly weak. In fact, the United States, itself the decades-long champion of this order through with it has leveraged its advantage, has begun to dismantle it. The current administration perceives multilateralism as a restraining factor for American ambitions, not an enabling one. Other points have contributed to the unraveling of global order: the growing unpredictability of international crises; the appearance of alternative “truths”; and the gradual disappearance of the monopoly of the nation state to exercise force.

More generally, both economic and a cultural globalization are facing headwinds from the emergence of global strongmen. Economic globalization has elevated large parts of the global population out of poverty and into wealth. Yet the liberal democra-

cies that used to promote open markets appear to have neglected to protect their citizens against the repercussions of such policy. Stagnant minimum wages, battered welfare states, and a lack of investment in education have enabled phenomena like the vote for Brexit and for a Trump administration. In cultural terms, the anti-globalist movement invokes a rootedness in local identity as well as nationalist authenticity in order to distinguish itself from the idea of a global village.

Today's populism could be seen a response to the increased pressure from global trade. A similar dis-harmonization as in trade can be detected in the "Balkanization" of finance, with increasing regulatory diversity around the globe. Especially crypto-currencies will have an impact on money moving very quickly, which calls for strict regulation and licenses becoming even more important. That is why there is a need for global rules for finance and trade, not just local ones, but it is not clear whether states can agree on them in the prevailing protectionist climate.

These countertrends have eroded the consensus regarding the benefits of free trade and protectionism is the new norm. As it happens, support for globalization is highest in the developing world, with declining support in the United States, France, or Germany. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has 'robbed' the group of liberal democracies of an organizing principle, a common project.

The European Union (EU) as one of the major proponents of the international liberal order has been shaken by number of crises over the past couple of years. These include weak public debt, migratory pressures, defense and security issues, the future of the euro, Brexit, and the rise of populism and nationalism. At the same time, some recent developments have helped to re-energize the EU, such as the election of pro-European President Macron in France, improved economic performance of the Eurozone, and even the election of U.S. President Trump and in some senses the prospect of Brexit.

However, in order to maintain its model of integration and the inherent sovereignty bargain (by which members pool their decision-making power to achieve greater outputs), the EU needs to undergo important changes. Shifting from freedom to security as its guiding principle, it is likely to focus on flexibly managing integration rather than striving for cohesion, and it will adapt to a 'post-Atlantic' rather than transatlantic (i.e. U.S.-centered) vision of the world.

While old powers are struggling and new ones are trying to gain more influence, in particular China has succeeded in becoming a strong regional and global player in recent years. The country's tremendous progress is based on a healthy sense of pragmatism and is driven by four important goals: sovereignty, stability, economic growth, and growing global ambitions. Given the widespread view that the existing order is inadequate to respond to pressing issues such as terrorism, migration or armed conflicts, it is surprising that emerging powers are not asking for new institutions. Instead, they want to transform the present structure to allow for their influence and participation. Yet the question is, for how much longer will they patiently wait for the established powers to give up on their privileged positions and agree to reforms?

The various discussions on the Middle East revealed three key themes: first, the apparent breakdown of the region's fragile order; second, the resultant surfacing of tribal identities as the key driver around which politics — and conflicts — are increasingly shaped; and, third, a critical lack of foreign support.

Regional order is breaking down on three different levels: the regional order of states and borders (whether through the civil war sparked by the self-declared Islamic State or the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum), the domestic order within nations

(such as in Syria, Yemen, and Libya), and the normative or moral order of the region (i.e. the culture of coexistence between a variety of religious and ethnic communities). This is the first phase of a major process of – evolutionary or revolutionary – change that will leave no country in the Middle East untouched. Rather, distinct camps can be identified across the region: The traditional forces of the old Sunni Arab authoritarian status quo including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt; a pro-Iranian camp around the "Shiite crescent" from Lebanon through Syria and Iraq to Iran; and an ideological alliance of sorts between Qatar and Turkey, two Sunni countries that have embraced the cause of grassroots Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Relations between these states seem to work on the principle that 'the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy'.

Also within those – sometimes barely functioning – states, tribal identities have resurfaced with any feeling of Pan-Arabism gone. If large parts of the population feel excluded from the distribution of power, income and resources, they will seek out other identifying groups. Thus, confessional, sectarian, and ethnic fault lines gain relevance, both as a response to and as a multiplier of deepest fears. Even Israel is turning into a tribal state, with cleavages opening up between four camps: secular Jews; right-wing Zionists; the ultra-Orthodox community propped up by government handouts and exemptions; and the Arabs in both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.

In this situation where the region would need all the support it could get, a powerful multilateral response is mostly absent. With regional actors unable to manage the conflicts, international actors too have not only different interests and priorities but also very limited influence. In addition, working towards a political solution poses two classic dilemmas to policymakers: to choose between maintaining stability or promoting democracy as well as between expanding liberalism in society or focusing exclusively on development.

With regard to how Europe dealt with migration and refugees, including from a war-torn Middle East, the first and core question was one of burden sharing. The redistribution of refugees and migrants among the EU states encapsulates the complicated question of striking a balance between the political and the humanitarian aspects of the "crisis". In fact, the word itself can hardly apply to what has become a chronic humanitarian condition of policy failure. Yet, given that politicians ultimately want voters to re-elect them and the latter are not particularly attracted to the topic of migration, this helps to explain why they ignored previous warnings about impending migration and still show little eagerness to address the issue. In that sense, it is more of a political crisis of responsibilities and election concerns than a refugee crisis.

Moreover, it is not a European problem as such but a global one: There are 65 million refugees around the world, and 84% of Syrian refugees do *not* reside in Europe. This leads to the question of how to respond to injustice in faraway places, which the group explored through different concepts from Immanuel Kant's 'perpetual peace' to Robert H. Jackson's idea of the fulfillment of humanity as the aspiration to justice.

Among the other "disruptors" of world order discussed, terrorism and the cyber world stood out. The former represents a violent asymmetric reaction to particular organizing principles and systems of values with the intent of instilling fear and insecurity among larger groups of people. Its ultimate aim is to bring about societal change. While difficult to achieve, a legally – or merely politically – binding definition of terrorism would be desirable to ensure legitimacy: It could bring about more focused efforts and more effective co-operation, while at the same time narrowing the space for deliberate misuse and manipulation of the term.

Through a very different, but possibly even more disruptive dynamic, social media is changing the nature of political communication by mobilizing users in new ways. In particular, the proliferation of fake news is disturbing less on substance but on sheer scale: As the Internet has given its users access to a world of instant information, it has also enabled the spread of disinformation on a hitherto unseen level. Both human users and computerized "bots" can dramatically amplify the power of disinformation campaigns by automating the process of preparing and delivering social media posts. Even though social media allow mass participation, it can be used in ways that severely inhibits the checks and balances of democracy.

As a response, cyber security is no longer considered merely from a technical point of view but understood as a new concept encompassing content, propaganda, and dissemination threats with a wide range of involved stakeholders. Consequently, the domain – so far mainly defined as civilian – has now become more militarized. Yet the challenge is not only that states generally do not agree on their approach to cyber security. Also private actors in cyber space have a wide-ranging impact. Only a handful of companies have major influence over what you can say and do on the Internet. What is more, private actions are often reinforced by public actors, as the latter outsource security issues to the private actors that they are supposed to regulate. As a consequence, a large private monopoly over regulations is growing.

A similarly vicious cycle (or virtuous, depending on the viewpoint) is present in company-consumer relations. Users have become "prisoners" of the products of Internet companies, allowing them to collect even more data to further analyze their users' lifestyle and purchasing behavior. People might feel they have the free will to use these digital products to make their life better, but there is no free lunch: The goal of private companies will still be to make money.

Tackling these challenges will be the task of a generation. Especially data ownership in the cyber domain is a very tricky one. A major takeaway was that self-regulation seems to be the predominant form of a regulatory structure, which also explains why the battle for data ownership and privacy was lost a long time ago. Is it possible to regain control over the use of customers' data? One solution would be to create an international data regime, limiting the amount and quality of data that digital platform companies can store. At the same time, civil society organizations, entrepreneurs and governments should build alternative infrastructures hosting such data.

Similar forms of cooperation could involve citizens, NGOs and businesses in an effort to fill the gaps left by the decline of U.S. power. In order to engage these new actors more, a multi-stakeholder system of global governance that is no longer state-centered is needed. How could such a system of global policy making look like? Crucially, who could implement it in a situation where negotiations and joint decision-making seem to be more difficult than ever? While such questions remain unanswered for the moment, the search for possible responses would be an important outcome of the current period of uncertainty.

Advancing women leadership was another proposal endorsed by Summer School participants. What was identified as the "confidence gap" of women is in fact a drag on societies more broadly. Whether through quotas or cultural awareness, aiming for a more equal representation in leadership position in politics, business, the media, academia, or civil society is not only morally right, but also good policy. Yet to do so should not lead to the exclusion of men from this debate: A lot of the solutions require specific policy actions, and one still tends to find more men in these circles than women.

Finally, architecture and infrastructure were two domains which are ripe for new forms of global cooperation. Architectural discourse should not be left to city planners and professional architects only; instead, it should be viewed as a means to address political unrest, migration, environmental issues, and more. These concepts can be made tangible through architecture and urban planning decisions. Indeed with cities in transformation, an increasing scarcity of resources, and rapid digitalization, prioritization of societal demands should be a critical discussion including more constituencies than only professional architects.

The emergence of mega cities around the globe is an emblematic example of the challenges of global governance: Over the next fifty years, the number of cities exceeding ten million inhabitants is expected to more than double. This has harsh consequences in terms of resources, transports, garbage but also criminality and extremism, putting great strains on the world's resources and infrastructure. Improving infrastructure, both digital and physical and both in urban and rural areas, is thus a common project that states can drive to their own and mutual benefit. Ultimately, this would help to establish new forms of cooperation between the 'West' and all other countries.

The Summer School's participants already have the open professional minds and the global spirit that it takes to address these challenges. Time for them to assume the institutional positions and operational means to put their ideas in practice.

Berlin, September 2017



2 Session reports

2.1 Prospects for the Liberal International Order: On Pause or in Retreat?

Speaker: *Robin Niblett*, Director, Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs), London

Session 1: Monday, August 14

Robin Niblett maintains that the liberal international order is at best on pause. If liberal societies cannot fix or control the root causes of their current weakness, liberalism as the dominant thought tradition after World War II and *the* global model for citizens' welfare and peace may well be in permanent retreat. The global dominance of the countries defined as liberal democracies is at present visibly eroded by illiberal or nationalistic narratives such as those of Russia or China. Saving the liberal international order is a cumbersome and long-term challenge, which requires a new and unifying project. Niblett gives the liberal international order as it stands now a five- to ten-year period to either recover or expire.

What is the liberal international order? Countries that describe themselves as liberal democracies share three characteristics according: Firstly, this group subscribes to the value of free markets. Next, they protect both individual and minority rights. Thirdly, they subjugate to the rule of law; namely, their governments are checked by a functioning and independent legal system and by a free press as the fourth estate.

The dominance of this group of liberal democracies in the international order has been protected since World War II by the United States. These countries have used their economic and military supremacy to establish international institutions according to what they perceived as universal values, among them the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and lastly, for once despite the opposition of the United States, the International Criminal Court. This fact, and the thriving economies in the countries that label themselves liberal democracies have let to an almost mythical romanticization of the liberal thought tradition as *the* model for global success. As Niblett put it: "There has been a belief that any country and its citizens live best when they follow the principles of the liberal international order, that war between liberal democracies would not happen, and that everlasting peace would be the future."

However, three developments signal the rapid decline of this liberal international order: Firstly, newly democratic countries, including for instance Brazil and the Philippines, are politically fragile, which restrains their economic rise and success. In contrast to that and as a second theme of decline, the economic success of *illiberal* societies such as China and Russia leads to a new self-confidence in and resistance from these countries. In Niblett's words, "they are not going to allow themselves to be subjugated to what they view as Western power". The third element is the increasing weakness of the global governance structures that liberal democracies instituted: The G8 cannot find a common view on global governance reform, the EU is about to lose a key member with the UK, three countries have withdrawn from the International Criminal Court, and numerous WTO agreements are in freeze.

What then are the root causes for the current weakness of the liberal international order? Liberal democracies promoted open markets but neglected to protect their

citizens against the repercussions of such policy. Stagnant minimum wages, battered welfare states, and a lack of investment in education have enabled phenomena like the vote for Brexit and for a Trump administration. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has 'robbed' the group of liberal democracies of an organizing principle, a common project. "Each country looks after itself, and freedom is relative", as Niblett said. Lastly, liberal democracies have failed to appreciate the "myth of nationalism" and its strength as a promise of salvation among citizens: Populist-nationalist narratives such as the one employed by Trump have developed strong public appeal, whilst the welfare promise of the liberal international order has left many of its citizens in disillusioned.

If the liberal international order does not recover in the next five to ten years, it may be permanently in retreat. In Niblett's analysis, this timeframe is how long it takes until illiberal societies such as China would want to cut their connection to liberally driven globalization and its institutions. Currently those countries still benefit from globalized trade flows and institutions such as the UN.

That is why liberal democracies must use those five to ten years to reintegrate certain neglected and disadvantaged groups of citizens back into the liberal project, inter alia via investments in education. Welfare states must be restructured to counter for example rising nationalist narratives. While fixing their internal problems, liberal democracies must also seek to find common projects with illiberal states, whose leaders are determined not to subject themselves under the liberal international order. Improving infrastructure, both digital infrastructure as well as physical, is one such common project that both sides can drive to their own and mutual benefit.

2.2 Trump and the Decline of Multilateralism

Speakers: *Erjon Kruja*, Foreign Service Officer, US Department of State, Mexico City
Cameron Munter, President and CEO, EastWest Institute, New York
Jana Puglierin, Head of Program, Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European Policy Studies, German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Berlin
Theo Sommer, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg

Session 2: Monday, August 14

The session provided perspectives on the election of Donald Trump and his presidency and on U.S. leadership in the world. Based on his campaign promises and his performance to date, participants sought clues as to Trump's priorities, both at home and abroad, and the impact that his administration's worldview might have on multilateralism. Although the majority of participants' observations were critical, they also sensed an opportunity for new and evolving forms of multilateralism among like-minded states.

In October 2015, the notion of Donald Trump becoming US President was deemed highly unlikely, even laughable. Just over a year later he was elected. Only time will tell why the election predictions were so wrong. The present concern, however, is what this may mean for the US and its role in the world.

One speaker suggested that everything President Trump says and does should be viewed through the lens of domestic politics. Actions are designed to appeal to his domestic base, although this reading has been complicated by the fact that he appears to be abandoning all traditional wings of the Republican Party. The old guard of the Republican Party, whether internationalist, nationalist or neoconservative, has become a target of the Trump administration. In addition to domestic politics, the economic trends that have left swathes of people bereft of hope need to be understood, since the Trump phenomenon is an example of a broader global trend.

The primacy and focus on domestic policy means that there is very little notion of foreign policy. Nor is there much experience. The world is reliant on those around the President—generals, nationalists and family members—to teach him on the fly to avoid the worst crises.

In this regard, the escalation of the situation on the Korean Peninsula is troubling. North Korea has become increasingly hostile for some time, but never to the extent of today. Past administrations must accept some blame, as policies of strategic patience have not worked. Yet, Trump's militaristic tone has made things worse. One speaker suggested that only two solutions remained for Washington: the acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state or an increase in sanctions.

Also, accusations of Russian meddling in U.S. elections, whether proven or not, have worked against Moscow's likely priorities. Sanctions against Russia have been strengthened, as has NATO unity. The Trump presidency has not changed policy much vis-à-vis its predecessor. This policy continuation, however, is also a result of a lack of coordination, with a great number of political appointees in key government positions not yet nominated. Meetings still take place as normal but without the ability or guidance to adjust policy.

More generally, the U.S. administration's position on multilateralism is one which views the concept as a restraining factor for America's ambitions. Despite the U.S. leveraging its advantage through multilateral institutions for decades, President Trump perceives this approach as benefitting only freeloading allies. Debates about burden sharing are not new, but have now been taken to a heightened level. Multilateralism is no longer seen as a problem solving tool, but a weakness.

In trying to convey the Trumpian worldview, one participant cited the lyrics of a 1972 Randy Newman song, ‚Political Science':

No one likes us - I don't know why
We may not be perfect, but heaven knows we try
But all around, even our old friends put us down
Let's drop the big one and see what happens

We give them money - but are they grateful?
No, they're spiteful and they're hateful
They don't respect us - so let's surprise them
We'll drop the big one and pulverize them

This approach has allies and partners abroad concerned. Donald Trump's election was a political earthquake, triggering a crisis of multilateralism. One participant assessed the president to be personally, intellectually and temperamentally unfit for office, referring to him as a "walking powder keg of foreign policy."

For Germany in particular, this has been a hard awakening. Then-President Barack Obama and Chancellor Angela Merkel were very much in line, whereas Trump controversially threatened the very cohesion of the EU, applauding the United Kingdom's decision to leave the club. In so doing, Trump has demonstrated his skepticism of institutions that Germany sees as linchpins of its own security and prosperity. Trump and Merkel are ideological opposites, with the former adopting a unilateralist and zero-sum approach to the world. In Germany and more broadly around the world, the United States is therefore viewed as a source of unprecedented uncertainty on the global level.

In terms of European reactions, one participant suggested sticking to existing convictions and foreign policy objectives; Trump should be shown that the EU is not a chimera. NATO should be strengthened and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran must be sustained. Similarly the fight against climate change should be continued. It was emphasized that there will be a time after Trump and that waiting for things to snap back to normal was unlikely to be effective. Instead, proactive multilateralists should seek to work with likeminded states.

In an effort to find positives, one participant suggested that change may occur, not through learning, but because those around Trump would find a way to constrain him. Similarly, the decline of US power may lead to new diplomatic tools to fill the gaps beyond Westphalian democracy, involving more citizens, NGOs and businesses. This form of multilateralism may be harder to define but could be an important outcome of the Trump presidency.

2.3 Debating Current Issues in the Near and Middle East

Speakers: *Mohamed Elfayoumy*, Middle East Expert, Geneva
Ayham Kamel, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia Group, London
Soli Özel, Professor of International Relations, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow, Robert Bosch Academy, Berlin
Yael Wissner-Levy, Speechwriter, Tel Aviv

Session 3: Tuesday, August 15

The Middle East is a land of overlapping crises. In Syria and Iraq, nation-states imploded, giving wake to ruinous conflicts, shaped by sectarianism and the destabilizing meddling of outside powers. In Egypt, an autocrat in secularist clothing swept out a democratically elected Islamist government and embarked on a stifling crackdown. In Turkey, an autocrat in Islamist clothing has set about reshaping a nation in his image, while eroding the state's democratic and secular institutions. In Israel, the Palestinian question remains unanswered, while Israelis themselves are more concerned about their own national divisions than a solution to a half-century of occupation.

In the session on "current issues" facing the region, three key themes emerged from the discussion. First, the reality of a breakdown in the region's fragile order and an inability to create new stable, inclusive polities. Second, the resultant surfacing of tribal identities as the key driver around which politics — and conflicts — are increasingly shaped. And, lastly, for all the troubles that ail the Middle East, the current moment seems to be defined by a critical lack of foreign support, including from a Trump administration that appears to be singularly disinterested in the type of assistance, diplomatic grunt-work and nation-building commitments that may be required. "We have been living in an arc of crisis from Afghanistan to Nigeria," one speaker said, gesturing at largely Muslim and post-colonial societies torn by recent political upheaval and war.

The Middle East, as laid out by anther speaker, is being carved out by three distinct camps: The traditional forces of the old Sunni Arab authoritarian status quo — led by wealthy states Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, and featuring the region's most populous country, Egypt — which seek to beat back the region's Islamist-populist movements; a pro-Iranian camp that seeks to consolidate its position amid wars in Iraq and Lebanon and preserve its beleaguered ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad; and an ideological alliance of sorts between Qatar and Turkey, two Sunni countries that have embraced the cause of grassroots Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood.

In this context, existing tensions and conflicts have grown all the more intractable. There is a veritable dissolution of the existing Arab order, with no new system of order emerging from the havoc. A victim of the turmoil has been the "never easy but largely functioning culture of coexistence" that defined the Middle East for centuries: "States are no longer unifying factors in the social and political lives of these countries," noted another speaker, suggesting also that the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq "was a propeller" of the unraveling now seen in the region.

The pro-democracy uprisings in 2011, and the subsequent counter-revolution in Egypt and the enduring wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen, were all symptoms of a

common theme in the Middle East — what happens when large segments of the public feel that they have either no more stake in the status quo or, indeed, increasingly feel threatened by it. “Neither Syria nor Iraq will be the kind of states they were before their respective wars,” someone noted. Even if the Syrian regime endures, Assad would be beholden to warlords and with little centralization of power.

That sectarian fragmentation is not only on show in Arab countries but also in Israel, which has long touted itself as the shining beacon of democracy and stability in a region shrouded in darkness. In fact, one speaker argued, it is rapidly becoming a tribal state. Cleavages have opened up between four different camps: secular Jews; right-wing Zionists; the ultra-Orthodox community, which is a beneficiary of myriad government handouts and exemptions; and the Arabs in both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories.

For many secular Israelis, Orthodoxy has become unbearable; they fear their nation’s politics hijacked by that community’s demands and influence, one speaker said. This leads to “an impossible situation” — an inherent contradiction between the image of Israel as a tech-savvy “start-up nation” and the “raw traditionalist society” that is finding greater voice under the right-wing government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

All the while, the peace process is on nobody’s agenda, with even Arab Gulf states and Egypt finding cozy new arrangements with the Israelis. The powder keg only needs a new spark. And while the geopolitical muddle does not help matters, the Middle East remains hobbled by woeful governance and sluggish economies.

Two classic dilemmas confront the region’s politicians: The choice between maintaining stability or promoting democracy as well as the question of expanding liberalism in society or focusing exclusively on development. The Egyptian government, for one, has clearly opted for bringing stability and development through heavy-handed repression and policy-making. U.S. President Donald Trump is a staunch supporter of the Egyptian regime, applauding its supposed tough stance on terrorism despite the myriad objections of human rights activists and dissidents.

Moreover, Trump has shown little interest in committing American resources to the painstaking reconstruction and institution building that countries like Syria and Iraq will need after their wars finally end. One speaker described Trump’s indifference as a “very disturbing broad development in the US,” provoked by “the rise of nationalist forces.” Similar politics face key European partners in Britain and France. Meanwhile, the wealthy Gulf states are locked in their own tense standoff over Qatar’s maverick foreign policy.

2.4 No Order, no Hegemon. Seven Theses on the State of Play in the Middle East

Speaker: *Volker Perthes*, CEO and Director, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

Session 4: Tuesday, August 15

Reflecting on a conflict-ridden in Middle East, Volker Perthes used seven broad headlines to sketch what we see today in a region in flux: from a breakdown of orders and a proliferation of local conflicts to an unstable geopolitical balance of forces, the importance of the Syrian conflict for the rest of the region, and the relevance of international actors to the threat of terrorism and some broader conclusions on long-term solutions involving local and regional actors.

The big headline characterizing the current state of the Middle East is the breakdown or dissolution of order. Ordering systems are breaking up on three different levels: the regional order of states and borders (e.g. the Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum), the domestic order within nations (such as in Syria, Yemen, and Libya), and the normative or moral order of the region (i.e. the culture of coexistence between a variety of religious and ethnic communities). This is the first phase of a major process of – evolutionary or revolutionary – change that will leave no country in the region untouched.

The second point is that in the Middle East all politics is local. Conflicts have local causes, mainly related to the dignity and rights of people, to the inclusivity or exclusivity of their regimes of governance. However, political systems are not stable if large parts of the population feel excluded from the distribution of power, income and resources. Wherever states stop to function or start to fail, people seek out other identifying groups. Thus, confessional, sectarian, and ethnic fault lines gain relevance, both as a response to and as a multiplier of deepest fears. Syria is an example where some people fight for President Bashar Al-Assad not because of loyalty to him but out of fear that, if the other side wins, they would be destroyed.

Thirdly, the geopolitical balance of forces in the region is highly fluid and also not stable. It is difficult to talk about winners and losers, as switching positions in a balance of mistrust have thus far prevented any stable regional coalitions or alliances from emerging. Instead, relations between states seem to work on the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy’. The two dominant conflicts today defining the regional structure and its dynamics are the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the war in Syria.

In fact, the dynamics and outcome of the Syrian war will likely be a major determinant for the future of the entire region. All political, geopolitical, social and sectarian conflicts in the region converge in Syria like under a burning glass. Originally a local power struggle, the conflict quickly became regionalized and internationalized. The number of external players with direct or indirect military involvement has increased. Until now there is an absence of a multilateral response: the UN are powerless, only trying to be ready at the right moment when regional and international consent would allow it to take some action. De-escalation zones do not end the war, but at least serve to reduce violence.

At the same time, regional actors are no longer able to manage conflicts and to reach regional stability without international powers. However, the current state of play shows how the interests and priorities of these powers differ and how limited even

their influence is. It may be possible to win the war with foreign intervention, but it is almost impossible to determine the political outcome after it.

Terrorism is not only the main threat *emanating from* the region but also one of the main threats for societies and states *within* the region. Terrorism and the Islamic State ideology must be fought and destroyed with all military and political power. Yet without a political solution within Syria and the region, as well as a political transition towards a credible form of inclusive governance in Syria, an “IS 2.0” will sooner or later emerge, Perthes warned.

Finally, while no one could predict the future of the Middle East, two rules of thumb informed the speaker’s outlook. First, there has to be a diplomatic – i.e. long-term – solution based on the concept of strategic patience and endurance. As an example, it took 13 years to negotiate the Iran nuclear agreement. Second, actors on the ground are often part of the problem as much as of the solution. Without regional partners, none of the conflicts would be solved. Ignoring or isolating difficult players does not inspire them to change. It is altogether easier to deal with difficult yet functioning partners than with failed states.

The ensuing discussion revealed a number of other issues regarding the conflict in Middle East. Calls for a regional Marshall Plan would require considerable funds; however, even before spending the money, certain conditions such as political economic institutions, reliable councils and control, schools etc. are required. Moreover, in Perthes’ view the conflict is not about religion per se. The latter is part of this region and is sometimes used as a justification for violence; however, the conflict is about political issues and a functioning state with respect for religious diversity and individuality.

On participant pointed out that the refugee crisis did not appear in the seven theses, even though half of the population of Syria was forced to leave their home and now lives outside the country. Before refugees could voluntarily return, rebuild their houses and restart the economy, there is again a need for certain basic requirements: a form of stability, a certain degree of human security, and a minimum amount of rule of law.

There still is competition within the international effort to solve the situation in the Middle East, but especially the Geneva and Astana processes need to be seen as complementary to each other. The group expressed the hope that they would lead to some progress in finding a solution for both sides: a political agreement and cease-fire management. There is a need to freeze the conflict and to stop the fighting. In that sense, de-escalation zones are a necessary condition for a political solution.

One last point in the discussion was the question of bringing the war crimes committed by all sides to the International Criminal Court. Having in mind that the solution of the conflict has to be reached through a negotiating deal, the speaker suggested that a new government could approach war crimes after a peace deal through a process of transitional justice. For the moment, however, all parties need to be at the table to find a solution. It is not about bringing them before court but convincing them to help solve the conflict.

2.5 Breakout Session: Egypt

Speaker: *Mohamed Elfayoumy*, Middle East Expert, Geneva
Session 5: Tuesday, August 15

Starting off with a presentation on how human rights concerns played a role in driving political change in Egypt in 2011, the discussion touched on a range of issues in the country's recent post-revolutionary history. These included the international community's stance as Cairo struggled in its transition; the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the region; Egypt's economic performance since the 2011 revolution; the relationship between the military and civilians; and Islam's compatibility with democracy. Furthermore, participants touched on human rights as a concept and whether this was more or less important than economic development and political freedoms.

When the 2011 revolution in Egypt ended three decades of Hosni Mubarak's rule, there was a general state of high expectations, mixed with and almost immediately followed by general instability. Mohamed Elfayoumy wryly commented, "Expectations go up, and performance goes low… which is a recipe for failure." With no solid transition plans in place, euphoria soon gave way to a sense of emptiness and confusion – starting from the transitional phase immediately after President Mubarak to the Muslim Brotherhood's rise to power with President Mohamed Morsi and later to the shift of power to the military when General Abdel Fattah El Sisi became president. In parallel to these political changes and challenges, the country suffered from other factors such as major drops in tourism.

This notwithstanding, Egypt today has strong alliances politically with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Russia, as well as most European governments. Importantly, President El Sisi has been able to establish a good working relationship with U.S. President Donald Trump.

The ensuing debate raised the question whether the international community could have, or should have, done more after the revolution. Given the overall instability of the state of the country and some general ambiguity, this international reluctance was deemed to be mainly driven by confusion over whom to support. Rapid power shifts led the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt to face a heavy crackdown by the government after the demise of President Morsi, thus losing its previously broad access to the masses.

Today, the Brotherhood is banned from any political involvement. Against this background, the discussion raised an interesting question: Could all this government pressure cause a "sympathizing sentiment" among some Egyptians? Besides the Brotherhood's position in Egypt, participants also highlighted their status in other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

As for the upcoming elections in Egypt in 2018, the group deemed change to be unlikely due to a lack of serious contenders on the horizon as well as restrictions on political freedoms and freedom of expression. Will Egyptians still have a chance to fulfill their post-revolution dreams? Only time will tell.

2.6 Breakout Session: Syria

Speakers: *Ayham Kamel*, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Eurasia Group, London
Luoxi Zhao, Assistant Professor, China Foreign Affairs University

Session 6: Tuesday, August 15

This breakout session focused on the current conflicts in Syria with a view to identifying possible scenarios to resolve them. The discussion started with an historical review of the crisis, subsequently moved into a debate about different solutions that would satisfy the interest of domestic groups, regional powers and outsiders, and ended with a vote for the favored scenario.

Luoxi Zhao briefed the group on the history and status quo of the crisis in Syria. It dates back to 2011 as a part of the Arab Spring, with peaceful protests and legitimate demands for more freedom, economic development and justice. The Syrian government under the leadership of President Assad considered the protests as threats to its administration; therefore it responded with repression, which triggered even stronger protects. Opposition forces including different rebel groups and ethnic minorities have challenged the Assad regime, and the country has become sectarian. Extremists and terrorists have also strengthened their forces in the country.

The crisis has not remained an internal issue, but has caused geopolitical upheaval in the region. Russia has historically had its military presence in the coastal area of Western Syria. It considers the possible fall of the Assad regime as a threat to its national security and therefore generally supports the current government. Turkey intends to fight against the Kurdish people in Syria, which it considers a threat to its own national security and integrity. Turkey also has great concerns about the refugee issue. Iran wants to maintain and secure its access to Lebanon through Syria. Arab countries display diverse attitudes towards the Assad regime: Some consider it problematic while others do not. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey support the removal of the Assad government because the latter refuses to compromise. Years of conflict have displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians either within the country or into other countries in the region as refugees, which has also raised international concerns.

During the discussion, participants, while sharing a common viewpoint that the crisis is mainly for the Syrians themselves to solve, believed that to prevent the conflict from going worse and to stabilize the situation in the country, international intervention was necessary. The question is what kind of intervention would be appropriate, and what results these efforts should aim to achieve.

The group shared two general points: For one, any solution to the crisis should satisfy the different interests of all the three layers of actors, i.e. domestic actors (the Assad government and rebel groups), regional actors, and outside powers. For another, the UN-led talks would be the most appropriate mechanism for a political settlement.

Participants also discussed the balance between democracy and stability. The discussion found it almost impossible to construct an ideal democratic government at the current stage for a number of reasons: First, the Assad government refuses to make any compromise. Second, it is unlikely to find legitimate representatives of different domestic interest groups, as many Syrian have moved out the country. And third, a new democratic system does not necessarily lead to stability. Authoritarian

politics may help more under current circumstances. Therefore, stability should be the priority policy goal in the short term, and democracy is the medium or long-term goal.

In terms of the future governmental structure in Syria, the group believed that it should be the Syrian people determining it, rather than outsiders imposing it. Given that the majority of the population has either fled to neighboring countries or been displaced within the country, it is almost impossible to organize any legitimate referendums or elections. The Assad government still remains strong and may retake more local areas under control, so it could be more realistic to retain it as a stabilizer of the country.

Having taken all these factors into consideration, the group identified four possible scenarios:

a) A political settlement between the Assad government and the rebel groups, pressured by regional and outside powers actively involved in Syria, such as Russia, Iran, and the United States, to establish a mechanism for power sharing.
b) If Assad refuses to negotiate and incrementally regains control of the country, stability should be the priority goal. Therefore a deal needs to be done with the Assad regime.
c) Split the country based on the existence of different groups and powers.
d) Supply rebels with weapons, let the war continue and try to take out Assad.

Participants conducted a vote on all four scenarios and found that an overwhelming majority of them (14 people) supported Scenario a); four people supported Scenario b); two people supported Scenario c); and one supported Scenario d).

2.7 Breakout Session: Israel and Palestine

Speaker: *Yael Wissner-Levy,* Speechwriter, Tel Aviv
Session 7: Tuesday, August 15

The breakout session considered one of the longest-standing challenges to international peace and stability – the conflict between Israel and Palestine and ways to make progress in the associated "peace process". The main themes were the significance of an increasing separation of Israeli society in different blocks, the right to exist of both sides to the conflict, the relationship between mind-set change and cessation of hostilities, the socio-economic perspective on the conflict, and questions related to the winners of the persisting conflict.

Following up to the morning's panel discussion, participants discussed the effect of a growing separation of Israel's society into different blocks as well as the disconnect between the people and their leaderships on both, the Israeli and Palestine side. Through sharing personal experiences, both the speaker and individual participants provided a glimpse into the human factors of the conflict such as trust, mistrust, fear, and the underlying mind-sets. This raised an important question regarding the relationship between trust and peace: What is the necessary sequence between a change of mind-set aimed at tackling the mutual mistrust and fear, and one aimed at the cessation of hostilities and violence? Does one follow from the other (and in which order), or can they go in lockstep?

The recognition of the state of Israel, i.e. its right to exist, remains a challenge. In some Arab societies there is a lack of acceptance that Israel exists or should exist as a state. Absent is a perspective that both sides have a right to the land. However, taking the current situation in the Balkans as an analogy, the contestations between two sides regarding an (alleged) historic right to land does not represent a step toward finding a solution. It is more about self-reflection on both sides regarding what is being done wrong. While the liberal left in Israel does take on this task, observers believe that its impact on policy is limited, whereas on the Palestinian side only limited reflection is visible to the outside world. For now, the question remains whether the prospects for peace are dependent on the cessation of violence taking place before a shift of mind-set. Still, work on both dimensions is ongoing.

Given Israel's strong economy and worldwide recognition as a "tech nation", the discussion also explored whether the country's economy and its many start-ups could be a lever to tip the needle in the conflict. However, economic prospects seemed to be only one amongst many factors and not the key avenue to pursue. Despite the many challenges, the judicial system of Israel provides some hope, as it stands solid and well respected according to the speaker. This is due to its accessibility and the protection provided to all involved parties, including the Palestinians, regarding constitutional and legal rights.

With respect to the prolonged nature of the conflict, the group considered the many parties involved and attempted to identify the winners of continued conflict. In addition to local beneficiaries such as the Palestinian leadership, third countries appear to have an interest in polarizing – and, thus, extending – the conflict in order to deflect from domestic problems at home.

This brings a multilateral perspective into the conflict. However, since the trust of Israel in the UN is limited, based on real or perceived double standards of some UN

resolutions, multilateral co-operation through established institutions was not seen as a likely solution to the conflict.

While acknowledging that simply “talking more” is not yet a strategy, the conclusion was to keep communication among conflicting parties alive and look for windows of opportunity. It was strongly indicated that the conflict could only be solved through a political solution. Two major questions remain: what could trigger the political will to find a solution, and how should the glimpse of hope be instilled in the younger generation of which many only know of conflict and war?

2.8 Emerging Powers and Global Governance

Speakers: *Renato Flôres*, Director, International Intelligence Unit, Fundação Getulio Vargas; Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Rio de Janeiro
Sunjoy Joshi, Director, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
Eberhard Sandschneider, Professor for Chinese Politics and International Relations, Otto-Suhr-Institut, Free University Berlin, Berlin
Karen Smith, University Lecturer, Leiden University, Leiden

Session 8: Wednesday, August 16

Does the current global governance structure match the needs of today's world? Can it accommodate a very diverse set of actors and several emerging powers that so far do not find themselves adequately represented in decision-making processes? While speakers highlighted the current trends sparking such questions and the apparent need for reform, the question of how to get to these reforms and who would steer them remained open.

The current international system consists of different kinds of global governance structures, e.g. for regulating economic matters, addressing climate change and environmental affairs, and promoting security or global transport. Power in this system is mostly defined as the ability to set the rules. Stemming from the post-World War II situation, this setup gives certain countries more powers than others, most notably France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia and China with their permanent seat and veto right in the UN Security Council. At the same time this post-war order had been designed in such a way that it would not allow a single country alone to write the rules of managing global affairs.

While this structure has served the purpose of providing order and stability over several decades, there is currently a widespread feeling that it does not deliver anymore. So what kind of global governance does today's world need?

In recent years, following the financial and economic crisis of 2008, the global center has shifted from "the West" to Asia. This has changed the balance of forces: Emerging countries in Asia (e.g. India) but also elsewhere (e.g. Brazil, South Africa) are asking for their fair share in global decision-making. Given the widespread view that the existing order appears to be inadequate to respond to pressing issues such as terrorism, migration or armed conflicts, it is surprising to see that these countries are not asking for new institutions. Instead, they want to transform the present structure to allow for their influence and participation. Yet the question is, for how much longer will they patiently wait for the old powers to give up on their privileged positions and agree to reforms?

While old powers are struggling and new powers are trying to gain more influence, China has succeeded in becoming a strong regional and global player in recent years. The country's tremendous progress is based on a healthy sense of pragmatism and is driven by four important goals: sovereignty, stability, economic growth, and growing global ambitions. Over a period of 40 years, China's leadership did not make any major mistake in bringing the country forward, one speaker opined. The rise of China represents normal progress, and soon China's economic power will transform into a political and military one, too. Especially in Eurasia, China is already

increasing its influence. Yet can we count on China to bring back the desired stability and global order?

Power has not only shifted among states but also from states to other actors. In the current system, governance is the outcome of negotiations between states as well-defined and recognized actors. Now, in a world where “liberal democracy” is largely questioned as a model for state governance, old alliances threaten to fall apart in the absence of a common goal or project. At the same time, new and powerful non-state actors are appearing, from both civil society (e.g. the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) and the business sector.

In order to engage these new actors more, a multi-stakeholder system of global governance is needed. How could such a system of global policy making – which is no longer state-centered – look like? Crucially, who could implement it in a situation where negotiations and joint decision-making seem to be more difficult than ever?

A palpable anxiety about the future exists in many societies today, as people fear a downward spiral into chaos. While it is true that the world is currently undergoing a major transformation, it should also be stated that global governance has always been “a bit of everything” and that disorder has also existed in the past decades. Crises should not be feared, as they are not necessarily bad. They provide learning opportunities. The question is, can they give an impulse for positive change and reform fast enough?

2.9 The Future of the European Union

Speakers: *Piotr Buras*, Head of Warsaw Office, European Council on Foreign Relations, Warsaw
Ulrike Guérot, Director, Department for European, Policy and the study of Democracy, Danube University, Krems
David Held, Master, University College Durham, Durham
Jan Techau, Director, Richard C. Holbrooke Forum for the Study of Diplomacy and Governance, American Academy, Berlin

Session 9: Wednesday, August 16

The panel discussed various factors that define the current status of the EU, considering the issue also from historical and geopolitical perspectives. Speakers identified key crises as well as prospects and possible ways forward for the future of the Union. Overall, there was a sense from the speakers that the focus and purpose of the EU are shifting as it faces ongoing and emerging challenges, and that changes will be needed to assure a successful future.

In terms of factors shaping the Union, one speaker used the concept of 'steering capacity.' This was defined as the ability of governance mechanisms to resolve pressing problems, together with the cultural and symbolic bonds that bind people together. When regimes face multiple and complex pressures that exceed their steering capacity, they tend to crumble. The EU may be approaching its own limits.

In addition, a series of fundamental paradigm shifts may shape the future of the EU:

1) A shift from freedom to security as the guiding principle of the EU, including its attitude towards expansion.
2) A shift from cohesion to flexibility in managing European integration.
3) A shift from a transatlantic (i.e. U.S.-focused) to a 'post-Atlantic' vision.

Another speaker emphasized that, from a geopolitical perspective and in light of the experience of the past 3000 years, Europe is an inherently unstable continent. In order to stabilize it, Europeans must consider how much they are willing to invest. This concerns money but even more so "sovereignty bargains," where states pool elements of their sovereignty in order to gain some greater benefits in return. Integration projects such as the EU and NATO so far have given Europe a massive return on investment, but the next steps are less certain.

Speakers identified a number of key crises facing the EU. These include the weak public debt, migratory pressures, defense and security issues, the future of the euro, Brexit, and the rise of populism and nationalism. At the same time, there are some recent developments that have helped to re-energize the EU, such as the election of President Macron in France, improved economic performance of the Eurozone, and even the election of U.S. President Trump and in some senses the prospect of Brexit.

Going forward, the panelists expressed various views on the possible future of the Union and what will shape it, including the following perspectives:

- While some recent developments are positive, deep reforms are still needed. With its steering capacity under pressure, the EU can only survive as a way of solving common problems.
- The next steps in addressing shared challenges and crises as a union require investments that go to the core of national identity and sovereignty. Major in-

tegration steps are needed that can no longer be ‘monetized.’ Thus, where Europe is going depends on whether it can reconcile two driving forces: integration and nationalism.

- For the EU to succeed, equality for all citizens before the law is required. The EU needs a single democracy to frame the single market and its common currency – or it will lose latter two.

2.10 Unresolved issues: Europe, Ukraine and Russia

Speakers: *Qëndrim Gashi*, Ambassador of Kosovo to France, Paris
Katja Gloger, Editor, Der Stern, Hamburg
Dominik P. Jankowski, Head of OSCE and Eastern Security Unit, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Warsaw
Dmitri Trenin, Director, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow

Session 10: Wednesday, August 16

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine remains one of the most pressing unresolved issues in Europe today. Every single day both parties use weapons prohibited by the 2014 Minsk ceasefire agreement, making it even harder to continue negotiations to sustainably resolve the hot standoff on Ukrainian soil.

By invading Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, Russia broke one of the most fundamental elements of European security – "We do not occupy foreign countries" – one speaker argued. In response and following the annexation of Crimea and continued Russian aggression in the eastern region of Donbas, the Ukrainian government, backed by the majority of its people, took a decisive course towards NATO. The alliance previously had not received strong support from the citizens of Ukraine, but Russia was no longer a partner to create a stable neighborhood in the region, the speaker underlined.

After the Euromaidan protests of 2013/14 and the fall of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russian soldiers without insignia took control of strategic positions and infrastructure within the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Russia occupied the peninsula after a referendum – deemed unconstitutional by Kiev and not recognized by the international community – in which Crimeans allegedly voted to join the Russian Federation. Subsequently, demonstrations by pro-Russian groups in the Donbas area escalated into an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and the Russia-backed forces. In August 2014, Russian military vehicles crossed the border in several locations of Donbas. The incursion by the Russian military was seen as responsible for the defeat of Ukrainian forces in early September. Yet Moscow continues to refuse to recognize its presence in Ukraine and considers occupied Crimea part of its own territory.

Participants learned about the "creeping annexation of Donbas", a term coined by OSCE representatives to describe the following actions of Russia:

1) Continued harassment of members of the OSCE special monitoring mission;
2) Introduction of Russian arms and permanent deployment of Russian forces;
3) Nationalization of Ukrainian enterprises currently supervised by Russian-backed militants;
4) Ongoing willingness to bring Donbas closer to Russia in terms of energy links and water supply.

Today, the Kremlin wants to continue cooperation with the international community on different issues concerning European and world security, yet it is not willing to proceed with talks on the de-occupation of Crimea and an end to the conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

2.11 Extremism: Finding Approaches to a Multifaceted Security Challenge

Speakers: *S. Paul Kapur*, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey CA
Alastair King-Smith, Head of International Counter Extremism, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London
Sediq Sediqqi, General Director of Government Media and Information Center, Office of the President, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Kabul
Elmar Theveßen, Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Head of News, Terrorism Analyst, ZDF Second German Public Television, Mainz

Session 11: Thursday, August 17

The discussion on extremism and terrorism focused on different attempts to define the issue, exploring also a number of underlying societal trends. It then highlighted various approaches to counter these major contemporary security challenges, outlining what governments and companies as well as civil society organizations could do. The aim should be to save the world *from* terrorism rather than (pretend to) save it *through* terrorism.

Terrorism is often defined in very broad terms, and pursuing a concise and uniform understanding of it is very difficult. Still, it was suggested that terrorism represents a violent asymmetric reaction to particular organizing principles and systems of values with the intent of instilling fear and insecurity among larger groups of people. Its ultimate aim is to bring about societal change.

Against this general background, participants stressed that discussions on this subject should not focus only on Islamic nor on religion-driven terrorism alone. They recognized that the phenomenon is significantly more diverse and complex, and that it includes radicalization and violent extremism unrelated to Islam or to any religion, for that matter. One of the participants suggested that a legally – or merely politically – binding definition of terrorism would ensure legitimacy: It would bring about more focused efforts and more effective co-operation, while at the same time narrowing the space for deliberate misuse and manipulation of the term.

The group acknowledged the difficulties of deterring terrorism as well as it oftentimes being a symptom of underlying trends. The discussion hence focused primarily on the prevention of radicalization particularly through addressing the root causes of social discontent. The wide range of drivers of violent extremism and radicalization toward terrorism include ideological considerations, a sense of injustice, search for identity and belonging or for a greater purpose. Any of these can be a way to counter alienation and isolation, a manifestation of social and other grievances and of frustrations arising from uncertainty or fear, exclusion, discrimination and poverty, and even mental health.

The concern was that radicalizers and terrorists were increasingly (ab-)using the growing online networks and the Internet, particularly social media platforms, to organize themselves and to mobilize and recruit. Illiteracy and low levels of education, including a lack of media literacy, were also suggested as conditions favoring radicalization toward violence.

The discussion identified the authorities, including law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as primary actors in addressing violent extremism and terrorism. However,

non-state actors such as companies from the field of information and communication technology but also religious as well as ideological leaders and even young people themselves had a crucial role to play.

Many felt that liberal democracies were constrained by the rule of law and human rights regulations, while stressing that governments' responses needed to be adequately balanced with respect for established civil liberties. This included the digital context: Regulation of Internet content that is used for radicalization and incitement of violence needs to be balanced with the right to freedom of expression and the lawful interception of communication. In this regard, the group discussed the trade-off implied in decreasing individual privacy in the hope of ensuring greater collective security.

One speaker suggested that the "do no harm" principle remains highly relevant when dealing with terrorist treats, so as not to make the situation worse and further diminish already low security prospects. Others thought that policy patience and even paralysis are acceptable responses, as was the incorporation of an opposition (that has renounced to violent means) into government structures to address their grievances. Similarly, participants suggested both hard enforcement and soft measures such as social campaigns, to address the threat.

In the context of global governance, it was noted that that state-sponsored terrorism remains a significant challenge, and that co-operation needs to be intensified on intercepting and disrupting financial flows of terrorists. Yet confidence and trust issues are hampering such international and inter-agency information sharing.

More generally, some suggested that terrorism would be dealt a significant blow if globalization were made to work for more people. Moreover, a key objective in tackling radicalization toward violence is to ensure high levels of social and community cohesion. The appeal of violent extremism and terrorism needs to be countered by positive narratives that aim at saving the world *from* terrorism rather than, supposedly, saving it *through* terrorism.

2.12 Is the Era of Globalization over?

Speaker: *Shashi Tharoor*, Member of the Indian Parliament, Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, New Delhi

Session 12: Friday, August 18

Shashi Tharoor emphasized that the era of globalization, as we know it, is over. In his opinion, the rapid economic development and integration witnessed over the previous thirty years have come to a halt. Still, globalization is not dead yet. By adapting the current global order and giving emerging powers a voice, it would be possible to maintain deep levels of economic integration and ensure economic benefits to a larger group of states and societies.

In his keynote, Tharoor distinguished between economic and cultural globalization, both of which have recently been challenged by the emergence of global strongmen.

During the last thirty years, economic globalization has elevated large parts of the world's population out of poverty and into wealth. The idea of creating a global village of sorts was a strong driver in deepening economic ties since the 1980s. This development is now in retreat with leaders from Russia, China, India, and the United States, among others, increasingly challenging the established global order. These challengers receive support from an anti-globalist movement directed against the "Davos men" of the global multinationals. Poorer parts of societies all over the world, in particular the unemployed, do not feel to benefit from globalization and do not understand why their governments focus on topics they are not invested in.

In cultural terms, the anti-globalist movement invokes a rootedness in local identity as well as nationalist authenticity in order to distinguish itself from the idea of a global village. In this context, U.S. President Trump's slogan "make America great again" also implies to *make America white again*. The notion is to "protect" what is perceived as Christian and Western culture against the growing intercultural influence from deeper integration with other parts of the world.

Moreover, rapid technological development bears the risk to substantially disrupt the international order. The old binary between developed and developing countries could be succeeded by a new binary of technologically able and unable societies. Technology has the potential to propel developing economies into the ranks of the developed world.

To put things into perspective, Tharoor claimed that not globalization itself but rather the management of it is the problem. He called for a modernization and adaptation of the existing Bretton Woods institutions to give a voice to emerging economies. Yet, developed countries seem reluctant to reforming the current institutional order, often referring to a lack of coherence in the BRICS countries' cohesion. Even so, he argued, the latter should still have a say in the management of globalization, and he deemed a reformed system to be central to maintaining the spirit of globalization.

Therefore, the end of globalization can only be avoided through reforming the current system. If in the long term countries like China and India are not commensurately included in the global order, they will turn to building up alternative institutions. This would lead to a further erosion and weakness of the established structures, albeit without necessarily destroying them.

In conclusion, it looks as if the era of globalization, as we know it, is over. However, allowing emerging economies to have a more prominent role within the existing system of institutions would preserve the spirit of globalization. Quoting Shashi Tharoor, “those countries that have been rule-takers, should be allowed to become part of the rule-makers.” Emerging economies do not aim at overthrowing the system. Given their economic potential as well as their share of the global population however, they need to have a say in managing globalization.

2.13 Globalization, Population Growth, and Global Challenges

Speaker: *Walter J. Lindner*, State Secretary, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Session 13: Friday, August 18

Walter Lindner invited the Bucerius group to travel with him in time, to imagine how the world would look like in 50 years – i.e. in 2067 – from the point of view of globalization, population growth, and global challenges. He expressed his worry that a "perfect storm" was approaching and nothing ambitious enough has been done so far in order to avoid it. Lindner urged that it was up to all of us to change that dire prospect by taking the much-needed steps and develop original initiatives.

Before becoming state secretary, Lindner had been Ambassador of Germany to Kenya as well as South Africa and had served as special representative of the federal government for the Ebola crisis. It was against this backdrop that he displayed his rather pessimistic opinion on the future of the globalization in three fields: population growth, global warming and the shrinking of natural resources.

An emblematic example is the emergence of mega cities around the globe: there will be 100 of them in 2067, with harsh consequences in terms of resources, transports, and garbage but also criminality and extremism. Today every hour, 10,000 more people are added to the global population and a similar amount of cars are produced. This will put great strains on the world's resources and infrastructure. Already today, an ambassador in Kenya can plan only one appointment per day because of unmanageable traffic jams.

In such circumstances, global migration is unlikely to disappear. Instead, there will be more movements of people in the future. Lindner challenged the participants to imagine what the dynamics around the Mediterranean would be when four billion people will inhabit Africa but only 500 million Europe.

Lindner continued deploring a lack of action on the side of multilateral regimes: Neither the UN Security Council (due to its unequal representation) nor the Bretton Woods institutions have responded to the urgency of the challenges. Countries like Germany can play a big role in the UN – such as by participating in 16 peacekeeping operations, being the third-largest contributor to the UN budget, and phasing out nuclear energy by 2022. However, it was for the entire international community though to address these problems.

In particular, young, far-sighted leaders were needed, Lindner concluded, in order to bring these issues to political attention and come up with innovative solutions.

2.14 The Unraveling of Global Order, and what it means for the EU

Speakers: *Wolfgang Ischinger*, Ambassador, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Munich
Thomas Bagger, Ambassador, Diplomatic and Foreign Policy Advisor to the President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Office of the Federal President, Berlin
Anka Feldhusen, Head of Division, Office of the Federal President, Berlin

Session 14: Friday, August 18

The session highlighted how German foreign policy addresses the current erosion of the international global order. A number of points have contributed to the unraveling of global order: the growing unpredictability of international crises; the appearance of alternative "truths"; the decline of self-confidence and trust in political institutions in the West; the growing impotence of official and unofficial international institutions; and the gradual disappearance of the monopoly of the nation state to exercise force. Germany's own experience has shaped a foreign policy that is geared towards international cooperation. However, Germany's push for international cooperation and European integration faces public skepticism. The challenge for German foreign policy is thus to identify those issues where important interests are at stake and where it can make a real difference with the resources and instruments at hand.

Wolfgang Ischinger presented the status quo of the international order as being in a state of crisis. He named five points that have, in his opinion, contributed to this erosion. First, international crises have become increasingly unpredictable, which makes forecasting more and more difficult. For example, during the preparation of the Munich Security Conference in early 2014, no one thought the conflict in Ukraine would turn into a crisis for European security just weeks later. Second, the world faces a loss of truthfulness in that facts do not seem to matter anymore and information becomes weaponized. Third, self-confidence and trust in Western institutions are increasingly diminished with illiberal forces growing and strong tendencies to search for stability in nationalism.

Fourth, international institutions seem to become increasingly unable to solve the global challenges of our time. For instance, the UN Security Council has proven incapable of fulfilling its function to prevent and end international conflicts, such as the Korean crisis. Even informal institutions such as the G7/G20 fail to deliver results. Fifth, private actors seem to get powers they never used to have which leads to a growing loss of the monopoly of the nation state to exercise force. This is especially true in the sphere of cyber conflicts where states seem to have lost control over the spread of disinformation.

Thomas Bagger then pointed out a few characteristics of German foreign policy. After 1989, there was a sentiment in Germany that history was on a clear path towards the spread of liberal democracies and a free market economy. The country now has come to recognize that some of these assumptions were overly optimistic and that the future is fundamentally open with alternative paths and different ways to organize and exercise power.

Thus, a lot depends on the policy choices and personalities of leaders. Yet, the political center in Germany, due to the country's past, is particularly averted to strong

leaders (in contrast to, say, neighboring France). Instead, it is overly open to the international system based on the assumption that win-win-situations exist and that international cooperation is not a zero sum game (in contrast to, say, the current U.S. administration). President Trump's approach to international relations thus creates a dilemma for German foreign policy: on one hand, the latter has a strong interest in international cooperation and European integration in particular, to which it sees no alternative despite the current difficulties. On the other hand, there is strong skepticism towards a more dominant German role in foreign policy, both internationally and domestically. In a nutshell, the challenge for German foreign policy is not so much to predict the next crisis but to identify those issues where important interests are at stake and where it can make a significant contribution with the resources and instruments at hand.

The ensuing discussion raised a number of further issues. The speakers emphasized the importance of German-American relations in times of Trump, especially for trade relations. They thus agreed on the need to eventually work around the White House and to engage other departments, members of Congress, state governors, civil society and business partners. Russia, in contrast, may have scored short-term successes (such as on Ukraine), yet its foreign policy comes at high political and financial costs and may not be sustainable in the long run. From a German perspective, successful foreign policy is measured in terms of long-term relationships with neighbors and global partners, and since Russia and the EU have strong (trade) links, both sides need to look for opportunities to rebuild trust.

On EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, it was emphasized that the future of the EU is decided at the center. Thus the EU would have to fix its core first instead of taking countries in that are not yet ready. Such further European integration includes the need for the EU to speak with one voice in the world. It might fall on Germany as the biggest player to bring forward the idea of majority voting in foreign policy among the EU-27, in particular because it is hard to imagine an unacceptable foreign policy for Germany (with the exception of harsh criticism of Israel). Hence, the biggest challenge at the moment is to make Europe work better, and Franco-German cooperation can be a strong driver in this regard, if there is enough political will.

2.15 The Perfect City Block – How Do We Want To Live Together (In The Future)?

Speakers: *Dunya Bouchi*, Managing Director, ANCB The Metropolitan Laboratory – Aedes Network Campus Berlin, Berlin
Miriam Mlecek, Program Manager, ANCB The Metropolitan Laboratory – Aedes Network Campus Berlin, Berlin
Rainer Hehl, Architect and Urban Designer, Technical University Berlin, Berlin
Anna Popelka, Architect, PPAG architects ztgmbh
Anna Tautfest, Artist and Researcher, Academy of Fine Arts, Berlin

Session 15: Saturday, August 19

In what was the Summer School's first departure from geopolitical themes, the panel discussion focused on issues relating to trends in urbanization, digitalization, and changing preferences of modern and future city-dwellers. Architecture discourse is not only for city planners and professional architects. Rather, it should be viewed as a means to address political unrest, migration, environmental issues and more. These concepts can be made tangible through architecture and urban planning decisions. Indeed with cities in transformation, scarcity of resources, and rapid digitalization, prioritization of societal demands should be a critical discussion including more constituencies than only professional architects.

"The future is already here, it's just not evenly distributed," was the panel's kick-off quote from speculative fiction writer William Gibson. It challenged the group to think not of a "utopian" space but a "transtopia" – a place with many worlds in interaction. This ideal community, possessing a desirable political system while continually in a state of transformation, would keep the world open for all possible futures and address societal trends in a more complete way.

Citizens of our near-future societies will need to accept and account for unavoidable trends including urbanization (Rainer Hehl posited that 80 percent of humans will live in megacities in the coming decades), resource depletion, land allocation for ecological systems instead of human habitation and (possibly extreme) compactness. Making architectural and development decisions with these concepts in mind would ideally lead to spatial constellations that address challenges such as cultural and socio-economic segregation, effective land use, scarce resources, and degradation of the environment.

Participants also discussed the concept of "speculative fiction", which, in contrast to science fiction, decolonizes the future and deconstructs it. This creates a fracture allowing an alternative logic and reflecting back on current reality. It was deemed a useful thought-project to break with assumptions based on the current hierarchical order and to conceive of various possible futures of the urban space. Anna Tautfest used several examples of speculative production to demonstrate this thought process, including a Janelle Monae music video as a criticism of racism and gender boundaries in society, and a short film from the show Black Mirror exploring the concept of future humans using their bodies to produce energy for communal use. This discussion and film examples may prove useful to disconnect from assumptions

about architectural necessities and imagine a society from a different point of view, resulting in the possible development of alternative structures.

In a turn toward the more practical, Anna Popelka urged thoughtful development of new solutions to effectively address stark facts about urban growth, climate change, heterogeneity vis-à-vis individualization, digitalization, and mobility changes. High-density city blocks as “urban hills” with “deep houses,” possibly with a different configuration than that with which most are familiar, are one answer to these challenges. These constructs would allow for different functions on different levels (ensuring necessities are only a short distance from inhabitants) and include multi-use and shared space, interior circulation throughout, energy and food production on-site, small living spaces and large interior communal spaces. Throughout the discussion, the concept of participation and “right to the city” resurfaced several times. One role of the architect is to translate the social “sculpture,” including how people want to meet. Inclusion and segregation (self-selection) must be in balance to avoid conflict as well as a provincial-style village construct.

Following the panel discussion, the group participated in an exercise to create the perfect future city block. Participants collaborated within eight teams and used the tools of architecture students to build models including residential, commercial, leisure, social services, and nature spaces. General trends with all groups included a predilection toward green space and aesthetics, liberal distribution of social services, clean and renewable energy production, and high-tech mobility and working solutions. The exercise unleashed creativity and shone a spotlight on the Type-A nature of the Bucerius participants. The professional panelists agreed that the imaginative models addressed almost all of the challenges of the near-term future, yet they did so only through compromising the ultimate goal of creating a high-density space.

2.16 Panel Discussion: Social Media and Politics

Speakers: *Hannes Grassegger*, Economist, Zurich
Steffanie Riess, Producer, Studio Washington, ZDF Second German Public Television, Washington, D.C.
Samir Saran, Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Session 16: Monday, August 21

The panel touched upon the impact that social media has on political communication and democracy around the world today. Moreover, the panelists discussed the effects of digitalization on society, in particular how Internet echo chambers have promoted the radicalization of political views and general opinions. Finally, the speakers addressed participants' concerns towards social media regulation as well as privacy and data ownership issues.

Social media is changing the nature of political communication because it is a tool to mobilize users in new ways. However, there's nothing dramatic to what is happening in social media today: New voices are replacing old ones and new media are rendering old media obsolete. In the same way, campaigns to manipulate public opinion through false or misleading information are not new in politics. These have a long history, from fifteenth century anti-Semitism to the East German secret police's efforts to spread misinformation in Western Germany to the (bogus) claim that the Pope had declared his support for then-candidate Donald Trump.

The difference that we see today in the proliferation of fake news is less on substance but on scale: As the internet has given its users access to a world of instant information, it has also enabled the spread of disinformation on a hitherto unseen level. Both human users and computerized "bots" can dramatically amplify the power of disinformation campaigns by automating the process of preparing and delivering social media posts.

Some participants suggested that technology companies should be held to the same standards as media companies. In this regard, big social media companies like Twitter, Facebook, YouTube and others need to assume editorial responsibility for their content, going beyond policing hate speech. This would be commensurate with the political influence and impact they have, especially if they are *de facto* replacing traditional media. Complexity has been reduced to simplistic, impulsive and emotionally charged short messages that could set an abusive and combative tone and have an impact on civil discourse.

Even though social media allow mass participation, creating the illusion of direct participation, and a direct channel of communication between policy makers and the population, it can be used in ways that severely inhibits the checks and balances of democracy. People's willingness to lie and spread fake news can potentially turn these outlets into channels of miscommunication – especially if combined with the sidelining and discrediting of traditional media and journalists. Moreover, leaders such as U.S. President Trump and his unfiltered communications create real risks for the world: Should an inflammatory tweet, for example, be interpreted as a declaration of U.S. foreign policy? In any case, differences in perceptions, the spread of falsehoods, and miscommunication can have disastrous consequences on the relationship between governments and others stakeholders.

Furthermore, the discussion highlighted how digitalization is changing society and how social media is focused on profit maximization. Social media has become an integral component of the political process. Internet echo chambers, where people discuss their political views mostly with like-minded peers, have not only helped increase radical positions but also led to the normalization of deviances and the proliferation of online bullies. Yet, the fact that social media companies like Facebook and Twitter consider their platform to be self-correcting platforms is not the only reason why they refuse to get involved in the fake news debate.

Social media companies use algorithms to make users' experiences a positive one and ensure that people are receiving the content they care about. These algorithms are based on ever-evolving mathematical equations meant to increase users' time – and thus the companies' revenues from advertising – in the various applications. It is thus in their (monetary) interest to have great debates about what is true or not, without having to judge themselves. However, there are not only the algorithms that are regulating everything that users see in their social media feeds. Facebook, for example, also has an army of humans editing the application.

The discussions concluded with two major takeaways on regulatory structures and data ownership. First, self-regulation seems to be the most predominant form of regulation. Many bodies are trying to regulate the way in which some of these social media platforms operate. In the case of Facebook, this has led to having a global social media policy but also to a fragmentation at the local level as policies differ from country to country. Second, it was pointed out that the battle for privacy was lost a long time ago. Social media platforms exploit personal data of which users simply no longer have ownership.

Therefore, today's users should in fact become the owners of the data they create by using such platforms. Still, the single most important issue that remains open is data integrity: How do we ensure that we have control over who uses our data and for what purpose?

2.17 Global Finance and Trade

Speakers: *Heribert Dieter,* Senior Associate, Research Division Global Issues, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin
Moira Feil, Senior Policy Officer, Division 410, G7/G8/G20, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, Berlin
Thomas Mirow, Non Executive Director and Senior Adviser, Chairman of the Supervisory Board of HSH Nordbank AG, Hamburg
Srinath Sridharan, Member, Group Management Council, Wadhawan Global Capital Pvt Ltd, Mumbai

Session 17: Tuesday, 22 August

The session touched upon the interconnectivity and uncertainties of global finance and trade. It highlighted in particular the political unknowns, the role of the G20, and underlying technological aspects. Two core messages stood out: Global trade requires global rules, which implies that the developed world to revise its protectionist behavior. At the same time, the positive narrative of free trade should not be neglected. Indeed, the development of Eastern European countries from communist times, the rise of China, and the emerging middle class around the world are testaments to its success.

First, the political unknowns: World trade has substantially changed after the 2008 financial crisis. We currently see a number of regional efforts to accommodate such changes, e.g. trade deals in the Pacific and across the Atlantic or a desire to renew the North American trade zone NAFTA. Yet the consensus regarding the benefits of free trade has evaporated. Protectionism is the new norm, the panel stated, as the liberalization of trade has not proven successful.

Today's populism is a response to the increased pressure from global trade, the speakers further opined. What is new is that support for globalization is highest in the developing world, with declining support in the United States, France, or Germany. That is despite the impression by other countries that those economic leaders do not abide by the rules themselves, but rather write and impose them on others.

In finance, we see the same dis-harmonization as in trade: The United States no longer accepts home regulations by other countries, e.g. local rules for international banks. Instead, it imposes U.S. regulations on foreign banks. This creates counter-reactions such as restrictions by the EU towards American banks. All of this leads to a "balkanization" of finance, with increasing regulatory diversity around the globe.

In addition, many political leaders are thinking of their countries first, the panelists lamented, as could be observed especially in the United States. However, also Germany was not always seen as a constructive player either: it continues to produce a considerable current account surplus, ignorant to any side effects such as other countries having to borrow capital for their imports. Without these credits, Germany's current account surplus would not work. Another example is the European car industry, which still imposes import tariffs to cars from non-European car manufacturers.

This led the panel to demand that the developed world should revise its protectionist behavior rather than imposing rules on emerging countries. In particular the roles of the United States and Germany in global economic governance need to be dis-

cussed, but also whether China or Russia could be a substitute for a lack of U.S. leadership. In addition, weaknesses within countries need to be resolved before dealing with cross-country topics. The globalization of rules will not work without local stability.

This is where the G20 comes in. Recently, the group's role and achievements have been substantially questioned. It visibly adjusted its position and focus: whilst it had previously been against the protection of trade, it now supports a rules-based international trading system and works together with the WTO. Another new development is the G20's aim to achieve sustainable and inclusive value chains. This includes an emphasis on human rights and work standards, which previously was not the case. Sustainable development is only achievable if everyone contributes.

Rules – as incomplete as they may appear – are a tool of foreign policy, and the only alternative to the geopolitical role the G20 plays would be war, one speaker said. Against this background, it was suggested not to discard the G20, but rather make it as multilateral as possible. The world needs institutions such as the G20 to take measures that have an impact, stabilizing the global system and addressing financial inclusion as well as social aspects.

Finally, the group also addressed some underlying technological aspects: 3D printing, artificial intelligence (AI), and the Internet of things all have a huge impact on value and production chains. There is a discernable shift from the production of goods to services, and world trade is substantially changing on the back of these developments.

Innovation (e.g. AI, robotics) will also change the way we look at money. Especially crypto-currencies will lead to money moving very quickly, which calls for strict regulation and licenses becoming even more important. That is why there is a need for global rules for finance and trade, not just local ones. This will also massively impact not only entire economies but also educational systems. Lines become blurred and regulation needs to be able to deal with ambiguous, grey areas, in particular with clients who do not care about regulation. In the future, trade will need to be globally regulated and will require diversified engagement.

The discussion also acknowledged the economic history and ultimate successes that free trade has delivered: Eastern European countries are now participating in the international economy, whereas their role was negligible under Soviet rule. The rise of China and its opening up over the last two decades would not have been possible without liberalization. And the emerging global middle class is thriving on economic opportunities that only free trade can provide.

2.18 How to Respond to Injustice in Faraway Places: A Plea for Assuming More International Responsibility

Speaker: *Gerd Hankel*, Research Fellow, Hamburg Foundation for the Advancement of Science and Culture, Hamburg

Session 18: Tuesday, August 22

A recent example of a conflict ignored by the West and a trip through the work of political philosophers such as Kant, Balzac, Goethe, and Jackson, helped participants explore the origins and challenges of the sentiment of empathy for injustice in faraway places. What is today's relevance of international legal instruments seeking accountability and lasting peace? Western states have ratified all major international human rights treaties, but some of our collective actions do contribute to generating inequality and human rights violations in other states. The tension between ideals and interests was tangible during the discussion, though "not all lies are equal", as was mentioned. So even if policy inconsistencies prevail and reality always rules, the feeling of empathy for faraway places seemed to persist in all the interventions discussed.

By recounting a recent example of active conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gerd Hankel took the group to a place where the West seems not to care about flagrant abuses of human rights. Unrest in the Kasai region has been ongoing since 2016 when Kamwina Nsapu, a traditional chief, was killed after calling for a popular uprising with the aim of removing state institutions from the Kasai region. The government authorities had refused to officially recognize Nsapu's chiefdom, and he in turn accused the state of failing to lead the country towards development. His militia, the Kamwina Nsapu fighters, vowed to avenge his death. Atrocities on both sides have led to 13,000 people being killed and more than 1.5 million displaced.

The international reaction to the Kasai clashes has been weak: The news simply did not attract attention from the Western world. This leads to the question of why liberal societies should care about the situation in the Kasai region? Other examples mentioned later to support the argument were the war in Yemen and the declining international attention towards the enduring conflict in Libya.

In order to look for answers to this question, the speaker started a trip through the work of nineteenth century political philosophers, including Immanuel Kant, Honoré de Balzac, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Robert H. Jackson. The idea was to explore where the sentiment of empathy for injustice in faraway places comes from, and where the philosophical basis of international moral responsibility could be found.

The group explored concepts such as Kant's lasting 'perpetual peace'. Based on universal hospitality and the respect for human rights, Kant believes in compassion to be a prerequisite for peace. Balzac, in contrast, pictures a society dominated by moral corruption and greed. The morals are challenged through distance: Would anyone be able to kill with impunity a stranger in a faraway place in exchange for immediate enrichment? What seems like a clear response from a moral perspective becomes indifference or rejection when it relates to structural violence. Unwillingness towards bad news is established. Goethe brings philosophical morality into rules and obligations and starts questioning how to transform dignity into a legal instrument. Finally, Jackson describes the fulfillment of humanity as the aspiration to justice.

The creation of international tribunals to respond to atrocities became reality after the World Wars of the twentieth century. The world sought to establish tools to eliminate threats to international peace and security and to avoid major disturbances. Yet where are we now in relation to international legal instruments seeking global accountability and lasting peace?

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international agreement that could only be confirmed by the will of states, including those whose leaders the court might indict some day. Yet it seems that the reasons for its creation have been abandoned in favor of national sovereignty, leaving global actors such as Russia, China and the United States out of the game. The discussion highlighted the ICC's lack of capacity to address the many challenges or to bring justice to the victims of atrocities as much as its growing loss of legitimacy.

One of the most debated topics was the "inconsistencies" of Western policy. Western states have ratified all major international human rights treaties, yet it appears that some of their collective actions contribute to generate inequality and human rights violations in other states. This is considered "structural violence". One of the clearest examples of this trend is the effect of climate change on the Sahara desert, which generates unequal opportunities in that region. The notion of "dis-attachment" of the West was also discussed and illustrated through the fact that international development agencies remain inactive in some regions despite knowing what is going on the ground.

At the same time, it was accepted that multiple factors such as terrorist attacks, Brexit, and refugee and migrant flows are contributing to a widespread mistrust in Western societies. The prevailing perception is that today's world is more hostile to democratic values than it was 20 years ago. Some people fear that the West's value system may ultimately fail.

Intense debate also surrounded the role of private companies when it comes to increasing the global inequality gap and generating more structural violence without a willingness to offer redress. Are companies accountable when profiting from human right violations? And is recompense optional or should the government of origin impose it, either as monetary compensations or through criminal liability? More broadly, the lack of responsibility was also discussed with regard to Africa, e.g. what is the role of post-colonial politics in perpetuating non-functioning systems?

The debate on empathy sparked a number of dilemma questions: How can one ensure international institutions as neutral actors when they are at the same time composed by the world's biggest arms dealers? What precisely constitutes a threat to international security, and is the agenda fixed? Is amnesty always acceptable? Can models to search for peace such as ICC jurisdiction or the Colombian peace deal be duplicated? Is non-intervention always good? How can peacekeeping operations become more efficient? Do we need to change humanitarian law?

There was a general understanding of the need to increase the capacity to search for the truth and for ways to improve information flows. The tension between human ideals and a world made up of nation states is real. Yet "not all lies are equal", as one panelist said; instead, inconsistencies prevail and reality rules. Still, the feeling of empathy for faraway places seemed to persist in all the interventions discussed.

2.19 How to Foster Women Leadership?

Speakers: *Netta Ahituv*, Senior Correspondent, Haaretz, Tel Aviv
Vani Tripathi Tikoo, Actor, Former National Secretary, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), New Delhi
Katja Gloger, Editor, Der Stern, Hamburg

Session 19: Tuesday, August 22

The open-ended discussion was held in an informal environment focusing on the reasons why women find it difficult to reach high positions and included some practical tips as to how to encourage women leadership. It was clear from both empirical evidence and personal experiences of female colleagues that women are often less self-assured than men. They do not believe their experience is sufficient to put themselves forward for promotion and often feel that they do not even deserve to get a high position. This phenomenon, also called the "confidence gap," resonated with many participants. They discussed the usefulness of quotas and agreed that when implemented well, such measures can foster women leadership. They also agreed that there is no one-size-fits-all response and that culture plays a huge role in this regard. Furthermore, while it is important for women to support one another, this should not lead to the exclusion of men from this debate: A lot of the solutions require specific policy actions, and one still tends to find more men in these circles than women.

The panel kicked off with thought-provoking studies that showcase how women are more likely to underestimate their abilities than men, and how traditional gender stereotypes prevail to this day. It was noted that women still find it difficult to combine successful professional careers and family life, and how tackling this problem is only possible when men and women work together: "This fight will only be won if men are not alienated," one panelist argued.

Another panelist challenged the group to think about whether quotas could be useful. As it turned out, the experience of the group was mixed. Women might not be interested in quotas, as they want to get a job because of merit, was one response. There were also complaints from some participants that rigid measures such as quotas do not necessarily increase the efficiency of the organization and can alienate rather than include male colleagues. However, a consensus emerged that when implemented well, quotas can bring well-needed diversity as well as efficiency, thus having a positive impact on the bottom line of companies.

Others noted that women needed to be better at supporting each other: Competition between women in the workplace can be worse than any type of discrimination. Furthermore, it was brought up that the social cost of pursuing a career is often higher for women than for men. This can be due either to the widespread popularity of traditional role models or cultural and social norms that are hard to change. Participants agreed that culture change is slow and difficult; still, everyone should, whenever they see positive behavior, note it and acknowledge it publicly.

Finally, some practical tips for fostering women leadership included the following:

- Focus on education of girls from an early age, allowing different behavior patterns and encouraging their participation in sports as this builds confidence;
- Policy solutions for childcare should foster the participation of both parents in childcare;

- Introducing and using gender-neutral language is important, especially in the public domain;
- Affirmative actions such as imposing quotas can be useful and should be encouraged;
- Women should try to think more like men (at least when it comes to self-confident leadership) and men should try to think more like women;
- Mentoring is important, either as a good mentor or by becoming a mentor oneself;
- Finally, women should get used to receiving “no” as answer; if propped up by positive self-declarations, this builds confidence.

2.20 Refugee Policies and Human Rights

Speakers: *Robin Alexander*, Reporter, Die Welt, Berlin
Lotte Leicht, EU Director, Human Rights Watch, Brussels
Wolfgang Schmidt, State Secretary, Plenipotentiary of the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg to the Federation, the European Union and for Foreign Affairs, Hamburg and Berlin
Astrid Ziebarth, Senior Migration Fellow, Europe Program, The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Berlin

Session 20: Wednesday, August 23

In 2015, a wave of refugees and migrants hit EU countries leaving them with the need to manage (or not) the influx and its consequences. Since then, many questions have arisen to national governments and city authorities where people arrived as well as to their populations. The first and core question of this quite emotional topic is one of burden sharing, i.e. the redistribution of refugees and migrants among the EU states. Secondly, there is the complicated question of striking a balance between the political and humanitarian aspects of the crisis. Thirdly, the question of coherence between foreign policies and development cooperation addressing the root causes of migratory flows remains as important as the policies about migration itself.

How to share the burden of receiving refugees and migrants between the countries of entry and non-peripheral EU members is still a tension-prone topic. More profoundly, it has posed a challenge to the notion of solidarity between the EU member states, even though the numbers of arrivals have gone down.

In 2015, when a city like Hamburg expected to receive roughly 25,000 refugees but saw 65,000 arriving, it was indeed time to enter into crisis management mode: From building shelter spaces for such big groups in an already dense city to organizing the reception of refugees. This included their integration into the system with education requirements for the youngsters and professional opportunities in the labor market for the adults. Existing institutions tried to cope with the situation through faster procedures and more staff, yet as one of the panelists quoted a German politician saying at the time, “our heart is wide open but our absorption capacity is limited”.

Still, reception capacity has been even more of a burden for the countries of entry. States such as Greece and Italy that had previously and unsuccessfully called for solidarity began to question the EU member states’ will to ‘stick together’. The EU’s Dublin Regulation organizing how member states dealt with asylum applications within the EU left the countries of entry to face most of the situation alone. This has created a political divide among its members, spurring political outrage and a populist-racist turn in some countries.

With lower numbers of refugees and migrants arriving (e.g. in Hamburg they are down from around 200 to 600 per day in 2015 to 20 to 30 per day currently), the focus is now on managing the situation in a joint effort. In addition to fostering a sense of solidarity among the local population, there is the necessity to avoid nourishing anti-migrant sentiments e.g. by using fewer public spaces for shelters. Also the role of volunteers and civil society organizations has been tremendous, one speaker stressed, and should be built on.

Yet, the integration challenge remains. Refugees and asylees need to be integrated in the labor market to establish a life while waiting for their return – if such return

there will be. Most of the recent arrivals possess only informal skills that are no longer needed in many European countries. Creating job centers and trying to match existing qualification with the needs of the European labor market is key, as are social integration and, most importantly, the education of the young. Such efforts will be necessary until the refugees can make an economic contribution to the country of reception, something that usually takes around 15 years.

Beyond these immediate tasks, there is the broad need to strike a balance between the political and the humanitarian aspects of the situation. “We are not dealing with numbers but with human beings”, one panelists said, echoing Chancellor Merkel’s stance from 2015 when she said that “if we have to apologize for showing a friendly face to the needy, then this is no longer my country”. The refugee ‘crisis’ – a word that hardly applies to what has become a chronic condition of policy failure – clearly has a humanitarian accent, yet the politicians dealing with it ultimately want voters to re-elect them. These are not particularly attracted to the topic of migration, which helps to explain why policymakers ignored previous warnings about impending migration and still show little eagerness to address the issue. In that sense, it is more of a political crisis of responsibilities and election concerns than a refugee crisis.

Moreover, it is not a European crisis as such but a global one with 65 million refugees around the world and 84% of Syrian refugees *not* residing in Europe. However, it is clearly a moral crisis in Europe, a solidarity crisis within the EU and with the rest of Europe. EU policies – including the ‘deal’ with Turkey – have discouraged further waves of refugees, but it is important to understand the motives of those fleeing: They are not a ‘problem’, one speaker insisted, but human beings seeking a future, and not long ago Europeans followed the same paths.

If one accepts that the refugee question is not a crisis to be solved but rather a situation to be managed, then doing so requires coherence between foreign policies and development cooperation. In practice, this could translate in more legal and safe pathways to enter European countries, e.g. through humanitarian and family reunion visas. This would have the advantage of giving more control over migratory movements, resulting in fewer casualties and reducing the vulnerabilities to smuggling etc. Advanced resettlement systems must ensure adequate education policies to guarantee chances for higher education and therefore less vulnerability to social deviations.

Other practical suggestions discussed include:

1. Education institutions should step up more, e.g. by providing student visas;
2. Partnerships with expert institutions and the private sector should offer more opportunities such as traineeships and jobs;
3. Governments should make better use of the solid solidarity chain run by individuals and civil society organizations. These groups are already very committed, e.g. by helping with paper work, providing friendship, or facilitating sponsorship and private initiatives. Citizens of receiving cities can make a real difference by welcoming and supporting the newcomers.
4. By transforming the situation into a win-win, also the receiving communities can benefit e.g. by reinforcing public school systems for the benefit of all.
5. Finally, disseminating the success stories – and how failures could be overcome – should become part of a broader narrative, e.g. sharing inspiring stories of 72 mayors talking about what works (or not) in handling the situation as well as good experiences from private sector integration initiatives.

More generally, states were advised to be more efficient with their investment. Instead of spending millions of Euros trying to stop the flow of migrants, more efforts could be done in addressing its root causes (such as violent conflict or economic deprivation) or by investing in the resettlement of the refugees and migrants. This again brought up the question of the need – and, at the same time, the difficulty – to distinguish between those two groups. While states have an undeniable constitutional responsibility for refugees and asylum seekers, does it make sense to (try to) systematically return economic migrants (knowing that they will likely find other ways to make it back to the borders of Europe)? There is a need for more cooperation with the countries of origin and for more alignment between development cooperation, migration policies and foreign policies. The greater goal should be to stabilize and pacify the rest of the world in such an interconnected system.

With political will, everything is possible.

2.21 Cyber Security

Speakers: *Georg Mascolo*, Journalist, Hamburg
Tatiana Tropina, Senior Researcher, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, Freiburg
Ben Wagner, Associate, Research Division Global Issues, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

Session 21: Wednesday, August 23

Cyber security has become an issue of growing global importance, both due to increased global risks and the number of different stakeholders involved. Regulating the Internet is a challenge for governments that are unsure of their responsibility, while private companies are gaining more influence and consumers lack awareness. Yet countries need to come together in order to define collaboration opportunities as well as common rules and approaches for cyber security.

The first question discussed in the session was how cyber security should be defined, as a precondition to finding common ground and a mutual way forward. Is it a matter of outside attack, an infrastructure issue, or one of relationships between countries? Previously in the European Union, cyber security was mainly considered from a technical point of view. Now, it is understood as a new concept encompassing content, propaganda, and dissemination threats with a wide range of involved stakeholders. As a result, the domain – so far mainly defined as civilian – has now become more militarized. And in this military sphere of cyber security, one speaker remarked, the offensive side is ten to 15 years ahead of the defensive one.

Yet states generally do not agree on their approach to cyber security. Not only do the incentives to regulate the domain vary from stakeholder to stakeholder. Also many actors see advantages in leaving the status quo since it best serves their interests. Moreover, it is hard to understand the full extent of some measures until they are implemented. For example in South Korea, regulators required personal identification on social media with actual identities, in an attempt to counter fake profiles and trolls. This had a significant backlash when the system was hacked and the identities of approximately 85% of South Koreans were stolen.

Private actors in the cyber space already have a wide-ranging impact. Only a handful of companies have major influence over what you can say and do on the Internet. What is more, private actions are often reinforced by public actors, as the latter are not able to handle the cyber security challenges themselves. Therefore they outsource security issues to the private actors that they are supposed to regulate.

As a consequence, a large private monopoly over regulations is growing. Previously, we used to think that consumer choice would help regulate the markets through the spirit of a libertarian free market approach, prodding companies to assume responsibility. However, experience has shown that consumers do not (often) vote with their feet; instead, they want the cheapest and most functional solutions. This notion has enabled attacks on devices of the Internet of things, including directly in private homes.

On the European level there is still a need for extensive coordination of cyber security issues. Due to the EU's Network Information Security Directive, it has become mandatory for industry providers to share information with governments in case of

attack. Yet since the exact implementation of this directive has been left to the individual member countries, this has created a patchwork of different approaches and EU-wide agreement is still lacking.

On a global level, the UN is struggling with the challenge to define conventions and measures that prevent states from attacking each other in cyber space. Currently, no global body has the legal or moral ground to bring states together even to initiate the relevant discussions.

Thus, the overarching question is: if consumers do not care and companies cannot, who will then provide cyber security? Will it be governments? Regulators and lawyers need to get involved to think deeply and critically about this.

Currently, there is no particular global solution in sight even if a few collaboration projects have proven successful, such as the approach to web domain addresses. It is to be hoped that it does not take a global crisis or disaster for the different actors to come together to act. At least one thing is for sure: with Big Data, advanced algorithms, and other cyber innovations, you simply cannot get out of technology anymore. Technology is here to stay.

2.22 Digital Power and Its Discontents: Why the Politics of Data is Crucial to the Future of Democracy

Speaker: *Evgeny Morozov*, Author, Barcelona

Session 22: Wednesday, August 23

Evgeny Morozov's speech addressed the emerging power of digital data in the world. The usage of Big Data has affected politics and economics alike, and has created new issues like privacy surveillance. So it matters to examine how data is produced, who acquires it, and how it can be used. Morozov believes that digital data are mostly created from online platforms like Google and Facebook. These private companies utilize the data they collect from people to offer various products generating huge profits. However, it is not certain how exactly they use these data, and currently there is little control over data collection. This is a big topic for global governance.

Looking at the Top Ten U.S. companies by market capitalization today, half of them are from the information technology industry: Apple, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Facebook. Ten years ago, only Microsoft was on the list; the other four companies accumulated their revenue within a short period of time. Internet companies like Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu showed exactly the same performance in China.

Many people nowadays rely on the products and services provided by these companies – especially when most of them are free of charge – and the value they create has changed the society and economy. For example, Uber largely affects the existing taxi business model to make transportation service a convenient shared economy. The company is not afraid of cutting down the prices to make their product work everywhere in the world so that it can pay off its investors. Google's business model, in contrast, is to sell online advertisement, which is considered safe by investment bankers. Yet ads will reach their market limit in the near future given the popularity of products like ad blocker. So, Google has started to develop machine learning and is preparing to launch more AI products like self-driving cars.

To Morozov, it seems that nothing can stop these companies from doing anything they want because users have become "prisoners" of their products. What is more, by binding users to their products these companies are able to collect even more data from them to further analyze their lifestyle and purchasing behavior. This helps them generate investment from their shareholders to continue what they plan to do – a vicious (or virtuous) cycle, depending on one's point of view.

Beyond such changes and disruptions, cyber security is another issue that governments have so far failed to handle, Morozov asserted. In particular on the international level, there is no consensus on establishing common regulations. All that governments can do at the moment is asking companies with the ability to fix problems to take actions like building counter-hacking tools. Sometimes they even have to pay them for doing so because it is more cost-effective.

This makes private Internet companies even more powerful, as the hazards created by past actions show:

- Expanding the coverage of their already popular products makes it harder for tech start-ups to survive and innovate. Amazon charges people for its services and extends its reach to almost every aspect of consumer life.

- Some developments are particularly controversial, such as the Internet of things and Smart City infrastructure.
- Dominant industries have the possibility to exploit their supply chains and increase inequalities. Only a small proportion of the price of an Apple device pays for its manufacturing cost; most of the money goes to patents and intellectual properties.
- Finally, there is the possibility to make “killer algorithms” that can dominate people’s lifestyle and ways to interact with others. Collecting more and more data about users’ behavior patterns is exactly what Facebook does.

People might feel they have the free will to use these digital products to make their life better, Morozov warned, but there is no free lunch: The goal of private companies will still be to make money, and we do not know what their next steps will be to achieve their goals. In that sense, appropriate counter-strategies might be:

1. To slow down the process of accumulating personal data by creating an international data regime. There should be a limit to the data that digital platform companies can store. Ultimately, citizens should own their data.
2. To obtain access to the infrastructure of data currently owned and stored by digital platform companies. Civil society organizations, entrepreneurs and governments should build an alternative infrastructure hosting such data.